Research and writing
China has the world’s largest navy, but there are important questions about its ability to contest the United States on a global scale. To do so, China would need more overseas bases than the two it currently has in Djibouti and Cambodia. Similarly, its aircraft carriers cannot sustain high-tempo aviation operations beyond the First Island Chain for an extended period. Developing super-quiet attack submarines would markedly improve China’s ability to conduct blue-water operations. However, to date, China has not fielded submarines that match the technological capabilities of U.S. boats. A careful examination of China’s naval strength shows that while it is well-positioned to wage a war close to its shores, the PLAN is not a global peer of the U.S. Navy.
The second installment in DEFP's series on topics in grand strategy is on the concept of the "balance of power"—both the distribution of power among states or an approximate equilibrium of power between states. When a state or bloc become powerful enough to threaten to dominate its region, other states tend to pool resources and form alliances in order to “balance” against the threat. Restrainers believe that Washington can and should encourage its allies to directly counter threats in their own regions, rather than maintain their status as dependents that outsource their security to an increasingly overstretched United States. This would not only be a more resilient and stable condition in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East, it would also help preserve the United States' power position.
Grand strategy is a state’s theory about how to provide for its own security. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States’ grand strategy shifted from one of maintenance of the balance of power in Eurasia to a militaristic and primacist idea of "liberal hegemony." This has proven to be a costly and bloody failure, and has left the United States strategically overextended. The United States should shift to a grand strategy of restraint, which will better preserve its power, minimize the risk of war, and turn over to its allies the responsibility for their own defense.
Despite Russia’s recent capture of Avdiivka, the war in Ukraine is entering its third year at a relative stalemate. Major changes to the 600-mile long frontline are few and far between, with Ukraine and Russia finding offensive warfare costly and resource-intensive. At the same time, neither side is willing to compromise on its maximalist aims, making talks on a ceasefire or end-of-war settlement remote. Yet with additional U.S. military aid to Ukraine stalled in Congress, questions arise as to how long the U.S. can maintain the status quo—and whether it even should. This brief argues that U.S. policy toward Ukraine and Europe overall is in need of significant reform. A combination of defensive security aid to the Ukrainian military, real burden-sharing in Europe and avoiding firm U.S. defense commitments to Ukraine has a better chance of accomplishing the limited U.S. interests at stake with less risk and at reasonable cost.
Houthi attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden have shown no signs of stopping, as multiple rounds of U.S. airstrikes inside Yemen have only succeeded in prompting more reprisals against merchant vessels. As regional tensions stemming from the Israel-Hamas war continue to build, policymakers must thoroughly consider all aspects of national power in approaching this problem. What policy options are available to the White House in handling this crisis? What do they entail? What are their advantages and drawbacks? This brief presents and evaluates various U.S. policy responses to Houthi attacks and finds that less escalatory prescriptions like diplomacy, buck-passing, and defense stand a better chance at success while carrying fewer risks for the United States than more aggressive options like indefinite military operations in Yemen.
Missing from foreign policy discussions at large are inquiries about how foreign intervention may change the scope or types of government activities conducted domestically. People involved in foreign interventions develop skills abroad which they afterward bring home to domestic organizations, such as local police departments. A full accounting of the costs of foreign interventions must recognize that government activism abroad runs the risk of undermining domestic freedoms.
The war between Israel and Hamas has increased the threat to U.S. troops in the Middle East, particularly to the 3,400 personnel in Iraq and Syria. But there is no good reason for U.S. forces to be there. The U.S. presence needlessly risks war by allowing Iran and militias it funds to threaten U.S. troops. ISIS’s capabilities have been degraded, capable local actors eagerly hunt the groups’ remnants, and the United States can still strike from a long distance if necessary. U.S. forces should be withdrawn from Iraq and Syria as part of a broader effort to deprioritize the Middle East and avoid an ill-advised conflict with Iran.
The Israel-Saudi normalization deal is still alive and still could be a bad deal for the United States. The war in Gaza has pushed the sweeping U.S.-backed diplomatic normalization deal between Saudi Arabia and Israel to the back burner, but both governments are likely to try to revive it at some point. This brief examines the drivers of the normalization deal, analyzes the case for and against it from the perspective of U.S. interests, and concludes that it is not worth much to Americans—nothing like the reported concessions the United States was prepared to make. Security guarantees for Saudi Arabia in particular should be avoided.
