The war in Ukraine is not going well for Kyiv. Manpower shortfalls, dwindling ammunition stockpiles, and relentless Russian attacks are grinding down Ukrainian forces across the frontline. In several places, Russian forces are making incremental gains, albeit at a heavy cost. Despite Congress’ imminent passage of another aid bill for Ukraine, difficult questions about the war are not going away.

What is the U.S. strategy in Ukraine—what does success look like, and how long will it take to achieve? Are there other weapons the United States should be sending? Can Ukraine offset its disadvantages in manpower and firepower with more sophisticated weapons systems? What escalation risks exist if the U.S. provides long-range missiles that can hit targets deep within Russia?

Please join Defense Priorities for a timely discussion about the effectiveness of U.S. military aid to Ukraine.

Houthi militants in Yemen have recently conducted more than 40 attacks on commercial and naval vessels in the Red Sea. Their strikes have disrupted shipping and a significant portion of global trade. The United States expanded naval operations to deter attacks and protect ships, and when that failed, President Biden ordered multiple rounds of strikes against Houthi targets. None of this prevented or even slowed Houthis from firing at civilian and military vessels in the Red Sea. The United States is now engaged in an open-ended, tit-for-tat conflict with the Houthis even though it has no chance to stop them.

Who are the Houthis, and what motivates them to disrupt the flow of goods? Do they pose a significant threat to U.S. interests in the Middle East? Has the U.S. response so far improved or exacerbated circumstances? What else, if anything, can and should the United States do to address this challenge to Middle East sea lanes? What realistic goals and potential outcomes are attainable, and what are the costs and risks associated with various policy options?

2023 shifted the war in Ukraine in Russia's favor. Ukraine’s counteroffensive failed to retake much of its territory, costing it vital manpower, confidence, and support. The firing of Ukraine's top general, Valery Zaluzhny, may herald further domestic fracture. Western support has ebbed, with President Biden’s proposed additional $61 billion stalled in Congress.

While neither Ukraine nor Russia appears able to deliver a decisive blow for now, Russia's material advantages are beginning to show, and its economy seems to have adapted to wartime conditions. How should U.S. policy deal with Ukraine's changed fortunes? Is a strategy that requires U.S. support for Ukraine, "for as long as it takes," to retake all of its lost territory, including Crimea, viable? Is a shift to a largely defensive, attrition strategy—rather than one focused on territory—more prudent? With more at stake than the U.S., what can European allies do to support Ukraine now and over the long term? What kind of security assistance would best help Ukraine while keeping the risk of direct U.S.-Russia conflict low? Should the U.S. do more diplomatically to induce Ukraine and Russia to negotiate peace or at least an armistice?

The Middle East is back at the forefront of U.S. foreign policy discourse. The war in Gaza has escalated to entangle U.S. forces. Continual attacks on U.S. bases in Iraq, Syria, and across the border in Jordan increased due to events in Gaza, injured scores of servicemembers, and now killed three soldiers. Repeated U.S. strikes on militias launching these attacks to "restore deterrence" have evidently failed. The U.S. launched an air campaign against Houthi targets in an ineffective effort to stop its attacks on shipping, which are done in the name of defending Gaza. The failure of the efforts to protect shipping and U.S. forces has created mounting pressure for direct war with Iran.

But what is actually at stake for the United States in the Middle East today? Would a war with Iran simply be a large war to protect a smaller and pointless one in Syria, Iraq, or Yemen? What interests justify the presence of 46,000 U.S. forces so far from home, along with these new strikes and their attendant risks? As a net exporter of oil today, is protecting Persian Gulf oil still a priority for the United States? Are U.S. forces there usefully combating terrorists? Is military force the best way to accomplish U.S. objectives in this region, and if so does it need to be based there?

In 2023, the United States signed basing agreements with the Philippines and Papua New Guinea. This continues a trend of increasing its already expansive military presence in the Asia-Pacific to balance China’s growing power and influence. Heightened Chinese military capabilities, rising tension, and limited U.S.-China diplomatic engagement fuel growing concerns that a war could break out between the world’s two largest powers.

Is sending more U.S. forces to the region and opening more bases the best policy to defend American interests? What military and political value do overseas bases provide to the U.S.—and what are the costs and risks of maintaining our current posture? How might China respond to an expanded U.S. presence? Are U.S. allies encouraged to do more to deter China because of our presence, or does it discourage them from balancing behaviors? Would a strategy centered on economic and diplomatic engagement better serve U.S. interests? Please join Defense Priorities for a thoughtful discussion on these important issues.

