Key points

1. Analysis of U.S. military interventions too often avoids a full accounting of costs. This is due to neglecting the tendency of techniques of social control applied in wars to come home and damage civil liberties.

2. Because the United States government faces weaker constraints abroad than domestically, military interventions are opportunities for developing new techniques of surveilling, policing, and other methods of controlling people.

3. People involved in foreign interventions develop particular skills and physical tools while abroad, which they afterward bring home to domestic organizations.

4. The tendency of methods used in counterinsurgency campaigns to show up in domestic policing attests to this fact.

Understanding the costs of foreign intervention

Anyone familiar with the Federalist Papers and founding ideology of the United States knows that the idea that foreign wars damage liberty at home is an old one. The idea that practices used in warfare can have consequences for the domestic government is also familiar. However, the mechanisms through which government activities abroad impact domestic institutions are undertheorized. In modern political and public discourse, foreign policy and the domestic sphere are often divorced. Outside of discussions related to the monetary cost of war to U.S. taxpayers, the Military-Industrial-Congressional Complex (MICC), or the future obligations owed to veterans and their families, there is little said about the possible effects of U.S. foreign policy on the domestic populace.

Missing from these discussions are inquiries about how foreign intervention may change the scope or types of government activities conducted domestically. This omission is potentially critical, especially when discussing foreign policy and its effects. Failing to appreciate such changes leaves us with a radically incomplete picture of the benefits and costs of intervention.¹

This paper addresses the impact of foreign interventions on domestic institutions. By analyzing how military occupations impact domestic policing, it develops a broader understanding of how tools of war come home and impact domestic liberties.

Location, restraint, and crisis

When the United States intervenes abroad, policymakers intend to achieve some outcome in another society. In this context, intervention is defined broadly, referring to the use of discretionary power by government officials to interfere in another society. Intervention may refer to direct or indirect actions (e.g., traditional war, military aid, etc.). The purposes or stated goals of the intervention (e.g., regime change, humanitarian aid, etc.), are irrelevant. Regardless of the type of intervention or its purpose, intervention abroad implies the imposition and enforcement of rules intended to alter the behavior of the target group or nation so that it aligns with the preferences and goals of the United States government. Coercion, regardless of the form it takes, is in these cases necessary. If the nation or group was willing to make the changes preferred by the U.S. government voluntarily, no intervention would be necessary. But how are these rules applied and enforced? This requires the development and deployment of methods of social control.

To understand the possible domestic outcomes of foreign intervention, it is necessary to understand the relative constraints faced by the U.S. government abroad and what that implies for the development and utilization of various methods of social control (means intended to achieve or maintain order within a society). While the U.S. Constitution limits the activities of the government domestically, the same constraints do not follow the flag abroad. U.S. territories or areas that the United States intervenes in are not automatically conferred the same rights as U.S. states, nor are their inhabitants offered the same rights as U.S. citizens.² The U.S. government is in theory constrained abroad by treaties or bodies like the United Nations. In reality, however, nations like the United States can (and do) ignore these constraints and often do so with minimal consequences—a point readily acknowledged by scholars of international relations and law.³

All of this effectively weakens the constraints placed on the U.S. government when acting abroad, allowing for more flexibility when it comes to what tools are available for maintaining social control. Consequently, U.S. agents can more easily develop new means of social control and are afforded the opportunity to hone or alter existing methods.

The fact that foreign intervention necessitates social control and provides an opportunity for developing new and improved methods for achieving it does not explain how these tools come to be used domestically. To understand how this step occurs, we need to appreciate (1) the political economy of crisis and (2) the mechanisms through which tools of social control may be imported back into the United States.

Scholars have noted the importance of crises for expansions in the scale and scope of government.⁴ Regardless of their origin (manmade or natural), duration (short- or long-term), or merit (whether a threat is real or merely perceived), crises generate two effects that better allow for the importation of social control techniques developed abroad.

