The second installment in DEFP's series on topics in grand strategy is on the concept of the "balance of power"—both the distribution of power among states or an approximate equilibrium of power between states. When a state or bloc become powerful enough to threaten to dominate its region, other states tend to pool resources and form alliances in order to “balance” against the threat. Restrainers believe that Washington can and should encourage its allies to directly counter threats in their own regions, rather than maintain their status as dependents that outsource their security to an increasingly overstretched United States. This would not only be a more resilient and stable condition in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East, it would also help preserve the United States' power position.

Grand strategy is a state’s theory about how to provide for its own security. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States’ grand strategy shifted from one of maintenance of the balance of power in Eurasia to a militaristic and primacist idea of "liberal hegemony." This has proven to be a costly and bloody failure, and has left the United States strategically overextended. The United States should shift to a grand strategy of restraint, which will better preserve its power, minimize the risk of war, and turn over to its allies the responsibility for their own defense.

Missing from foreign policy discussions at large are inquiries about how foreign intervention may change the scope or types of government activities conducted domestically. People involved in foreign interventions develop skills abroad which they afterward bring home to domestic organizations, such as local police departments. A full accounting of the costs of foreign interventions must recognize that government activism abroad runs the risk of undermining domestic freedoms.

The war between Israel and Hamas has increased the threat to U.S. troops in the Middle East, particularly to the 3,400 personnel in Iraq and Syria. But there is no good reason for U.S. forces to be there. The U.S. presence needlessly risks war by allowing Iran and militias it funds to threaten U.S. troops. ISIS’s capabilities have been degraded, capable local actors eagerly hunt the groups’ remnants, and the United States can still strike from a long distance if necessary. U.S. forces should be withdrawn from Iraq and Syria as part of a broader effort to deprioritize the Middle East and avoid an ill-advised conflict with Iran.

Washington’s current Syria policy is failing and misguided, and it should be abandoned for one consistent with U.S. interests. The approximately 900 U.S. military forces in northeastern Syria lack a justifying rationale given the last ISIS-held territory was liberated in March 2019, more than four years ago—continued occupation with so few forces, and without a vital U.S. security goal, runs needless risks with imperceptible potential gains. U.S. forces are vulnerable to local militias with local aims that could otherwise not reach them. Existing sanctions punish regular Syrians in service of unrealistic, unnecessary regime-change goals. Syria is a strategically unimportant country that poses no direct threat to the United States nor its limited and diminishing interests in the Middle East. With higher priorities at home and in Asia, the U.S. should recalibrate sanctions and end its open-ended presence in Syria.

The recent coup in Niger—home to over 1,000 U.S. forces—shed light on one of the many counterterrorism missions the United States is waging across Africa with little scrutiny or oversight.

In a new explainer, Visiting Fellow C. William Walldorf Jr. explains why and how U.S. counterterrorism policy in Africa needs to change. U.S. policy there has been not just disappointing but counterproductive, exacerbating the problem of Islamic terrorism. As terrorists continue to operate in Africa and local U.S. partners become less popular the dangers of mission creep have risen. U.S. forces across the continent are applying too much force against too little of a threat, and U.S. security assistance has failed to address the issues that breed terrorism in the first place. Indeed, in many cases, local partners have used U.S. training and aid to launch coups, commit human rights abuses against their own people, and shore up corrupt governments.

U.S. interests would be better served if U.S. forces were withdrawn from Africa and security assistance to local partners was curbed. Rather than perpetuate a failed policy, Washington needs to end these decades-long missions and revise its assessment of the threat posed by Islamic terrorism.

Even as the war with Russia continues, Ukraine is demanding NATO membership, or at least a path to it, and some lesser security guarantees in the interim. The United States should say no, closing the door to committing to fight a future war for Ukraine. The benefits of fighting for Ukraine are lacking—Ukraine is neither a prize that Russia can use to rebuild its Soviet empire nor an example that will destabilize global politics. The risks of fighting for Ukraine meanwhile are severe—entailing a real prospect of nuclear war and mass destruction. Because of these risks, the United States has not and will not directly fight Russia on behalf of Ukraine. That means U.S. commitments to militarily defend Ukraine, even through NATO, will not be credible; they will be an obvious bluff. Such false promises will not only leave Ukraine exposed to Russia, they will increase its peril, by preserving a cause of war and encouraging Ukraine to make poor choices based on the false hope of western protection. Armed neutrality, where the United States and its allies continue to arm Ukraine to deter future Russia aggression is a safer and more credible alternative.

