The second installment in DEFP's series on topics in grand strategy is on the concept of the "balance of power"—both the distribution of power among states or an approximate equilibrium of power between states. When a state or bloc become powerful enough to threaten to dominate its region, other states tend to pool resources and form alliances in order to “balance” against the threat. Restrainers believe that Washington can and should encourage its allies to directly counter threats in their own regions, rather than maintain their status as dependents that outsource their security to an increasingly overstretched United States. This would not only be a more resilient and stable condition in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East, it would also help preserve the United States' power position.

Grand strategy is a state’s theory about how to provide for its own security. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States’ grand strategy shifted from one of maintenance of the balance of power in Eurasia to a militaristic and primacist idea of "liberal hegemony." This has proven to be a costly and bloody failure, and has left the United States strategically overextended. The United States should shift to a grand strategy of restraint, which will better preserve its power, minimize the risk of war, and turn over to its allies the responsibility for their own defense.

Missing from foreign policy discussions at large are inquiries about how foreign intervention may change the scope or types of government activities conducted domestically. People involved in foreign interventions develop skills abroad which they afterward bring home to domestic organizations, such as local police departments. A full accounting of the costs of foreign interventions must recognize that government activism abroad runs the risk of undermining domestic freedoms.

The war between Israel and Hamas has increased the threat to U.S. troops in the Middle East, particularly to the 3,400 personnel in Iraq and Syria. But there is no good reason for U.S. forces to be there. The U.S. presence needlessly risks war by allowing Iran and militias it funds to threaten U.S. troops. ISIS’s capabilities have been degraded, capable local actors eagerly hunt the groups’ remnants, and the United States can still strike from a long distance if necessary. U.S. forces should be withdrawn from Iraq and Syria as part of a broader effort to deprioritize the Middle East and avoid an ill-advised conflict with Iran.

The balance of power in East Asia has shifted in China's favor, but it does not follow that China constitutes a major threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of all neighboring states. As DEFP Non-Resident Fellow Peter Harris argues in a new explainer, upholding peace and stability in East Asia does not require U.S. military primacy. U.S. efforts to dominate the region could backfire by intensifying the U.S.-China rivalry and plunging East Asia into a new cold war. A more sensible approach would be to move toward an offshore balancing posture that incentivizes capable regional states to provide for their own defense and deter Chinese aggression.

Washington’s current Syria policy is failing and misguided, and it should be abandoned for one consistent with U.S. interests. The approximately 900 U.S. military forces in northeastern Syria lack a justifying rationale given the last ISIS-held territory was liberated in March 2019, more than four years ago—continued occupation with so few forces, and without a vital U.S. security goal, runs needless risks with imperceptible potential gains. U.S. forces are vulnerable to local militias with local aims that could otherwise not reach them. Existing sanctions punish regular Syrians in service of unrealistic, unnecessary regime-change goals. Syria is a strategically unimportant country that poses no direct threat to the United States nor its limited and diminishing interests in the Middle East. With higher priorities at home and in Asia, the U.S. should recalibrate sanctions and end its open-ended presence in Syria.

The recent coup in Niger—home to over 1,000 U.S. forces—shed light on one of the many counterterrorism missions the United States is waging across Africa with little scrutiny or oversight.

In a new explainer, Visiting Fellow C. William Walldorf Jr. explains why and how U.S. counterterrorism policy in Africa needs to change. U.S. policy there has been not just disappointing but counterproductive, exacerbating the problem of Islamic terrorism. As terrorists continue to operate in Africa and local U.S. partners become less popular the dangers of mission creep have risen. U.S. forces across the continent are applying too much force against too little of a threat, and U.S. security assistance has failed to address the issues that breed terrorism in the first place. Indeed, in many cases, local partners have used U.S. training and aid to launch coups, commit human rights abuses against their own people, and shore up corrupt governments.

U.S. interests would be better served if U.S. forces were withdrawn from Africa and security assistance to local partners was curbed. Rather than perpetuate a failed policy, Washington needs to end these decades-long missions and revise its assessment of the threat posed by Islamic terrorism.