First, crises have a “disarming” effect, whereby citizens become more amenable to, and likely to comply with, more intensive government intervention.⁵ For example, during the COVID-19 pandemic, previously unfathomable mandates restricting the freedom of movement and limiting or prohibiting commerce were viewed by many as necessary government actions within the context of the crisis. Similarly, fears about terrorism following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, specifically about additional attacks, made civilians more receptive to restrictions and other stricter policies in relation to flying. More intensive searches of persons and property—which were previously unthinkable—became standard procedure for U.S. citizens while flying.

The second effect generated by crises is the consolidation of state power and an increase in the size of government.⁶ Responses to crises, particularly those related to war or other foreign interventions, require resources and some means of deploying them. This creates a natural tendency toward centralization, which is reinforced by a process of “bureaucratization,” whereby existing government bureaus expand, and new bureaus are created. This brings more civilian activities under the purview of the government. For example, with the launch of the “Global War on Terror,” the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) subsumed all or part of 22 distinct government agencies, from the Federal Emergency Relief Agency (FEMA) to the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC).⁷

With these conditions in place, there are two primary channels through which tools of social control employed abroad can come to be used domestically.

Channel 1: Human capital and organizational dynamics

Human capital refers to the knowledge, skills, and other characteristics that contribute to an individual’s productivity. Economists often discuss human capital in reference to labor markets, but the concept is broadly applicable. In the context of foreign intervention, specific qualities are likely to make a person operating within a foreign intervention successful. Generally speaking, interventionists are likely to possess a mix of the following qualities.⁸

1. Confidence that a foreign intervention will solve complex problems in other societies.
2. A sense of possessing preferable or “better” knowledge about the status quo and an alternative set of institutional or other arrangements.
3. Comfort with using various methods to impose desired ends on recipient populations.
4. An association of the state with order and control.

To understand why these qualities are necessary, consider how someone with the opposite qualities would fare within an agency or bureau executing U.S. foreign policy. Someone who does not associate the state with order, who feels discomfort imposing external preferences on others, does not believe he possesses superior knowledge, or who lacks confidence in the ability of a foreign state to achieve desired ends would be unlikely to (1) intervene in the first place and (2) see any meaningful career advancement.

Foreign intervention also provides incentives for operatives to engage in entrepreneurial behavior, developing new techniques and tools that they believe will help to achieve the goals of a given intervention. These will vary from intervention to intervention. One example is the development of “clean” torture techniques. These methods of torture, when performed correctly (from the perspective of the interrogator), leave no marks, making it much more difficult for others to detect the use of torture. There is a well-documented history of individuals intervening on behalf of democratic governments developing new torture methods for the purposes of generating cooperation and fear and extracting confessions. Specific examples include the development of electrotorture by modifying field telephones and variations on water torture, including waterboarding.⁹

The human capital developed during the preparation for and engagement in foreign intervention becomes part of an individual’s “toolset.” That toolset does not disappear at the conclusion of an intervention; a soldier does not forget his training because he transitions to civilian life. Indeed, those who develop skills associated with intervention and social control abroad often continue to use those same skills after returning to the domestic workforce. This occurs in both the private and public parts of the domestic defense sector.¹⁰

In addition to transferring the mentalities and skills they have acquired, individuals involved with interventions abroad similarly integrate the organizational dynamics or structures of intervention into their new ventures. One example of this is the use of clean torture techniques within the U.S. criminal justice system. In one well- documented case, members of the Chicago Police Department used electrotorture developed in Vietnam on suspects. This technique, also referred to as the “Tucker Telephone,” was likewise used for decades in Arkansas.¹¹ As for the integration of organizational structures, this can be seen in the adoption of military organizational techniques by far-right extremist groups in the United States. The Ku Klux Klan, for example, was developed by military veterans. The group’s contemporary structure is modeled directly on military hierarchies.¹²