Is nuclear deterrence eroding? Recent developments in international affairs and military technology lead some analysts to conclude the nuclear revolution, which purportedly prevents war between nuclear powers, no longer has much effect. They say the world is getting safer for nuclear war or conventional war beneath the nuclear umbrella, which makes it likely that states, starting with China, will test U.S. commitments to fight for their allies. This paper argues these conclusions are wrong. Using recent cases that some claim are evidence of deterrence failure—Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the 2017 “fire and fury” crisis between the United States and North Korea—it demonstrates that nuclear deterrence remains robust.

Understanding the underlying causes and conditions that led to the Russo-Ukrainian war may help resolve the conflict and avoid future crises. Dominant narratives, which blame the pathologies of the Russian government and its opposition to Ukraine’s democratic efforts, fail to adequately account for what led to the invasion. Instead, realist theories of international relations consider Russia’s security concerns and warnings, highlight the problems posed by post-Cold War NATO expansion, and accurately predicted a conflict between the neighboring countries. This paper compares the realist and liberal explanations for the war’s outbreak and argues U.S. policy should give greater consideration to realist views going forward.

It needs to be acknowledged that U.S. contributions to NATO could be scaled back in the face of contending domestic priorities or competing demands for military resources in Asia. In either event, Europe would need to take up the primary burden for its defense. Realistic discussions of what that could look like in practice are therefore prudent. A serious effort to enhance European defensive autonomy would open the door to a range of issues—including the need for increased European defense spending, difficult questions of command arrangements, and complex issues related to nuclear-sharing and deterrence. None of these matters present easy answers, but what follows is an exploration of issues that would need to be addressed to make greater European defensive autonomy a reality.

U.S. leaders often express the fear that leaving the Middle East or removing U.S. forces from warzones there and in other parts of the world will leave “vacuums,” which adversaries will fill. This fear misunderstands international politics. Vacuum fears imagine a precarious global balance of power where minor gains by U.S. adversaries create grave dangers, but in reality, the U.S. is quite secure and does not need to worry about its adversaries potentially making minor gains by rushing into U.S.-made vacuums.

NATO was founded to deter a Soviet attack on Western Europe. However, U.S. military presence in Europe today lacks a clear mission beyond sustaining U.S. dominance in Europe. Washington has frequently talked about the need for burden sharing with its European allies, but a more far-reaching approach of burden shifting is needed. The explainer presents recommendations for how to implement burden shifting and explains how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has made burden shifting even more prudent.

The United States is obligated by treaty to defend 51 countries with military force. Beyond its formal allies, the United States also has several quasi-allies, or states the U.S. is not explicitly committed to defend but to which it provides substantial amounts of military and political support. While many experts assume more allies means the United States is more secure, quasi-allies present clear dangers for U.S. interests. The United States should be wary of the risks quasi-allies pose and avoid loose talk and policy that may commit it to a quasi-ally’s defense.

Great powers routinely stake out geographic zones within which they limit the autonomy of weaker states. The prominence of these spheres of influence depends largely on the distribution of power in the international system. During the post-Cold War moment of unipolarity, the U.S. alone was able to assert a sphere of influence. However, with the increase in great power competition, the relevant question now is not if the transition to a world of multiple spheres of influence will take place (given the structural changes at the level of international order, it most certainly will), but how the U.S. should manage this development in ways that are conducive to U.S. interests.

Policymakers have poorly defined U.S. strategic interests in the Russia-Ukraine War, and those interests that have been defined do not stand up to scrutiny. Actual U.S. interests in Ukraine are essentially negative: preventing further escalation or spillover of the conflict and limiting a wholesale collapse in U.S.-Russian relations. The limited, core interests the U.S. does have in Ukraine suggest that Washington should try to convince Ukraine and Russia to accept a negotiated settlement.