Even as the war with Russia continues, Ukraine is demanding NATO membership, or at least a path to it, and some lesser security guarantees in the interim. The United States should say no, closing the door to committing to fight a future war for Ukraine. The benefits of fighting for Ukraine are lacking—Ukraine is neither a prize that Russia can use to rebuild its Soviet empire nor an example that will destabilize global politics. The risks of fighting for Ukraine meanwhile are severe—entailing a real prospect of nuclear war and mass destruction. Because of these risks, the United States has not and will not directly fight Russia on behalf of Ukraine. That means U.S. commitments to militarily defend Ukraine, even through NATO, will not be credible; they will be an obvious bluff. Such false promises will not only leave Ukraine exposed to Russia, they will increase its peril, by preserving a cause of war and encouraging Ukraine to make poor choices based on the false hope of western protection. Armed neutrality, where the United States and its allies continue to arm Ukraine to deter future Russia aggression is a safer and more credible alternative.

Is nuclear deterrence eroding? Recent developments in international affairs and military technology lead some analysts to conclude the nuclear revolution, which purportedly prevents war between nuclear powers, no longer has much effect. They say the world is getting safer for nuclear war or conventional war beneath the nuclear umbrella, which makes it likely that states, starting with China, will test U.S. commitments to fight for their allies. This paper argues these conclusions are wrong. Using recent cases that some claim are evidence of deterrence failure—Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the 2017 “fire and fury” crisis between the United States and North Korea—it demonstrates that nuclear deterrence remains robust.

Understanding the underlying causes and conditions that led to the Russo-Ukrainian war may help resolve the conflict and avoid future crises. Dominant narratives, which blame the pathologies of the Russian government and its opposition to Ukraine’s democratic efforts, fail to adequately account for what led to the invasion. Instead, realist theories of international relations consider Russia’s security concerns and warnings, highlight the problems posed by post-Cold War NATO expansion, and accurately predicted a conflict between the neighboring countries. This paper compares the realist and liberal explanations for the war’s outbreak and argues U.S. policy should give greater consideration to realist views going forward.

It needs to be acknowledged that U.S. contributions to NATO could be scaled back in the face of contending domestic priorities or competing demands for military resources in Asia. In either event, Europe would need to take up the primary burden for its defense. Realistic discussions of what that could look like in practice are therefore prudent. A serious effort to enhance European defensive autonomy would open the door to a range of issues—including the need for increased European defense spending, difficult questions of command arrangements, and complex issues related to nuclear-sharing and deterrence. None of these matters present easy answers, but what follows is an exploration of issues that would need to be addressed to make greater European defensive autonomy a reality.

U.S. leaders often express the fear that leaving the Middle East or removing U.S. forces from warzones there and in other parts of the world will leave “vacuums,” which adversaries will fill. This fear misunderstands international politics. Vacuum fears imagine a precarious global balance of power where minor gains by U.S. adversaries create grave dangers, but in reality, the U.S. is quite secure and does not need to worry about its adversaries potentially making minor gains by rushing into U.S.-made vacuums.

NATO was founded to deter a Soviet attack on Western Europe. However, U.S. military presence in Europe today lacks a clear mission beyond sustaining U.S. dominance in Europe. Washington has frequently talked about the need for burden sharing with its European allies, but a more far-reaching approach of burden shifting is needed. The explainer presents recommendations for how to implement burden shifting and explains how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has made burden shifting even more prudent.

The ongoing Russo-Ukraine war is analogous to a hypothetical war between China and Taiwan. Taiwan cannot assume the United States will fight on its behalf and should invest in anti-access, area-denial weaponry. While Taiwan can expect global support if attacked, challenges exist for aid to be delivered and employed. Sanctions against China are unlikely to deter them if they choose to invade Taiwan. Taiwan should learn applicable lessons from the war in Ukraine and use them to secure their continued safety and prosperity.