The war started by Hamas's surprise October 7 attack on Israel could still escalate into a regional conflict, even one drawing the United States into a fight with Iran. Hezbollah and Israel have exchanged fire on the Lebanese border. The Houthis in Yemen have increased missile attacks on U.S. warships and commercial shipping in the Red Sea. Groups linked in some ways to Iran have increased attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria—troops originally deployed to combat ISIS. In response, President Biden has ordered repeated strikes on Iranian facilities and personnel in Syria, organized a U.S.-led coalition to respond to Houthi attacks and keep shipping lanes open, and deployed an additional 1,200 troops to the region, increasing the total troop count to at least 45,400, with the aim of bolstering deterrence.

Is the decision to augment the number of U.S. troops in the Middle East the responsible choice? Does the U.S. military presence serve to ease tensions or exacerbate them? Are U.S. forces an effective deterrent against attacks, or do they become attractive targets for hostile actors, potentially serving as a source of coercive leverage?

Tensions have flared in the South China Sea over recent months. Various naval encounters—particularly between U.S. ally the Philippines and China and a close call between a U.S. military plane and a Chinese fighter jet—may indicate a deliberate decision by China to heighten tension. President Biden has responded with an unequivocal statement that the United States will defend the Philippines in the event of an attack in these waters, calling the mutual defense treaty “ironclad.”

Is war coming? Are the uninhabited, contested rocks and reefs worth risking great power war? How can the United States most effectively act to resolve tensions rather than elevate them? This event will examine these questions, evaluate what U.S. interests are at stake in the South China Sea, and recommend policies to advance them responsibly.

Overshadowed by wars in the Greater Middle East, the U.S. has conducted aggressive counterterrorism operations in Africa for more than 20 years.

At least 6,500 personnel at approximately 29 enduring and contingency bases around Africa support training of local militaries, intelligence collection, drone strikes, air strikes, military exercises, and other activities to eradicate terrorism from the continent.

These small wars appear to be growing in the shadows, with little oversight and only sporadic public attention, let alone debate. This panel of experts will examine these operations, scrutinizing their aims and costs.
What are U.S. objectives in Africa? Has the U.S. strategy successfully achieved them? What are the costs and benefits for the U.S. and the host nations and their people? After more than two decades of effort, what do we know about the most effective ways to prevent terrorist attacks? Are there superior alternative policies the U.S. should consider? Join us for a thoughtful discussion on these issues.

As Ukraine's offensive continues and NATO's annual summit approaches, an array of European leaders and prominent pundits are promoting NATO membership for Ukraine, either now or once the war ends. Others propose lesser forms of security guarantees for Ukraine, with the United States or other states potentially promising protection on a bilateral basis. The question of whether NATO or the United States alone should extend security guarantees to Ukraine has become vital.

Our panelists will debate the benefits and risks associated with offering Ukraine security guarantees. Supporters argue that such guarantees would deter future Russian aggression and compel Russia to engage in constructive negotiations. Opponents meanwhile contend that previous offers of NATO membership played a role in provoking the initial Russian invasion, that guarantees would not be credible, and that they would undermine U.S. security for no good reason.

Defense Priorities Director of Grand Strategy Rajan Menon just returned from an extensive trip to Ukraine—his third since the war began. Venturing beyond Kyiv to areas near the frontlines, Menon witnessed Russian assaults on Kyiv; the aftermath of key battles, like Bakhmut; and the launch of Ukraine’s long-awaited counteroffensive.

Menon will share firsthand accounts from numerous Ukrainians, including soldiers and officials, as well as his insights into the situation on the ground. We will examine the current state of the war in Ukraine, including the balance of forces as Ukraine’s counteroffensive unfolds; evaluate burgeoning proposals to guarantee Ukraine’s security beyond the ongoing conflict; and explore the prospects for a negotiated settlement—or simply an end to the war—that best advances U.S. interests.

Founded in 1949 with 12 members, NATO successfully balanced the Soviet Union during the Cold War. When the Soviet Union fell, there were 16 NATO members—today, there are 31 member states, with Sweden likely to join soon. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Ukraine’s desire for NATO membership puts post-Cold War NATO enlargement and the future of trans-Atlantic security at the forefront of foreign policy debates.