A careful reading of the Greek Thucydides’ The History of the Peloponnesian War suggests that a U.S.-China war is hardly inevitable. Such a war is a choice, not a trap—and selecting the appropriate U.S. grand strategy is the way to avoid it. Despite China’s rise, the United States and its regional allies are in a strong position to maintain a regional balance of power that keeps a peace and serve U.S. interests in Asia.

Melting ice is poised to make the Arctic more accessible for commercial and military activity. But neither that shift nor competition with Russia and China elsewhere translate into a threat to the United States in the Arctic. Washington should base U.S.-Arctic policy on the reality that the United States enjoys a strong conventional and nuclear deterrent, a robust network of Arctic allies, and favorable geography. With this in mind, the United States should avoid mistaking the Arctic for a new arena for military competition.

A continued military-centric approach to cyber issues risks underservicing the other core competencies of U.S. statecraft—intelligence, diplomacy, law enforcement, and other tools—necessary to address illicit cyber activity like ransomware and state-backed hacking. The most persistent and enduring threats from the cyber domain are best addressed through investments in civil infrastructure, public-private resiliency, and international coalitions and less through military superiority.

Over the past several decades, U.S. foreign policy has increasingly become devoted to democratizing the world, by force if necessary. Recent rhetoric about a global struggle between autocracy and democracy is a reflection of this. The United States should return to its founding ethos where its foreign policy tries to make the world safe for self-determination, and hence democracy, rather than trying to democratize the world. This will again make the U.S. an advocate of peace and stability, rather than a revolutionary power that promotes instability. It will also improve U.S. security.

The Ukraine war will provide a fillip to U.S. activism, as the Europeans seek inexpensive security insurance from the United States and U.S. policymakers succumb to the temptations of invitational hegemony, if only confined to certain regions. At the same time, the notion of a U.S.-led, rules-based, liberal world order is looking pretty threadbare. That intellectual construct was founded on a unipolar structure of power that no longer exists. Instead, we see the reemergence of the U.S.-led Cold War coalition.

The ability to respond rapidly to global trouble sounds good, but it can tempt policymakers to intervene militarily even for non-vital interests. U.S. military bases and logistics hubs in and near the Middle East are the primary examples of this—they make foolish wars too easy to start. Closing bases will therefore make wars more difficult to start, spur public debate about potential interventions, and give diplomacy an opportunity to return as the primary policy option.

A solution to the current crisis centered on the agreed neutrality of Ukraine will serve the United States’ main goals, and Ukraine's and Russia's as well. Neutrality deals have worked well in the past, and solutions that omit Ukrainian neutralization will fail. The stakes at issue in Ukraine are too small to justify a costly conflict. Hence, finding a compromise to resolve things should take priority for the United States.

Changes in the global balance of power and in Europe’s security environment demand prevailing U.S.-Europe strategy change fundamentally. What is needed is a reduction in U.S. security commitments on the continent. A drawdown of U.S. obligations will help the U.S. preserve resources and refocus on the Indo-Pacific. It will also benefit Europeans by encouraging them to pursue strategic autonomy. However, while European strategic autonomy is important, a reduction in U.S. commitments in Europe should not be predicated on Europeans’ readiness to defend themselves.

Making democracy promotion abroad a centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy is a mistake that counterintuitively harms the ability to spread democracy and advance U.S. interests. China, Russia, and other non-democracies—informed by years of U.S. military and non-military actions—view democracy promotion and regime change as linked threats to regime security. Promoting democracy, outside of serving as an exemplar, is counterproductive since regimes often respond to this outside pressure by suppressing democracy at home and aggressing against U.S. interests.

U.S. bases and troops abroad no longer translate into influence, making America’s far-flung garrison a “Phantom Empire.” The refusal of U.S. leaders to countenance drawdowns in most cases removes what leverage U.S. troops might provide over host nations. U.S. commitments in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia yield example after example of countries whose close defense relationship with the United States does not prevent them from going their own way geopolitically.

While much has changed since the Cold War, it remains in the U.S. interest to avoid Russia and China—the only two near-peer, nuclear-armed U.S. competitors—combining their economic and military power. The current U.S. approach of dual containment encourages their cooperation. Mounting a global campaign pitting democracies against autocracies adds to that pressure. The U.S. should focus on reducing tension with Moscow to improve the chances of productive diplomacy and limit incentive for Russia to cooperate with China against the U.S.