The United States is obligated by treaty to defend 51 countries with military force. Beyond its formal allies, the United States also has several quasi-allies, or states the U.S. is not explicitly committed to defend but to which it provides substantial amounts of military and political support. While many experts assume more allies means the United States is more secure, quasi-allies present clear dangers for U.S. interests. The United States should be wary of the risks quasi-allies pose and avoid loose talk and policy that may commit it to a quasi-ally’s defense.

Many experts have expressed fears that China could either stage a hostile takeover of Taiwan’s semiconductor chip-manufacturing capacity or effect a critical disruption of chip supplies as a secondary consequence of a blockade or protracted invasion of the island. Some have therefore argued that these “nightmare scenarios” provide additional reasons for the United States to defend Taiwan. Neither of these scenarios, however, justify an explicit commitment to defend Taiwan or the risk of a great power war with China.

Great powers routinely stake out geographic zones within which they limit the autonomy of weaker states. The prominence of these spheres of influence depends largely on the distribution of power in the international system. During the post-Cold War moment of unipolarity, the U.S. alone was able to assert a sphere of influence. However, with the increase in great power competition, the relevant question now is not if the transition to a world of multiple spheres of influence will take place (given the structural changes at the level of international order, it most certainly will), but how the U.S. should manage this development in ways that are conducive to U.S. interests.

A careful reading of the Greek Thucydides’ The History of the Peloponnesian War suggests that a U.S.-China war is hardly inevitable. Such a war is a choice, not a trap—and selecting the appropriate U.S. grand strategy is the way to avoid it. Despite China’s rise, the United States and its regional allies are in a strong position to maintain a regional balance of power that keeps a peace and serve U.S. interests in Asia.

Melting ice is poised to make the Arctic more accessible for commercial and military activity. But neither that shift nor competition with Russia and China elsewhere translate into a threat to the United States in the Arctic. Washington should base U.S.-Arctic policy on the reality that the United States enjoys a strong conventional and nuclear deterrent, a robust network of Arctic allies, and favorable geography. With this in mind, the United States should avoid mistaking the Arctic for a new arena for military competition.

Over the past several decades, U.S. foreign policy has increasingly become devoted to democratizing the world, by force if necessary. Recent rhetoric about a global struggle between autocracy and democracy is a reflection of this. The United States should return to its founding ethos where its foreign policy tries to make the world safe for self-determination, and hence democracy, rather than trying to democratize the world. This will again make the U.S. an advocate of peace and stability, rather than a revolutionary power that promotes instability. It will also improve U.S. security.

Admitting Finland into NATO constitutes a permanent defense commitment by the alliance. In the case of the United States, it also entails a further extension of its nuclear umbrella. Such moves warrant a fulsome public debate, not a rush to action. U.S. forces cannot be everywhere at once. New, permanent security commitments in northern Europe should be examined relative to other U.S. global priorities and take into account Finland’s defensibility—not just now, but in the face of a revitalized, long-term Russian threat.

In the opening rounds of the war, Russian armed forces made major errors in both the operational and tactical realm. In recent weeks though, Russia has made slow, methodical progress on the northern shoulder of Donbas. If Russia defeats Ukraine in the Battle of Donbas, Kyiv will face a difficult choice: (1) dig in and continue fighting, even though much of its most effective forces will have been captured or killed or (2) negotiate with Russia to trade territory lost since 2014 to stanch further losses of Ukrainian lives and territory.

The Ukraine war will provide a fillip to U.S. activism, as the Europeans seek inexpensive security insurance from the United States and U.S. policymakers succumb to the temptations of invitational hegemony, if only confined to certain regions. At the same time, the notion of a U.S.-led, rules-based, liberal world order is looking pretty threadbare. That intellectual construct was founded on a unipolar structure of power that no longer exists. Instead, we see the reemergence of the U.S.-led Cold War coalition.

The United States has an interest in avoiding a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, but America’s overriding concern is to avoid a ruinous war with China. Proposals to deter China by bolstering U.S. military deployments in the Western Pacific are unlikely to succeed and fraught with danger. Instead, the United States should encourage Taiwan and other regional actors to develop their own means of deterring a Chinese invasion. If calibrated correctly, Taiwan and others may be able to threaten a response severe and credible enough to deter Beijing.