These integrations occur in two ways. First, those who have developed skills in these areas may be more likely to move into positions of authority within an organization. A well-known example of this phenomenon is the “revolving door,” the movement of people between the military and private defense firms or consultancies.¹³ Some 80 percent of retired four-star generals later took work in the arms sector, including positions on multiple company boards. The rationale behind defense contractors seeking these individuals, with their experience and knowledge of defense processes, is clear: “[E]mploying well-connected ex-military officers can give weapons makers enormous, unwarranted influence.”¹⁴ Second, those who have developed, deployed, and learned new and improved methods of social control may benefit from higher wages or promotions by acting entrepreneurially, suggesting that the integration of these tools and techniques into domestic organizations can have career benefits. A particularly clear example of this dynamic involves the integration of military members into extremist groups. It is well documented that individuals with military experience are more likely to occupy positions of authority and leadership in these groups than their non-veteran counterparts.¹⁵

Channel 2: Physical capital

In addition to developing particular human capital, foreign interventions also necessitate the development of new and improved physical tools for implementing and maintaining social control. The reason for these developments is straightforward. New physical tools, such as unmanned aerial vehicles or new surveillance techniques, can lower the cost of government attempts to bring the behaviors of a recipient population in line with the government’s preferences. For example, the ability to engage in surveillance using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or track phones makes it easier for governments to monitoring populations abroad than it otherwise would be.

The reason for the transfer and integration of these tools into the domestic space is similarly straightforward. There is a significant complementarity between physical capital and human capital. Those who develop the human capital associated with foreign intervention typically also develop and use new and enhanced physical capital. Having knowledge of and being comfortable with using these tools, these individuals are likely to suggest their use domestically. Moreover, they are likely to recognize when the deployment of these tools may effectively serve the purposes and goals of their domestic organizations. In turn, this leads to better employment and other outcomes for these individuals, thus reinforcing the dynamics discussed in the preceding section. This dynamic is captured clearly by the late Gen. David M. Shoup. Discussing the period following World War II, he noted, “military leaders from the war years filled many top positions...Military minds offered the benefits of firm views and problem-solving experience to the management of the nation’s affairs. Military procedures including... the organizational and operational techniques...spread throughout American culture.”¹⁶

Illustrations from domestic policing

Examples of the domestic integration of tools developed for foreign intervention are plentiful, but some are particularly easy to observe. Perhaps not surprisingly, in many instances the tools of foreign intervention have been integrated into domestic law enforcement. Both of the aforementioned channels are relevant. Many police departments make it a point to hire military veterans (see, for, example “military to law enforcement” or “M-2-LE” programs, the U.S. Department of Justice’s “Vets to Cops” program, and the offering of “Equivalency of Training” (EOT) to Armed Forces veterans). This trend is far from new.¹⁷

Though veterans make up just 6 percent of the population, 19 percent of police officers are military veterans.¹⁸ It is not difficult to see why this would be a popular career path after military service. Police officers must work as a team, be comfortable with danger and ambiguity, make quick decisions under pressure, and be familiar with firearms—elements that are common to both careers. Both groups, police and military, are tasked with enforcing rules, but in different contexts.

The integration of former military members into police departments is a clear example of how human and physical capital developed for foreign intervention, as well as associated organizational dynamics, can be integrated into domestic institutions. A few more examples are illustrative of this process.

The Philippines and the strcture of police departments

First, consider the impact of the U.S. war in the Philippines on contemporary policing. Following the war and during the subsequent U.S. occupation of the Philippines in the late 1800s and early 1900s, the U.S. military established the Philippine Constabulary (PC) as a means of keeping and enforcing order among a largely uncooperative Philippine population. Members of the Constabulary—comprised of members of the U.S. military— developed a variety of tools of social control to quell an intensive resistance that followed the United States’ annexation of the islands.¹⁹ The PC developed or altered patrol and surveillance techniques to better carry out U.S. foreign policy goals.

After their service in the PC had concluded, many members returned home to the United States and joined local police departments. Leveraging their unique human capital, these men often found themselves in positions of authority within their respective departments. In these positions, they not only worked to integrate what they had learned abroad but also transformed departments using the organizational dynamics of the Philippine Constabulary.