The Biden Administration’s forthcoming Global Posture Review—a top-to-bottom examination of all overseas U.S. military bases and deployments—should jumpstart a needed shift in U.S. strategic thinking away from the leftover assumptions of the Cold War and the War on Terror. Through balancing and burden sharing in Asia, major troop reductions in Europe and the Middle East, and limiting presence deployments to preserve military readiness, the United States can realign its military posture to sustainably confront the challenges ahead.

Washington has increasingly turned to sanctions in recent years, even as they fail to achieve desired policy outcomes and dilute U.S. power overtime. Overreliance on financial sanctions, for example, risks the U.S. dollar’s status as the dominant reserve currency. Correcting the errors of U.S. sanctions policy demands a serious reevaluation of all sanctions, a higher bar for imposing new sanctions, and a coordinated effort to curtail financial and secondary sanctions in particular.

Today, “great power competition” is too often invoked by advocates of a more militarily assertive foreign policy. The phrase represents a view of the world that is to a great extent zero-sum, in which the U.S. must constantly confront China and Russia abroad. This view is dangerously outdated; changes in the international system such as nuclear weapons and the end of territorial expansion mean that the great powers should move toward more cooperative relations.

The next four years are an opportunity for the U.S. to pursue a new, more realistic foreign policy. In addition to the urgent task of ending endless wars, the U.S. should focus on narrow missions in the Middle East to thwart anti-U.S. terror threats. In Europe, the U.S. should shift burdens to NATO members. And in East Asia, it should encourage allies to invest in defensive capabilities to strengthen deterrence. In all, abandoning the failed status quo in favor of a foreign policy based on restraint will mean a stronger America with more security at less cost and risk.

China has the world’s largest navy, but there are important questions about its ability to contest the United States on a global scale. To do so, China would need more overseas bases than the two it currently has in Djibouti and Cambodia. Similarly, its aircraft carriers cannot sustain high-tempo aviation operations beyond the First Island Chain for an extended period. Developing super-quiet attack submarines would markedly improve China’s ability to conduct blue-water operations. However, to date, China has not fielded submarines that match the technological capabilities of U.S. boats. A careful examination of China’s naval strength shows that while it is well-positioned to wage a war close to its shores, the PLAN is not a global peer of the U.S. Navy.

The balance of power in East Asia has shifted in China's favor, but it does not follow that China constitutes a major threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of all neighboring states. As DEFP Non-Resident Fellow Peter Harris argues in a new explainer, upholding peace and stability in East Asia does not require U.S. military primacy. U.S. efforts to dominate the region could backfire by intensifying the U.S.-China rivalry and plunging East Asia into a new cold war. A more sensible approach would be to move toward an offshore balancing posture that incentivizes capable regional states to provide for their own defense and deter Chinese aggression.

The ongoing Russo-Ukraine war is analogous to a hypothetical war between China and Taiwan. Taiwan cannot assume the United States will fight on its behalf and should invest in anti-access, area-denial weaponry. While Taiwan can expect global support if attacked, challenges exist for aid to be delivered and employed. Sanctions against China are unlikely to deter them if they choose to invade Taiwan. Taiwan should learn applicable lessons from the war in Ukraine and use them to secure their continued safety and prosperity.

Many experts have expressed fears that China could either stage a hostile takeover of Taiwan’s semiconductor chip-manufacturing capacity or effect a critical disruption of chip supplies as a secondary consequence of a blockade or protracted invasion of the island. Some have therefore argued that these “nightmare scenarios” provide additional reasons for the United States to defend Taiwan. Neither of these scenarios, however, justify an explicit commitment to defend Taiwan or the risk of a great power war with China.

The United States has an interest in avoiding a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, but America’s overriding concern is to avoid a ruinous war with China. Proposals to deter China by bolstering U.S. military deployments in the Western Pacific are unlikely to succeed and fraught with danger. Instead, the United States should encourage Taiwan and other regional actors to develop their own means of deterring a Chinese invasion. If calibrated correctly, Taiwan and others may be able to threaten a response severe and credible enough to deter Beijing.