The ability to respond rapidly to global trouble sounds good, but it can tempt policymakers to intervene militarily even for non-vital interests. U.S. military bases and logistics hubs in and near the Middle East are the primary examples of this—they make foolish wars too easy to start. Closing bases will therefore make wars more difficult to start, spur public debate about potential interventions, and give diplomacy an opportunity to return as the primary policy option.

Amid the debate over U.S. policy toward Taiwan, advocates of an overt declaration to defend the island tend to assign Taiwan significant value, while proponents of abrogating U.S. defense commitments often downplay its utility. The truth is somewhere in the middle. The military value of Taiwan to China must be viewed in the aggregate. Occupying Taiwan would offer China some important military advantages, but China’s current technical deficiencies limit Taiwan’s overall utility to China, and occupying Taiwan could stress Chinese military and security forces.

China’s recent nuclear expansion, consisting of new ICBMs, submarine-launched weapons, and a new generation of strategic bombers, suggests a significant recalibration of Beijing’s traditional “minimum deterrence” strategy. Washington should avoid overreacting to this shift in Chinese strategy, prioritize preserving a strong nuclear deterrent that focuses on survivability, and accompany any modernization efforts with attempts at dialogue, arms control, and the development of crisis management mechanisms.

The U.S. was right to leave Afghanistan. By withdrawing militarily from the country, the U.S. extracted itself from a costly war that did not protect Americans from terrorism or help Afghanistan transition to a healthy democracy. Now, with the resources freed up by withdrawal, the U.S. is better able to honor commitments elsewhere and invest at home.

The United States should apply the lessons learned in Afghanistan to Syria and pull out its ground forces. President Biden noted two key reasons for exiting Afghanistan: military missions should have achievable objectives and strikes and raids from afar, instead of permanent occupation, are sufficient to thwart foreign terrorism against United States. Both conditions also apply to Syria, where the original mission to dismantle ISIS’s territorial caliphate, once achieved, morphed into an open-ended campaign with murky objectives divorced from U.S. security and from counterterrorism.

A solution to the current crisis centered on the agreed neutrality of Ukraine will serve the United States’ main goals, and Ukraine's and Russia's as well. Neutrality deals have worked well in the past, and solutions that omit Ukrainian neutralization will fail. The stakes at issue in Ukraine are too small to justify a costly conflict. Hence, finding a compromise to resolve things should take priority for the United States.

Despite Russia’s recent capture of Avdiivka, the war in Ukraine is entering its third year at a relative stalemate. Major changes to the 600-mile long frontline are few and far between, with Ukraine and Russia finding offensive warfare costly and resource-intensive. At the same time, neither side is willing to compromise on its maximalist aims, making talks on a ceasefire or end-of-war settlement remote. Yet with additional U.S. military aid to Ukraine stalled in Congress, questions arise as to how long the U.S. can maintain the status quo—and whether it even should. This brief argues that U.S. policy toward Ukraine and Europe overall is in need of significant reform. A combination of defensive security aid to the Ukrainian military, real burden-sharing in Europe and avoiding firm U.S. defense commitments to Ukraine has a better chance of accomplishing the limited U.S. interests at stake with less risk and at reasonable cost.

Houthi attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden have shown no signs of stopping, as multiple rounds of U.S. airstrikes inside Yemen have only succeeded in prompting more reprisals against merchant vessels. As regional tensions stemming from the Israel-Hamas war continue to build, policymakers must thoroughly consider all aspects of national power in approaching this problem. What policy options are available to the White House in handling this crisis? What do they entail? What are their advantages and drawbacks? This brief presents and evaluates various U.S. policy responses to Houthi attacks and finds that less escalatory prescriptions like diplomacy, buck-passing, and defense stand a better chance at success while carrying fewer risks for the United States than more aggressive options like indefinite military operations in Yemen.