For example, two PC veterans, Sergeant Jesse Garwood and Superintendent John C. Groome, created the Pennsylvania Constabulary (PAC). Modeled after the PC, the PAC integrated tactics developed during the U.S. occupation of the Philippines, namely a “platoon system” whereby Pennsylvania police (like their PC counterparts in the Philippines) patrolled certain areas at particular times in an effort to maintain complete geographic coverage.²⁰ Other PC veterans set up similar operations across the United States, integrating other tactics they had learned during their time abroad.²¹ In West Virginia, for example, Lieutenant Colonel Larry Bandholtz “used psychological methods developed during his years of combatting Filipino rebels to quash a militant miners’ revolt.”²²

Perhaps the best example of this dynamic, however, is the life of August Vollmer, “the father of modern policing.”²³ A PC veteran, Vollmer joined the Berkeley Police Department upon his return. He later held positions as the Berkeley Police Chief and the Chief of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD). He also became the president of the International Association of Police Chiefs and served as a consultant for departments across the United States, including those in Chicago, Dallas, and Kansas City.

Vollmer actively worked to have his departments and those with which he consulted integrate military tools and tactics. He implemented surveillance and other techniques that had been developed to quash the resistance in the Philippines, including pushing for bike patrols as opposed to foot patrols, equipping officers with firearms, and integrating radios into patrols.²⁴ He was explicit in his desire to have police departments operate like the military. According to one biographer, Vollmer “frequently referred to his Army experience when discussing the strategy of police operations.”²⁵ Vollmer was an early adopter of military technologies domestically: he equipped officers with radios as early as 1919.²⁶ Explaining why he adopted these approaches, Vollmer pointed to his military experience: “For years, ever since the Spanish-American War days, I’ve studied military tactics and used them to good effect in rounding up crooks...After all we’re conducting a war, a war against the enemies of society.”²⁷

The changes to policing after the U.S. occupation of the Philippines highlight how human capital and physical capital are integrated into domestic institutions. It shows how the organizational dynamics of domestic institutions can be changed when they are influenced by veterans of foreign interventions. The role of Vollmer and his influence on integrating military structures and tactics in U.S. police departments cannot be overstated. As one biographer has noted, “Vollmer has assisted personally in the reorganization of the operating methods of scores of police departments, and through correspondence he has assisted hundreds of others.”²⁸ Another biographer acknowledges the effects even more pointedly, stressing how modern discussions about police militarization have a direct connection to the structures and attitudes implemented by Vollmer: “Vollmer refashioned American police into an American military.”²⁹

Vietnam and the implementation of the SWAT

Another example of these dynamics in domestic law enforcement is the creation of Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams. SWAT teams were first used in the United States in the mid-1960s, but their origin can be traced to Vietnam and a man named John Nelson.

Nelson was part of an elite Marine Force Reconnaissance Unit. Highly trained and seeing frequent close enemy engagement, men in these units were trained to surveil, engage, and eliminate the enemy. After returning from Vietnam, Nelson joined the LAPD where he put his experience to work. Race riots and general unrest relating to civil rights had left many police departments, including the LAPD, feeling unprepared to control crowds.

Here too there was ultimately an integration of the tools and organizational structures developed abroad. Nelson suggested to his superior, Inspector Darryl Gates (a World War II veteran who would later become chief of the LAPD), that the LAPD develop a unit modeled after the Force Recon units in Vietnam. The idea was that “A small squad of highly trained police officers armed with special weapons ... would be more effective in a riotous situation than a massive police response.”³⁰ His idea was quickly adopted. The new unit was structured in the manner Nelson had suggested and, illustrating the further integration of military human capital into the department, each member of the original 60-person SWAT team, by design, had prior military experience.³¹ The unit was first deployed amidst the “long, hot summer” of racial protests in 1967.³² In 1969, the SWAT unit was deployed to serve a warrant against the Black Panthers. By 1971, the SWAT team became a permanent fixture of the LAPD, referred to as “D platoon,” though it would not be known to the public until 1974.³³

