Taiwan’s dominance in advanced semiconductor manufacturing and rising U.S.-China tensions have produced alarm that an invasion or blockade of the island could cause a major disruption in the global semiconductor supply chain that the U.S. relies on to power its economy and military.

This fear of either a hostile takeover of Taiwan’s chip-manufacturing capacity or a critical interruption of chip supplies as a secondary consequence of hostilities has led some to argue that semiconductors offer an additional reason for the U.S. to defend Taiwan.

Are semiconductors actually a reason to defend Taiwan? How likely are these “nightmare scenarios” of hostile takeover or disruption? Would China actually be able to seize Taiwan’s chip-manufacturing capacity and leapfrog the U.S. technologically? Would further efforts by the U.S. to deter China over semiconductors present Beijing with a closing window, encouraging it to use force before its prospects worsen? Should the U.S. instead prioritize the status quo until it can onshore or “allyshore” semiconductor manufacturing?