Amid the debate over U.S. policy toward Taiwan, advocates of an overt declaration to defend the island tend to assign Taiwan significant value, while proponents of abrogating U.S. defense commitments often downplay its utility. The truth is somewhere in the middle. The military value of Taiwan to China must be viewed in the aggregate. Occupying Taiwan would offer China some important military advantages, but China’s current technical deficiencies limit Taiwan’s overall utility to China, and occupying Taiwan could stress Chinese military and security forces.

China’s recent nuclear expansion, consisting of new ICBMs, submarine-launched weapons, and a new generation of strategic bombers, suggests a significant recalibration of Beijing’s traditional “minimum deterrence” strategy. Washington should avoid overreacting to this shift in Chinese strategy, prioritize preserving a strong nuclear deterrent that focuses on survivability, and accompany any modernization efforts with attempts at dialogue, arms control, and the development of crisis management mechanisms.

The Quad has transformed in recent years into a multilateral forum to enhance military coordination in the Indo-Pacific among the U.S., Japan, India, and Australia and to address issues of mutual concern, including China. But the Quad is not—and should not become—an anti-China alliance. Pushing the Quad toward such a goal undermines U.S. interests and risks unnecessary conflict, possibly even nuclear war.

China is destined to be the leading power in East Asia. It will soon have an economy much larger than that of the U.S., and its advantages in East Asia compared with the U.S. are compounded by geographic proximity and hence deeper economic ties to the countries of the region compared to the U.S. At the same time, the U.S. need not be directly threatened by the rise of China—if it focuses on balancing in ways that bring prosperity and avoid catastrophic war.

As discussion intensifies over U.S. policy toward Taiwan, including debates over the future of strategic ambiguity, nuclear concerns should be at the forefront. In the event of setbacks in a conflict over Taiwan, China could find itself willing to use nuclear weapons, even if it had not intended to do so before the start of hostilities. The U.S., too, could be forced to contemplate nuclear use in certain scenarios. The potential for miscalculation by each side is higher than commonly acknowledged.

It is at sea where the risk is greatest for a direct clash between Chinese and U.S. forces. But a closer look at Chinese maritime capabilities reveals a fleet that is powerful, but uneven and geographically constrained, with important capability gaps. This reality affords the U.S. time and strategic flexibility to pursue prudent policies that advance U.S. interests while avoiding a needless conflict.

Competition between the world’s two greatest powers is in some ways inevitable—but military conflict need not be. Geography, starting with the Pacific Ocean, and the positive sum outcomes of trade limit the dangers of competition with China. And U.S. allies, fortified with U.S.-supplied A2/AD defense systems and aided by other regional states, are capable of balancing a potentially expansionist China. That limits the risk of U.S.-China confrontation and the shadow it casts on cooperation in areas of overlapping interests.

The U.S. is strong, and the DPRK is weak and vulnerable, which is why it acquired nuclear weapons. The DPRK’s nuclear deterrent makes U.S. military intervention unthinkable. The DPRK is therefore unlikely to ever give up its arsenal, but a diplomatic solution could see freezes or rollbacks of the DPRK’s nuclear program in exchange for economic relief. Should the DPRK prove uncooperative, U.S. conventional and nuclear superiority can deter DPRK aggression indefinitely, maintaining an acceptable status quo. Given its strong position, the only way the U.S. loses is by going to war.

Admitting Finland into NATO constitutes a permanent defense commitment by the alliance. In the case of the United States, it also entails a further extension of its nuclear umbrella. Such moves warrant a fulsome public debate, not a rush to action. U.S. forces cannot be everywhere at once. New, permanent security commitments in northern Europe should be examined relative to other U.S. global priorities and take into account Finland’s defensibility—not just now, but in the face of a revitalized, long-term Russian threat.

In the opening rounds of the war, Russian armed forces made major errors in both the operational and tactical realm. In recent weeks though, Russia has made slow, methodical progress on the northern shoulder of Donbas. If Russia defeats Ukraine in the Battle of Donbas, Kyiv will face a difficult choice: (1) dig in and continue fighting, even though much of its most effective forces will have been captured or killed or (2) negotiate with Russia to trade territory lost since 2014 to stanch further losses of Ukrainian lives and territory.