The Israel-Saudi normalization deal is still alive and still could be a bad deal for the United States. The war in Gaza has pushed the sweeping U.S.-backed diplomatic normalization deal between Saudi Arabia and Israel to the back burner, but both governments are likely to try to revive it at some point. This brief examines the drivers of the normalization deal, analyzes the case for and against it from the perspective of U.S. interests, and concludes that it is not worth much to Americans—nothing like the reported concessions the United States was prepared to make. Security guarantees for Saudi Arabia in particular should be avoided.

The Israel-Hamas conflict shows little signs of slowing down, and the risk of a wider war remains credible. This brief examines and addresses the complex dynamics at play that could cause the crisis to expand, and it clearly defines parameters for how the U.S. should navigate the conflict. Washington should avoid direct U.S. military involvement, work with all parties to prevent escalation, and redeploy troops out of Syria—and eventually Iraq—which denies Iran leverage for broadening the war.

U.S.-Iran nuclear diplomacy is on the brink of collapse. A year after President Trump withdrew from the JCPOA, Iran restarted and advanced its nuclear program. Despite re-engaging with Tehran diplomatically, the Biden administration has so far failed to revive the JCPOA in large part because the administration continues its predecessor’s approach of maximum pressure. If the administration doesn’t shift course, it will likely destroy the JCPOA, and Iran will move toward a bomb. This predictable failure, however, would not justify preventive military strikes that could result in U.S.-Iran war.

A continued military-centric approach to cyber issues risks underservicing the other core competencies of U.S. statecraft—intelligence, diplomacy, law enforcement, and other tools—necessary to address illicit cyber activity like ransomware and state-backed hacking. The most persistent and enduring threats from the cyber domain are best addressed through investments in civil infrastructure, public-private resiliency, and international coalitions and less through military superiority.

Targeted killings, usually by drone and air strikes from afar, are an overused tool in U.S. counterterrorism policy. They prioritize short-term results over longer-term outcomes, tactics over strategic effect. The U.S. does face threats, and the correct number of targeted killings abroad is unlikely to ever reach zero. Yet U.S. strikes should be limited to exceptional circumstances, where taking life stops terrorists with the intent and capability to attack the U.S.

The U.S. security interest in Afghanistan is unchanged after it ended its nearly 20-year occupation: defend against terrorists with the capability and intent to strike the U.S. To aid its counterterrorism goals, the U.S. could take steps to ease some sanctions and restrictions on the Taliban. This would also help relieve an economic crisis which threatens to starve many Afghans, who should not be punished for their government’s past sins

President Biden has continued to pursue a policy of regime change via sanctions on Venezuela, extending a failed approach started by President Trump. This policy has no bearing on U.S. security and is counterproductive from a humanitarian standpoint. Nicolás Maduro is a harsh dictator, but unlikely to fall. Indeed, sanctions helps immiserate Venezuelans for no good reason.

While much has changed since the Cold War, it remains in the U.S. interest to avoid Russia and China—the only two near-peer, nuclear-armed U.S. competitors—combining their economic and military power. The current U.S. approach of dual containment encourages their cooperation. Mounting a global campaign pitting democracies against autocracies adds to that pressure. The U.S. should focus on reducing tension with Moscow to improve the chances of productive diplomacy and limit incentive for Russia to cooperate with China against the U.S.

U.S. forces deployed to Iraq in 2014 to help annihilate ISIS’s territorial caliphate there, which was achieved more than three years ago. No core U.S. interest today requires a military presence in Iraq. The U.S. can minimize the risks of war, dissolve unnecessary commitments, and focus on higher priorities by withdrawing the remaining 2,500 troops and allowing Iraqi security forces to take responsibility for Iraq’s security.

U.S. forces originally deployed to Syria to help annihilate ISIS’s territorial caliphate, which was achieved more than two years ago. No core U.S. interest today requires a military presence in Syria. Maintaining the current deployment needlessly prolongs the civil war, exacerbates suffering there as a result of the war's continuation, and risks drawing the U.S. into wider conflict.