The case of SWAT demonstrates multiple links to the dynamics of human and physical capital discussed above. With the new unit in place and seeing deployments, Gates sought next to integrate further military structures, tactics, and physical tools into the teams and the department as a whole. In his autobiography, Gates stated that “We looked at military training ... They [the Marines] shared with us their knowledge of counter-insurgency ... John Nelson became our specialist in guerilla warfare ... [W]e attended several marine sessions on guerilla warfare ... [and] brought in military people to teach [the SWAT unit].”³⁴

The case of SWAT also shows how this organizational structure, developed initially for use in foreign wars, became a mainstay in most domestic police departments in the United States. From 1971, the time the first unit was established, to 1995, the number of units increased dramatically. By 1982, about 59 percent of police departments serving populations of 50,000 or more had SWAT units. By 1990, this number had climbed to 78 percent, and it reached 89 percent by 1995.³⁵ The military origins and structure are widely acknowledged, with some SWAT teams being referred to as “police paramilitary units” or PPUs.

Physical capital in the War on Terror

Another contemporary example of how the tools of foreign intervention have been used in policing involves the transfer of military weapons and other items to state and local police departments.

There are several programs through which the Department of Defense (DOD) may sell or transfer equipment to domestic entities, but the most well-known of these is the 1033 program.³⁶ Initially created to help domestic law enforcement combat drugs, this program has seen a marked expansion since the beginning of the War on Terror. It is estimated that the DOD has transferred approximately $1.6 billion in equipment to law enforcement agencies between 2001 and 2020.³⁷ The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) reported that, as of June 2020, some 8,200 law enforcement agencies from 49 states and 4 U.S. territories have participated in the program.³⁸

The items that have been transferred would be familiar to those who have participated in the War on Terror. Researchers at Brown University found that the DOD began transferring unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or “drones” to domestic police departments beginning in 2005 and noted that “[t]he U.S. military has relied heavily on unmanned vehicles after 9/11.”³⁹ The same work records over 1,000 transfers of robotic items from January 2001 to June 2020.

These transfers make sense in light of the dynamics referenced above. Tools like UAVs have been developed in an attempt to make interventions abroad easier. These same tools, having been deployed effectively in this context, are then integrated domestically by those individuals accustomed to using them (see the above discussions about veteran status and employment as law enforcement officers). Unsurprisingly, UAVs have been used extensively by SWAT teams. Even some police departments have adopted, like their military counterparts, UAV units.⁴⁰ This is yet another example of how the organizational structures developed for use in foreign interventions can come to be used within the domestic sphere.

The proliferation of military-born SWAT units and the introduction and expansion of military equipment to domestic law enforcement agencies is not without consequences. Historically, police and military have maintained two separate functions. Police are intended to be domestic peacekeepers. They are tasked with upholding the rights of citizens and are expected to use force only as a last resort. This stands in stark contrast to the intended function of the U.S. armed forces, who are trained to use deadly force against foreign enemies. The integration of military tools and tactics blurs this distinction. The phenomenon of “militarized police,” which has received significant attention in recent years, is undoubtedly linked to U.S. interventions abroad.⁴¹

Updating our accounting

The integration of human and physical capital and organizational dynamics of foreign intervention into domestic institutions is neither intrinsically “good” nor “bad.” In theory, the integration of tools and tactics of war into various domestic arms of government could enhance the ability of government agencies at all levels to provide defense and security to U.S. citizens and perhaps allow for more efficient provision of goods and services by private actors.