A solution to the current crisis centered on the agreed neutrality of Ukraine will serve the United States’ main goals, and Ukraine's and Russia's as well. Neutrality deals have worked well in the past, and solutions that omit Ukrainian neutralization will fail. The stakes at issue in Ukraine are too small to justify a costly conflict. Hence, finding a compromise to resolve things should take priority for the United States.

In recent years, three of Europe’s biggest powers—the United Kingdom, France, and Germany—have issued Indo-Pacific strategies and sailed naval ships to the region to show maritime presence. European forays into the Indo-Pacific do not help the United States, but they do weaken NATO’s ability to defend Europe. The United States should discourage European deployments to the Indo-Pacific and shift the burden for the defense of Europe to Europeans.

The U.S. provided $2.5 billion in military aid to Ukraine since 2014 and U.S. leaders regularly voice support for Ukraine joining NATO. Both policies poison U.S.-Russia relations. Neither advances U.S. security. Each risks drawing the U.S. into open conflict, even nuclear war, with Russia. And these policies prevent a realistic settlement and prolong suffering in Ukraine.

Official U.S. policy still endorses the notion of Georgia someday joining NATO. An essential question is whether the alliance could successfully defend it through conventional means. A number of factors argue against this, including Georgia’s proximity to Russia, its limited military capabilities, and its relative geographic isolation. Absent an effective conventional defense, the only means available to NATO and the United States for protecting Georgia would be to resort to nuclear threats, possibly even nuclear use. But does Georgia warrant the United States extending its nuclear umbrella?

The U.S. must find a way to co-exist with Russia to advance U.S. interests and avoid a nuclear conflict. Endless cycles of sanctions, diplomatic expulsions, antipathy, and saber-rattling obscure an important reality. Inflating the threat Russia poses to the U.S., or confusing its violations of liberal values with hard security interests, risks conflict that could go nuclear. The good news for the U.S. is that Russia is not the Soviet Union, and while Russia still fields a formidable military, its overall power is limited and best held in check by European powers, not by the U.S. military.

October 3, 2020, marks 30 years since East and West Germany reunified. Europe today is a different continent than it was in 1990. Germany, along with many of its allies, is wealthy and capable of shouldering a larger burden for defense. A residual Cold War mentality, 30 years after German reunification, should not be permitted to undermine U.S. security and prosperity for the next 30 years. Toward this end, the U.S. should station fewer U.S. troops on the continent and halt the extension of new U.S. security guarantees through NATO.

NATO’s tactical nuclear weapons—particularly the estimated 150 U.S. B61 nuclear bombs in Europe—are dangerous relics. Whereas during the Cold War tactical nuclear weapons were believed to help bolster deterrence, today, they serve no functional purpose other than to unnecessarily escalate a local crisis, such as in the Baltic states, into a potential strategic calamity. Moreover, the removal of the nuclear warheads could serve as a gesture to restart a constructive dialogue with Russia on reducing risks, including nuclear threats, in Europe.

Ukraine today has inherited Poland’s status as Europe’s reigning victim of geography. Kyiv needs politics and a security strategy to match this complex position. It must be mindful of its powerful neighbor Russia while also satisfying a population with divided beliefs about where Ukraine’s orientation should lie—east or west. In light of these facts, the U.S. and NATO should abandon their public position supporting Ukraine’s eventual membership in the alliance. That would encourage Kyiv to focus on more realistic options, such as some form of neutrality or non-alignment.

Supplying weapons to Ukraine, which is neither a U.S. ally nor NATO member, damages U.S. relations with Russia—a nation with 6,500 nuclear weapons. It also incentivizes the continuation of the conflict in the Donbass rather than its political resolution, and it absolves European powers of responsibility for their neighbor. Russia’s strong security interests in Ukraine mean it would use as much force as necessary to prevent Ukraine from joining the West. Ukraine’s future is best guaranteed by supporting the current peace process between Kiev and Moscow and declaring Ukraine a neutral nation—allied with neither Russia nor the West.

U.S. allies must be held responsible for defending themselves and the global commons. During the Cold War, defending the free world from communist conquest and domination while they rebuilt their economies was necessary and proper. As those countries prospered, however, the justification for American protection waned. The Cold War’s end further eroded the foundations of perpetual alliances backed by foreign-deployed U.S. troops. Other advanced nations should share America’s global burdens instead of free-riding on us.