The U.S. must find a way to co-exist with Russia to advance U.S. interests and avoid a nuclear conflict. Endless cycles of sanctions, diplomatic expulsions, antipathy, and saber-rattling obscure an important reality. Inflating the threat Russia poses to the U.S., or confusing its violations of liberal values with hard security interests, risks conflict that could go nuclear. The good news for the U.S. is that Russia is not the Soviet Union, and while Russia still fields a formidable military, its overall power is limited and best held in check by European powers, not by the U.S. military.

The U.S. Constitution reserves the power to declare war to the legislative branch, but in recent years Congress has ceded that responsibility to the executive branch. The War Powers Resolution of 1973 has been misunderstood and misconstrued. Open-ended and vague authorizations for the use of military force have resulted in sprawling and endless wars divorced from original objectives. Only Congress can reclaim its constitutional authority in conducting U.S. foreign policy.

The U.S. and Saudi Arabia are not treaty allies and never have been. Moreover, today the U.S. can meet its narrow interests in the Middle East without providing unconditional support to Saudi Arabia. Catering excessively to the kingdom’s demands, supporting its foreign policy, and stationing U.S. troops on Saudi soil undermine U.S. interests. Instead, the U.S. should recalibrate Saudi relations to maintain a less accommodating, more balanced and business-like relationship.

The Biden administration has three options in Afghanistan: (1) keep the U.S. commitment to exit by May 1; (2) prolong the war by breaking the U.S.-Taliban agreement; or (3) prolong the war by attempting to negotiate with the Taliban for an extension. Withdrawing by May 1 is optimal. The U.S. can better secure its counterterrorism goals while not imperiling U.S. troops in Afghanistan any longer, or spending billions of dollars more on a conflict two decades of evidence shows is futile and wasteful to perpetuate.

Washington has increasingly turned to sanctions in recent years, even as they fail to achieve desired policy outcomes and dilute U.S. power overtime. Overreliance on financial sanctions, for example, risks the U.S. dollar’s status as the dominant reserve currency. Correcting the errors of U.S. sanctions policy demands a serious reevaluation of all sanctions, a higher bar for imposing new sanctions, and a coordinated effort to curtail financial and secondary sanctions in particular.

Two U.S. administrations in a row have supported the Saudi-led coalition’s intervention in Yemen’s civil war, a violent caldron for local and regional grievances. U.S. participation in this war prolongs it; exacerbates human suffering; and gives the main U.S. concern in Yemen, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, greater space to operate. Involvement in this proxy war undermines U.S. interests and values—ending our support would encourage Saudi Arabia to settle and help end the conflict.

Plans to reduce U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan and Iraq to 2,500 are responsible—it would be irresponsible not to continue to zero. The ongoing U.S. military occupations are costly mistakes that come at the expense of higher defense priorities. In Afghanistan, the February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement set a timeline to remove all U.S. forces by May 2021. Nothing should derail progress toward bringing all U.S. troops home by that deadline.

The next four years are an opportunity for the U.S. to pursue a new, more realistic foreign policy. In addition to the urgent task of ending endless wars, the U.S. should focus on narrow missions in the Middle East to thwart anti-U.S. terror threats. In Europe, the U.S. should shift burdens to NATO members. And in East Asia, it should encourage allies to invest in defensive capabilities to strengthen deterrence. In all, abandoning the failed status quo in favor of a foreign policy based on restraint will mean a stronger America with more security at less cost and risk.

U.S. alliances are outdated. Alliances that early in the Cold War served U.S. security have become permanent subsidies to allies capable of doing more. Instead of backing allies and getting them to provide for the bulk of their defense, U.S. forces too often man their front lines, encouraging allies to “free ride” on U.S. support or sometimes take provocative risks. Instead of pleading with allies to bear a greater burden, the U.S. should do less and shift burdens by reducing deployed forces.

The COVID-19 pandemic and efforts to manage it ravaged the U.S. economy and government finances, raising demand for domestic spending, cutting revenue, and increasing debt. U.S. grand strategy—long overly ambitious—should be restrained to manage these budgetary pressures. Domestic needs should take greater priority because the U.S. is fundamentally secure. Restraint prioritizes vital interests, abandons peripheral missions, shifts the burden of securing other regions to allies, and ends military overstretch—it provides more security at lower cost and aids the difficult task of domestic rebuilding.