However, these same tools may also be used against citizens and change domestic institutions in ways that undermine critical liberties—a phenomenon that is well documented. For example, while SWAT teams may be helpful in crowd control and other high-risk situations, there is ample evidence that SWAT teams are often deployed inappropriately and undeniably produce serious negative consequences. Thousands of cases of property destruction, serious bodily injury to suspects, civilians, and officers have been reported, as have the deaths of non-violent suspects and innocent civilians.⁴² Similarly, multiple studies have found that law enforcement agencies receiving significant amounts of DOD transfers are more likely to demonstrate characteristics of militarization and use more lethal force.⁴³ The Government Accountability Office (GAO) found multiple problems with the DLA’s running of the 1033 program, including unauthorized parties obtaining controlled items like Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAPs) and aircrafts.⁴⁴

The institutional and other contextual differences between where these tools were first used and where they are used currently are undeniably important. As noted above, domestic police and the military have historically been deliberately separated, owing to the two very different functions these groups are intended to serve. The integration of military tools, structures, and procedures into domestic law enforcement may have serious consequences. In addition to the botched execution of SWAT raids referenced above, others have found that police agencies using military equipment are more likely to display violence toward and even kill civilians than their counterparts.⁴⁵ Others report similar findings and suggest that militarization erodes trust in police and reduces officer safety.⁴⁶ Still others have reported that these tools are used disproportionately against minority groups within the United States.⁴⁷

These examples of how the tools of foreign intervention are used in domestic policing are far from the only examples. There are similar dynamics present in discussions of domestic surveillance by police and other federal agencies.⁴⁸ The contemporary use of UAVs by domestic police and immigration and border patrol can similarly trace its origins to foreign intervention, specifically the War on Terror.⁴⁹

It is important to note that these domestic institutional changes are often long and variable. It is difficult, if not impossible, ex-ante, to determine when and how the tools of intervention are likely to be integrated. Nevertheless, the changes to domestic institutions resulting from foreign intervention are a cost that, while not revealed in a conflict’s monetary costs, are nonetheless necessary to consider when discussing interventions abroad. Considering the 170 “notable deployments” since 9/11, it is likely that we will continue to see important domestic changes from these policies well into the future.

Endnotes

¹ For discussions of the importance and reason for this neglect, see Robert Higg, Crisis and Leviathan: Critical Episodes in the Growth of American Government (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1987), 57–74. See also, Christopher J. Coyne and Abigail R. Hall, Tyranny Comes Home: The Domestic Fate of U.S. Militarism (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2018), 12–17.

² See the Insular Cases, specifically Downes v. Bidwell (1901) in which the United States Supreme Court ruled that, despite being an acquired territory of the United States, Puerto Rico was not afforded the same rights as a U.S. state and that Congress has the authority to decide when and where to apply full constitutional rights to territories. This had the effect of giving Congress an array of options with respect to what rights to grant territories.

³ It is relevant to note that the desirability of constraints upon U.S. interventions abroad is fundamentally irrelevant to the discussion of how tools of intervention come to be used domestically and the consequences of said integration. What is important is that the U.S. government is relatively less constrained when intervening abroad.

⁴ While a crisis is not the only setting in which government growth occurs, it is relevant for the discussion of the importation of tools of social control. See Higgs, Crisis and Leviathan, for a detailed discussion of the role of crisis in the growth of government. See also Coyne and Hall, Tyranny Comes Home, 21–24.

⁵ See Higgs, Crisis and Leviathan. See also Robert Higgs, “The Political Economy of Crisis Opportunism,” Mercatus Center, October 2009, https://www.mercatus.org/research/policy-briefs/political-economy-crisis-opportunism.

⁶ See Higgs, Crisis and Leviathan, and Higgs, “The Political Economy of Crisis Opportunism.”

⁷ See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Who Joined DHS,” https://www.dhs.gov/who-joined-dhs.

⁸ For a more detailed discussion, see Coyne and Hall, Tyranny Comes Home, 30–35. See also Christopher J. Coyne and Abigail R. Hall, “Empire State of Mind: The Illiberal Foundations of Liberal Hegemony,” Independent Review 21, no. 2 (Fall 2016): 237–250.

⁹ “Pumping” refers to torture methods that force large quantities of water into the body. For a comprehensive overview of the development of these and other techniques, and an analysis of torture conducted by democratic governments, see Darius Rejali, Torture and Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).