What impact has NATO had on European and American security? Did NATO enlargement strengthen the alliance by adding new contributing members and spreading democracy, or did it weaken the alliance by increasing the territory that must be protected and triggering security dilemma dynamics with Russia? Did Ukraine make a strategic mistake by pursuing NATO membership instead of armed neutrality? Given Russia’s poor conventional military performance and higher priorities in Asia, how heavily should the U.S. invest in European security?

Its preventive war in Ukraine jolted Europe, but Russia’s abysmal performance revealed its weakness—and it’s weakened further over the last year. Russian aggression also increased European unity and reinvigorated military spending debates inside many allied capitals. And the balance of power already significantly favored NATO-Europe. 

While it remains the biggest conventional threat to European security, the Russian threat is diminishing. With higher priorities elsewhere, the U.S. faces a choice about the burdens of securing the continent: it can keep them or shift them to our wealthy allies.

The Ukraine-Russia war is nearly a year old with no end in sight. Both Kyiv and Moscow eschew negotiations and seem prepared to endure a brutal war of attrition. The U.S. provided more than $100 billion in military and economic support for Ukraine and pledged to arm and aid them “for as long as it takes.”

What lessons can be drawn from the fighting so far? What is the current military balance—particularly with Russia’s mobilization effort and U.S. and European tanks on their way to Ukraine? Does either side have the capacity to mount a sustained offensive? What do the next few months hold for Ukraine, Russia, and the West, and could fighting in the spring prove decisive? What circumstances could bring escalation—whether through the use of nuclear weapons by Russia or the spread of the fighting to Crimea or NATO countries?

The war in Ukraine is nearly one year old and the prospects for peace appear remote. Separated by the Dnipro River, both sides seek incremental gains during winter. DEFP Director of Grand Strategy Rajan Menon recently traveled to Ukraine for a second time to observe the war’s latest developments.

This livestream event will provide insight into how the battlefield looks today and impressions of the military, political, and economic challenges facing Ukraine. How will the next phase of the conflict unfold for Ukraine, Russia, and the United States? What will it take for Ukraine to hold the territory it has recaptured in recent months? How should the United States adjust its policies in anticipation of a potential Russian offensive and continued escalation?

Taiwan’s dominance in advanced semiconductor manufacturing and rising U.S.-China tensions have produced alarm that an invasion or blockade of the island could cause a major disruption in the global semiconductor supply chain that the U.S. relies on to power its economy and military.

This fear of either a hostile takeover of Taiwan’s chip-manufacturing capacity or a critical interruption of chip supplies as a secondary consequence of hostilities has led some to argue that semiconductors offer an additional reason for the U.S. to defend Taiwan.

Are semiconductors actually a reason to defend Taiwan? How likely are these “nightmare scenarios” of hostile takeover or disruption? Would China actually be able to seize Taiwan’s chip-manufacturing capacity and leapfrog the U.S. technologically? Would further efforts by the U.S. to deter China over semiconductors present Beijing with a closing window, encouraging it to use force before its prospects worsen? Should the U.S. instead prioritize the status quo until it can onshore or “allyshore” semiconductor manufacturing?

August 30, 2022, marks one year from when the U.S. completed its withdrawal from Afghanistan. Some praised President Trump and President Biden’s policies to withdraw U.S. forces from Afghanistan as a prudent strategic decision which benefitted U.S. security interests. Others condemned the U.S. exit as reckless abandonment or a show of weakness.

Earlier in August, a CIA drone strike in Kabul killed Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, one of the masterminds behind the 9/11 attacks. This is indicates the U.S. maintains an “over-the-horizon” capability in Afghanistan (and beyond) to disrupt anti-U.S. terror threats. However, the Taliban have complete control over Afghanistan, and they’ve reversed many of the reforms instituted in the country during the 20-year U.S. war.

One year after the last American servicemember left Afghan soil, what are the implications of that policy decision? How should the execution of the U.S. exit inform decisions about troop levels in the greater Middle East? What is the likely affect on U.S. national security going forward?

Speaker Pelosi’s recent trip to Taiwan escalated cross-Strait tensions. China launched military live-fire drills that crossed the median line and fired missiles over Taiwan and into Japanese waters as part of its largest-ever military exercises around the island; China also suspended/ended cooperation with the U.S. on climate-change and anti-drug efforts. All of this heightens risks and adds urgency to key questions about the U.S. relationship with Taiwan.

What are vital U.S. interests in Asia and do they include defending Taiwan? Do the longstanding policies of “One China” and “strategic ambiguity” still serve U.S. interests? How much support can the U.S. provide Taiwan before China considers forcibly integrating it? Would Taiwan's fall endanger other Asian states? What role might other Asian powers, like Japan, play in a conflict over Taiwan?