Maximum pressure is an escalation strategy that courts war with Iran. It has already led to direct U.S.-Iran conflict and leaves U.S. soldiers in Iraq and Syria especially vulnerable to Iranian reprisals. Instead of the U.S. dictating the terms of engagement, keeping U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria allows Iran and other adversaries to target Americans at will. The likelihood for American fatalities to trigger a prolonged and costly war with Iran, combined with growing local hostility to the U.S. presence, makes it imperative to withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq and Syria.

The U.S. is strong, and the DPRK is weak and vulnerable, which is why it acquired nuclear weapons. The DPRK’s nuclear deterrent makes U.S. military intervention unthinkable. The DPRK is therefore unlikely to ever give up its arsenal, but a diplomatic solution could see freezes or rollbacks of the DPRK’s nuclear program in exchange for economic relief. Should the DPRK prove uncooperative, U.S. conventional and nuclear superiority can deter DPRK aggression indefinitely, maintaining an acceptable status quo. Given its strong position, the only way the U.S. loses is by going to war.

Supplying weapons to Ukraine, which is neither a U.S. ally nor NATO member, damages U.S. relations with Russia—a nation with 6,500 nuclear weapons. It also incentivizes the continuation of the conflict in the Donbass rather than its political resolution, and it absolves European powers of responsibility for their neighbor. Russia’s strong security interests in Ukraine mean it would use as much force as necessary to prevent Ukraine from joining the West. Ukraine’s future is best guaranteed by supporting the current peace process between Kiev and Moscow and declaring Ukraine a neutral nation—allied with neither Russia nor the West.

The death of ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi during a U.S. special forces raid follows the decisive military victory over ISIS’s caliphate. The raid’s success highlights U.S. intelligence capabilities—the globe’s most robust and well-funded—to locate anti-U.S. terrorists and the military’s ability to strike targets anywhere in the world, even without a local presence. With ISIS’s caliphate destroyed, the U.S. military mission is over. The U.S. should avoid being ensnared in another permanent policing mission, and instead methodically withdraw all remaining forces from Syria.

The fall of ISIS's caliphate should have concluded the military mission in Syria and led to a withdrawal of all U.S. forces. Failure to do so encouraged the Kurds to seek autonomy rather than protection from Damascus, which would have kept Turkey out, ISIS down, and the Kurds reasonably safe. Staying entangled in Syria has precipitated a crisis between Turkey and the Kurds, and left the U.S. with no appealing options. While the U.S. and Kurdish forces forged a partnership of convenience and mutual benefit to defeat a common adversary, the U.S. did not agree to adopt other Kurdish interests, nor should it. An orderly withdrawal of all U.S. forces is the only way to promote a sustainable status quo.

The origins of the heightened crisis with Iran can be traced back to “maximum pressure,” the Saudi war in Yemen, and the broader Sunni-Shiite fight between Riyadh and Tehran. The recent attacks on Saudi Arabia’s oil infrastructure should come as no surprise. But it is a major warning to de-escalate. As realists predicted, economic sanctions are strangling Iran’s economy, but it is resulting in increasingly risky, belligerent behavior—the exact opposite of its intent. Any military response could spiral into a regional war. Unwinding economic sanctions and pursuing strong diplomacy would best safeguard U.S. interests.

Like most Middle East nations, Iran is guilty of malign behavior—but it is weak, regionally isolated, and unable to meaningfully project power. Its undesirable local activities pose no direct threat to the United States, and it lacks the capability to cause significant disruptions to the flow of oil. The threat Iran does pose is easily checked by its more powerful neighbors. “Maximum pressure” is a risky strategy that could provoke a war instead of negotiations. Normalizing relations with Iran would enhance U.S. security, extricate the U.S. from the region’s disputes, and avoid a potentially catastrophic war.