¹⁰ Individuals may also transfer these skills to other, non-defense organizations. For example, similar dynamics have been observed between foreign intervention and far-right extremist groups. See Abigail R. Hall, Jerod T. Hassell, and Chivon H. Fitch, “Militarized Extremism: The Radical Right and War on Terror,” Independent Review 26, no. 2 (Fall 2021): 225–242.

¹¹ See John Conroy, “House of Screams,” Chicago Reader, January 26, 1990, https://chicagoreader.com/news-politics/house-of-screams/. See also G. Flint Taylor, “U.S. Torture: A Sordid History of Official and Systematic Abuse,” Prison Legal News, March 15, 2003, https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2003/mar/15/us-torture-a-sordid-history-of-official-and-systematic-abuse/.

¹² Hall, Hassell, and Fitch, “Militarized Extremism.”

¹³ Mandy Smithberger, “Brass Parachutes: The Problem of the Pentagon Revolving Door,” Project on Government Oversight, November 5, 2018, https://www.pogo.org/reports/brass-parachutes.

¹⁴ William Hartung and Dillon Fisher, “When 80 Percent of US Generals Go To Work for Arms Markers,” Responsible Statecraft, October 5, 2023, https://responsiblestatecraft.org/pentagon-revolving-door/.

¹⁵ Federal Bureau of Investigation, White Supremacist Recruitment of Military Personnel Since 9/11, (Washington, DC: Federal Bureau of Investigation, July 7, 2008), https://documents.law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/FBI_WHITE_SUPREMACY-2008-ocr.pdf.

¹⁶ Quoted in Godfrey Hodgson, The Colonel: The Life and Wars of Henry Stimson 1867-1950 (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990), 384–385.

¹⁷ See the U.S. Department of Justice, “Vets to Cops,” https://cops.usdoj.gov/vetstocops.

¹⁸ Simone Weichselbaum, Beth Schwartzapfel, and Tom Meagher, “When Warriors Put on the Badge,” Marshall Project, March 30, 2017, https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/03/30/when-warriors-put-on-the-badge.

¹⁹ For specific examples of these tools and techniques, see Coyne and Hall, Tyranny Comes Home, 71–95; 96–119; 138–170.

²⁰ Coyne and Hall, Tyranny Comes Home, 103.

²¹ Issues with historical record keeping mean we do not know the outcomes for everyone who was involved in the PC or their employment record post-war. The fact that we have clear documentation of at least four people is revealing.

²² Alfred W. McCoy, Policing America’s Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), 316.

²³ For a comprehensive overview of Vollmer’s life and work see Willard M. Oliver, August Vollmer: The Father of Modern Policing (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2017).

²⁴ Gene Dunn, “Meet August Vollmer, The Man Who Militarized American Police.” All That’s Interesting, September 30, 2017, https://allthatsinteresting.com/august-vollmer.

²⁵ Gene Carte, “August Vollmer and the Origins of Police Professionalism,” (PhD diss., University of California and Berkeley, October 1972), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/68880NCJRS.pdf.

²⁶ O.W. Wilson, “August Vollmer,” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 44, no. 1 (1953): 91–103.

²⁷ Quoted in Jill Lepore, “The Invention of the Police,” New Yorker, July 13, 2020, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/07/20/the-invention-of-the-police.

²⁸ Wilson, “August Vollmer.”

²⁹ Lepore, “The Invention of the Police.”

³⁰ Coyne and Hall, Tyranny Comes Home, 106.

³¹ Coyne and Hall, Tyranny Comes Home, 107.

³² For a comprehensive overview, see Malcolm McLaughlin, The Long, Hot Summer of 1967: Urban Rebellion in America (New York, NY: Springer, 2014).

³³ Paul Clinton, “Daryl Gates and the Origins of LAPD SWAT,” Police Magazine, April 15, 2014, https://www.policemag.com/blogs/swat/blog/15318243/daryl-gates-and-the-origins-of-lapd-swat.