Keeping competition with China limited and peaceful is probably the most important foreign policy challenge facing the country today. Please join DEFP’s Asia Engagement program for a thoughtful discussion about all these critical issues.

The Department of Defense now estimates that China will have 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030–meaning this decade will see a massive buildup from today’s 350. This has led some analysts to alarming conclusions, like China is trying to outgun the United States or use its arsenal to bid for hegemony in Asia. But Lyle Goldstein, in a new paper for Defense Priorities, argues it isn’t so, that China–at least partially in response to U.S. nuclear doctrine, U.S. initiatives to develop ballistic missile defense, and a decline U.S.-China relations–has merely upped its estimate of what it takes to deter the United States. It has adjusted, not abandoned, its traditional “minimum deterrence” strategy.

What do China’s new ICBMs, submarine-launched weapons, a new generation of strategic bombers, and advances in hypersonic weapons mean for stability in Asia and U.S. deterrence? Is arms control futile? Is China repeating U.S. Cold War mistakes?

The Russian military buildup along its 1,200-mile border with Ukraine has renewed concerns Russia will again invade its neighbor. It is clear the U.S. and NATO will not defend Ukraine. Without outside help, Ukraine stands little chance of resisting an attack.

With deterrence basically off the table, invasion then turns on Moscow’s whims and on whether the United States and European powers can prevent an attack with a diplomatic push that answers Russia’s major demands.

What political outcome will satisfy both the United States and Russia? What reforms to Europe’s security order would help stave off Ukraine-Russia conflict and future crises?

The U.S. deploys more than 200,000 military personnel globally in hundreds of military installations ranging from expeditionary outposts to sprawling mini-cities.

The U.S. commitment to defend Europe means, even post-Cold War, approximately 70,000 American servicemembers permanently deploy there. After nearly 30 years of war, around 40,000 U.S. servicemembers constantly rotate throughout the Middle East. With a shifting global balance of power, the U.S. military stations nearly 100,000 Americans across the Indo-Pacific—fraught U.S.-China tensions might mean more sent to Asia soon.

What American military presence is actually needed abroad, and where, to protect U.S security and prosperity?

The Biden Administration has just released its long-awaited Global Posture Review (GPR)—though virtually the entire document is classified. This review, the first of its kind since 2004, promised to ensure "America's military footprint is appropriately aligned with our foreign policy and national security priorities."

The limited information released from the GPR signals no major changes. Minor reinforcements have been made to U.S. forces in South Korea and Australia, and infrastructure improvements are slated to begin in Guam. But the U.S. force posture in Europe, the Middle East, and the rest of the world will remain as is.

Is the GPR an incremental step forward, even if oversold, or just a ratification of the status quo? With strategic competition with China firmly in front of us, what should the U.S. global posture look like? Is the United States long overdue to significantly change its overseas military footprint?

More than 18 years after 9/11, U.S. forces remain mired in Afghanistan and a host of lesser campaigns in the Greater Middle East.

The 2001 AUMF—which authorized U.S. military action to pursue and destroy those responsible for the attacks—has been used to justify military force in more than 40 countries, yet there are now more than four times as many Salafi-jihadist militants worldwide as there were when the global war on terror (GWOT) began.

Why has American power and wealth manifestly failed to defeat radical Islamic terrorism? What is the reality for American servicemen on the ground in Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, and other theaters?

The failure of the GWOT invites a host of deeper questions about the U.S. and its military: Is there an alternate strategy to effectively counter terrorist threats without permanently deploying ground troops? What are attainable objectives—tactical, operational, and strategic—for necessary U.S. military expeditions? What damage is overextension from open-ended wars causing the U.S. military? What do our all-volunteer military and our willingness to go to war tell us about America’s social compact in 2019? How should ground truths about ground wars inform national security policy and congressional war-making powers?

Defense Priorities and Catholic University’s Center for the Study of Statesmanship (CSS) are delighted to invite you to “NATO at 70: Vital, relevant, or obsolete?,” a panel discussion on the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

As NATO celebrates its 70th birthday next week, the military alliance faces renewed questions about its purpose, cohesion, and future.

President Trump’s antipathy toward NATO is well documented. Yet even friends of the alliance acknowledge that NATO’s capabilities and will are increasingly in question.

Last week brought news that Germany, one of the wealthiest and most important NATO members, has chosen not to spend even a paltry 1.5% of GDP on defense in the years to come. Some members contribute even less. And when put to the test in combat in Afghanistan and Libya, NATO performed unevenly, at best.