U.S. allies must be held responsible for defending themselves and the global commons. During the Cold War, defending the free world from communist conquest and domination while they rebuilt their economies was necessary and proper. As those countries prospered, however, the justification for American protection waned. The Cold War’s end further eroded the foundations of perpetual alliances backed by foreign-deployed U.S. troops. Other advanced nations should share America’s global burdens instead of free-riding on us.

Policymakers have poorly defined U.S. strategic interests in the Russia-Ukraine War, and those interests that have been defined do not stand up to scrutiny. Actual U.S. interests in Ukraine are essentially negative: preventing further escalation or spillover of the conflict and limiting a wholesale collapse in U.S.-Russian relations. The limited, core interests the U.S. does have in Ukraine suggest that Washington should try to convince Ukraine and Russia to accept a negotiated settlement.

Over four years, the U.S. could reduce its presence in the Middle East by as many as 50,000 military personnel, mainly by drawing down its forces in four key states—Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE—and ending regular deployments to the region by carrier battle groups. Moving to the region’s periphery—drawing on existing bases and access agreements with Jordan and Oman—could position the U.S. to return to a role as offshore balancer with an option to completely withdraw from the region.

Nothing about the Middle East warrants an enduring U.S. military presence there. Of the few important interests there—preventing major terrorist attacks, stopping the emergence of a market-making oil hegemon, curbing nuclear proliferation, and ensuring no regional actor destroys Israel—not one requires a permanent garrison of American troops. The roughly 60,000 U.S. military personnel in the region should come home.

NATO’s tactical nuclear weapons—particularly the estimated 150 U.S. B61 nuclear bombs in Europe—are dangerous relics. Whereas during the Cold War tactical nuclear weapons were believed to help bolster deterrence, today, they serve no functional purpose other than to unnecessarily escalate a local crisis, such as in the Baltic states, into a potential strategic calamity. Moreover, the removal of the nuclear warheads could serve as a gesture to restart a constructive dialogue with Russia on reducing risks, including nuclear threats, in Europe.

During the Cold War, the U.S. operated just two major bases in the Middle East. Today, even though the region is of vastly diminished strategic importance, the U.S. maintains an expansive network of bases. The “zero option”—reducing U.S. military bases in the region to zero—should be responsibly considered. It would force decision makers to rethink the means-end chain for securing U.S. interests. Employing other levers of power would free up resources—military and otherwise—and avoid costly entanglements in the region. Removing immediate U.S. military protection would also prompt partners to reconsider their own positions and conduct their external relations with greater circumspection.

America’s dominance of the global financial system confers many advantages: influence over the institutions governing the global economy, the ability to borrow cheaply, and regulatory authority over most large foreign corporations. Policymakers have abused this power, often sanctioning other states to punish rather than secure realistic political concessions. Overuse of sanctions has spurred other nations to develop alternative economic and financial institutions outside the U.S.-led system—threatening to undermine U.S. financial hegemony. Sanctions, a tool of statecraft, are best employed when carefully crafted and in pursuit of necessary, clear, attainable goals.

Following 9/11, the United States was right to target Al-Qaeda and the Taliban government which harbored them—that was a justified, achievable mission. After a swift victory and the establishment of a new, popular Afghan government, policymakers should have removed U.S. troops. Instead, Washington pursued a nation-building effort to establish a central authority to govern all of Afghanistan—a goal unrelated to the core security interests that justified the initial campaign and impossible to achieve at reasonable cost. After nearly 18 years of war and our key goals accomplished long ago, it is past time to withdraw all U.S. forces to focus on vital national security interests.

When President Obama, without congressional authorization, ordered U.S. forces to intervene in Syria, the mission was clear: liberate ISIS-held territory. That mission has been achieved. Leaving behind U.S. forces in Syria involves large risks without any security upside: it threatens to drive adversaries into allying against the United States; to inflame Islamist-nationalist sentiments in Iraq and Syria, making U.S. forces targets; and to risk U.S. conflict with Russia, Iran, Turkey, and Syria for no good reason. Staying also ties down U.S. forces and limits their focus on core missions. With ISIS’s “caliphate” destroyed, U.S. troops have achieved all they reasonably can and should be fully withdrawn.