³⁴ Coyne and Hall, Tyranny Comes Home, 107.

³⁵ Peter B. Kraska and Victor E. Kappeler, “Militarizing American Police: The Rise and Normalization of Paramilitary Units,” Social Problems 44, no. 1 (February 1997): 1–18.

³⁶ The program initially began in 1990 as the 1208 Program.

³⁷ See Jessica Katzenstein, “The Wars Are Here: How the United States’ Post-9/11 Wars Helped Militarize U.S. Police,” Costs of War Project, Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, September 16, 2020, https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2020/Police%20Militarization_Costs%20of%20War_Sept%2016%202020.pdf.

³⁸ Defense Logistics Agency, “1033 Program FAQs,” https://www.dla.mil/Disposition-Services/Offers/Law-Enforcement/Program-FAQs/.

³⁹ Katzenstein, “The Wars Are Here.”

⁴⁰ For example, Frisco Police Department, Report For the Use of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, (Frisco, TX: Frisco Police Department, 2023), https://www.friscotexas.gov/1708/UAV-Unit; Eugene Police Department, Policy 908, (Eugene, OR: Eugene Police Department, April 4, 2019), https://www.eugene-or.gov/ArchiveCenter/ViewFile/Item/5188); New York City Police Department, “NYPD Unveils New Unmanned Aircraft System Program,” December 4, 2018, https://www.nyc.gov/site/nypd/news/p1204a/nypd-new-unmanned-aircraft-system-program#/0.

⁴¹ Coyne and Hall, Tyranny Comes Home; See also Hall and Coyne, “The Militarization of U.S. Domestic Policing.”

⁴² See Radley Balko and Joel Berger, “Wrong Door,” Cato Institute, September 2, 2006, https://www.cato.org/commentary/wrong-door. See also Radley Balko, “Overkill: The Rise of Paramilitary Police Raids in America.” Cato Institute, July 17, 2006, https://www.cato.org/white-paper/overkill-rise-paramilitary-police-raids-america#.

⁴³ See Casey Delehanty et al., “Militarization and Police Violence: The Case of the 1033 Program,” Research and Politics (April-June 2017): 1–7. See also Edward Lawson Jr., “TRENDS: Police Militarization and the Use of Lethal Force,” Political Research Quarterly 72, no. 1 (March 2019): 177–189.

⁴⁴ U.S. Government Accountability Office, DOD Excess Property: Enhanced Controls Needed for Access to Excess Controlled Property, (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, July 2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-17-532.pdf.

⁴⁵ See Delehanty et al., “Militarization and Police Violence.”

⁴⁶ Federico Masera, “Police Safety, Killings by Police, and the Militarization of US Law Enforcement,” Journal of Urban Economics 124, (July 2021). See also Radley Balko, Rise of the Warrior Cop: The Militarization of America’s Police Forces (New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2013).

⁴⁷ See Jonathan Mummolo, “Militarization Fails to Enhance Police Safety or Reduce Crime but May Harm Police Reputation,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 115, no. 37 (September 11, 2018). See also, Edward E. Lawson, “Causes and Consequences of Police Militarization” (PhD diss., University of South Carolina, 2019), https://www.proquest.com/docview/2275992478?pq-origsite=gscholar&fromopenview=true; Ashley K. Farmer, Cara E. Rave-Hemp, and Jeruel Taylor, “Police Militarization: Implications for Communities of Color,” in Political Authority, Social Control, and Public Policy, eds. Cara E. Rave-Hemp and Nancy S. Lind Bingley (Bingley, UK: Emerald Publishing, 2019).

⁴⁸ Coyne and Hall, Tyranny Comes Home, 120–137.

⁴⁹ See Christopher J. Coyne and Nathan P. Goodman, “U.S. Border Militarization and Foreign Policy: A Symbiotic Relationship,” Economics of Peace and Security Journal 17, no. 1 (2022): 5–16.