Is NATO’s original purpose of keeping “the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down” still relevant, nearly thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall? What are America’s vital national interests in Europe? Does America’s current role in the alliance enhance or hold back European collective security?

Geopolitics in the 21st Century is poised to revolve around the U.S.-China relationship. Russia presents different, but still significant, challenges.

The latest National Security Strategy called for focusing America's foreign policy tools on great power competition, especially with China and Russia. Nonetheless, counterterrorism continues to absorb substantial resources and attention. As operations wind down in Syria and Afghanistan, however, the practice of American foreign policy may finally be shifting.

Recognizing the need to prioritize relations with great powers is only the first step. The way in which the United States engages them is crucial.

Nuclear weapons with global reach encourage all sides to avoid military conflict, so what does competition under deterrence and mutually assured destruction look like? How should we balance and use economic, diplomatic, and military tools of statecraft to achieve realistic political outcomes that benefit the American people? How do domestic economic, cultural, and political outcomes affect the conduct of international affairs?

Most Americans reacted with horror and outrage as we learned about the barbaric murder of Saudi citizen, U.S. resident, and contributor to The Washington Post Jamal Khashoggi. According to recent reports, the CIA assesses Mohammad bin Salman (MbS) ordered the murder.

In the wake of this latest incident and other recent aggressive actions—kidnapping Lebanon's prime minister, blockading Qatar, intervening in Yemen's civil war, among others—it's increasingly apparent that U.S.-Saudi relations need reappraisal.

However, as the Trump administration has argued, a strategic relationship must place higher value on safeguarding U.S. interests—in other words, our alliance with Saudi Arabia is a "necessary evil."

But is that true? Is an alliance with Saudi Arabia a necessary evil?

Here are some of the overdue questions which should be answered about U.S.-Middle East policy and our relationship with Saudi Arabia:

What are U.S. interests in the Middle East today, and how have they changed since the Cold War? What does Saudi Arabia do for the United States? Should we recalibrate U.S.-Saudi Arabia relations, treating it like a normal autocratic country? How should the United States pursue its legitimate security and prosperity interests in the region?

In 1992, the United States stood at the pinnacle of world power—Americans were confident that a new era of peace and prosperity was at hand. Today, those hopes have been dashed.

Relations with Russia and China have soured, the European Union is wobbling, partisan politics are increasingly vicious, and the United States is stuck in costly and counterproductive wars that have expended trillions of taxpayer dollars and undermined its influence around the world.

In a new book, Harvard professor Stephen Walt argues that the root of this dismal record is the Washington foreign policy establishment’s stubborn commitment to a strategy of “liberal hegemony.”

Since the end of the Cold War, Republicans and Democrats alike have tried to use U.S. power to spread democracy, open markets, and other liberal values into every nook and cranny of the planet. This strategy was doomed to fail, but its proponents in the foreign policy elite were never held accountable and kept repeating the same mistakes.

The best alternative, Walt argues, is a return to the realist strategy of “offshore balancing,” which eschews regime change, nation-building, and other forms of global social engineering. The American people would surely welcome a more restrained foreign policy, one that allowed greater attention to problems here at home. This long-overdue shift will require abandoning the futile quest for liberal hegemony and building a foreign policy establishment with a more realistic view of American interests and power.

With the U.S. military intervention in Syria almost four years old and the Islamic State’s caliphate nearly eliminated, it’s past time to answer some basic questions about the war there: What are America's interests in Syria? What does the U.S. hope to achieve by remaining involved in Syria's civil war? What are the risks of sustained entanglement, and are they justified?

The United States intervened in Syria in 2014 to help regional powers reverse the gains the Islamic State had made. With their caliphate now a shrinking patch of desert, that aim is nearly achieved.

Many in the Washington foreign policy establishment say that the conflict cannot be resolved as long as Bashar al-Assad’s brutal regime remains in power. It’s true that his failure to address Syrians’ legitimate grievances sparked the civil war in 2011. But tragically, no credible alternative exists there today, let alone one who could govern Syria the way Americans would like. The likelier alternative is that no one rules, and the civil war continues killing Syrians, attracting foreign meddling and fanning extremism.

The Islamic State's collapse is bringing barely suppressed regional rivalries and enmities back to Syria's front lines. Every day, U.S. forces there risk conflict with Russia and other powers. The official rationale for our presence keeps changing without cohering into a clear argument about how a sustained U.S. military presence advances America’s interests. It is the responsibility of Congress, at a minimum, to demand answers.

Since the catalyzing horror of the 2001 attacks, the United States has undertaken a broad approach to attempt to counter terrorism, including changing regimes hostile to American interests.

From Iraq to Libya—and potentially Syria, Iran, and North Korea—Washington has pursued policies to change regimes' behavior. When sanctions and pressure have failed, rather than manage problems and hedge against risks, presidential administrations have sometimes opted to launch regime change campaigns to reorder societies in distant lands.

But have these efforts delivered the promised outcomes? If not, is it a failure of tactics or strategy?

What, if anything, can the U.S. do to accelerate political change in foreign countries without creating negative, unintended consequences? Does toppling regimes—not only through military interventions, but also any attempts short of kinetic operations—unleash forces beyond our control? What strategies might deliver better results for American security and prosperity?

Our upcoming briefing will provide analysis of the principles, practice, and dynamics of relations with unsavory nations.

The United States and the Soviet Union were allies during WWII and enemies during the Cold War. America stood for freedom and the dignity of the individual—the Soviet Union subjugated persons to the collective and committed gross violations of human rights. We threatened each other with nuclear annihilation and competed globally for power and influence.

The Cold War could have ended in calamity, but instead, the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union itself dissolved peacefully. Russia and other formerly communist states then faced daunting challenges for restructuring economic, political, and security arrangements. Russia was, and remains, a shadow of the USSR, but it has regained its footing in the last 27 years.

Today’s Russia poses a substantially different threat to the U.S. than during the Cold War. It is much weaker but still must be taken seriously. Only Russia's nuclear arsenal comes close to matching America's in number, and its conventional forces have legitimate capabilities near its borders. It has interfered with elections abroad, including America's, engaged in cyber-aggression, violated internationally accepted borders, and more. And yet, Russia isn't going anywhere.

Americans must better understand Russia's interests and what they will risk to secure them. This will help us determine our best options for advancing America's security and prosperity interests despite Russian actions. Please join us for a discussion of a realistic, interests-based approach to the U.S. relationship with Russia.

As the cooling off period during the Winter Olympics fades, reality about the standoff with North Korea resumes.

The U.S. insists it will settle for nothing short of total denuclearization by North Korea. North Korea insists—and indeed has shown through its spending and behavior—that it is totally committed to developing and maintaining a nuclear deterrent capability.

As these mutually exclusive interests and objectives collide, there are only two options to end this stalemate: preventive war or deterrence and diplomacy.

What is the basis for the Trump administration's campaign of "maximum pressure"?

What is the rationale for National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster's warning that, "[North Korea's] intentions are to use that weapon for nuclear blackmail, and then, to, quote, you know, 'reunify' the peninsula under the red banner"? Is such a scenario possible or likely?

What can and should the United States prioritize: denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula or ensuring North Korea never uses its nuclear weapons capability, which it first demonstrated in 2006?

If Washington insists on denuclearization, what price are we willing to pay to achieve such an outcome—the most costly of which would be preventive war? Should we consider direct engagement to discourage mishandling of nuclear material, miscalculation, and proliferation?

Brigadier General Robert P. Givens, USAF, Ret. will explain why some support preventative war—as McMaster seems to—and what it would look like. Dr. David Kang will discuss the merits of deterrence—based on our overwhelming nuclear and conventional superiority—and diplomacy.

President Trump's new National Security Strategy rightly focuses on competition between countries:

"China has mounted a rapid military modernization campaign designed to limit U.S. access to the region and provide China a freer hand there. China presents its ambitions as mutually beneficial, but Chinese dominance risks diminishing the sovereignty of many states in the Indo-Pacific. States throughout the region are calling for sustained U.S. leadership in a collective response that upholds a regional order respectful of sovereignty and independence."

Since the last war between great powers—the Second World War—strategies for security, prosperity, and influence have changed dramatically.

Mutual nuclear deterrence, stealth, the precision revolution, cyber espionage and related threats, space operations, distributed design and 3-D printing, autonomous vehicles, social media, anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems, and more are combining to relentlessly force military tactics and strategies to adapt.

They also affect the costs and benefits of higher-level foreign policy choices, especially in America's relationship with a rising China.

What are America's security and prosperity interests in the region, and what is the best way to advance them? In particular, can America promote a balance of power that empowers our partners and allies to take more responsibility for their sovereignty? What is the most effective way for the United States to prevent a hostile power from dominating the region?