The Israel-Hamas conflict shows little signs of slowing down, and the risk of a wider war remains credible. This brief examines and addresses the complex dynamics at play that could cause the crisis to expand, and it clearly defines parameters for how the U.S. should navigate the conflict. Washington should avoid direct U.S. military involvement, work with all parties to prevent escalation, and redeploy troops out of Syria—and eventually Iraq—which denies Iran leverage for broadening the war.
The balance of power in East Asia has shifted in China's favor, but it does not follow that China constitutes a major threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of all neighboring states. As DEFP Non-Resident Fellow Peter Harris argues in a new explainer, upholding peace and stability in East Asia does not require U.S. military primacy. U.S. efforts to dominate the region could backfire by intensifying the U.S.-China rivalry and plunging East Asia into a new cold war. A more sensible approach would be to move toward an offshore balancing posture that incentivizes capable regional states to provide for their own defense and deter Chinese aggression.
Washington’s current Syria policy is failing and misguided, and it should be abandoned for one consistent with U.S. interests. The approximately 900 U.S. military forces in northeastern Syria lack a justifying rationale given the last ISIS-held territory was liberated in March 2019, more than four years ago—continued occupation with so few forces, and without a vital U.S. security goal, runs needless risks with imperceptible potential gains. U.S. forces are vulnerable to local militias with local aims that could otherwise not reach them. Existing sanctions punish regular Syrians in service of unrealistic, unnecessary regime-change goals. Syria is a strategically unimportant country that poses no direct threat to the United States nor its limited and diminishing interests in the Middle East. With higher priorities at home and in Asia, the U.S. should recalibrate sanctions and end its open-ended presence in Syria.
The recent coup in Niger—home to over 1,000 U.S. forces—shed light on one of the many counterterrorism missions the United States is waging across Africa with little scrutiny or oversight.
In a new explainer, Visiting Fellow C. William Walldorf Jr. explains why and how U.S. counterterrorism policy in Africa needs to change. U.S. policy there has been not just disappointing but counterproductive, exacerbating the problem of Islamic terrorism. As terrorists continue to operate in Africa and local U.S. partners become less popular the dangers of mission creep have risen. U.S. forces across the continent are applying too much force against too little of a threat, and U.S. security assistance has failed to address the issues that breed terrorism in the first place. Indeed, in many cases, local partners have used U.S. training and aid to launch coups, commit human rights abuses against their own people, and shore up corrupt governments.
U.S. interests would be better served if U.S. forces were withdrawn from Africa and security assistance to local partners was curbed. Rather than perpetuate a failed policy, Washington needs to end these decades-long missions and revise its assessment of the threat posed by Islamic terrorism.
Even as the war with Russia continues, Ukraine is demanding NATO membership, or at least a path to it, and some lesser security guarantees in the interim. The United States should say no, closing the door to committing to fight a future war for Ukraine. The benefits of fighting for Ukraine are lacking—Ukraine is neither a prize that Russia can use to rebuild its Soviet empire nor an example that will destabilize global politics. The risks of fighting for Ukraine meanwhile are severe—entailing a real prospect of nuclear war and mass destruction. Because of these risks, the United States has not and will not directly fight Russia on behalf of Ukraine. That means U.S. commitments to militarily defend Ukraine, even through NATO, will not be credible; they will be an obvious bluff. Such false promises will not only leave Ukraine exposed to Russia, they will increase its peril, by preserving a cause of war and encouraging Ukraine to make poor choices based on the false hope of western protection. Armed neutrality, where the United States and its allies continue to arm Ukraine to deter future Russia aggression is a safer and more credible alternative.
Is nuclear deterrence eroding? Recent developments in international affairs and military technology lead some analysts to conclude the nuclear revolution, which purportedly prevents war between nuclear powers, no longer has much effect. They say the world is getting safer for nuclear war or conventional war beneath the nuclear umbrella, which makes it likely that states, starting with China, will test U.S. commitments to fight for their allies. This paper argues these conclusions are wrong. Using recent cases that some claim are evidence of deterrence failure—Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the 2017 “fire and fury” crisis between the United States and North Korea—it demonstrates that nuclear deterrence remains robust.
Understanding the underlying causes and conditions that led to the Russo-Ukrainian war may help resolve the conflict and avoid future crises. Dominant narratives, which blame the pathologies of the Russian government and its opposition to Ukraine’s democratic efforts, fail to adequately account for what led to the invasion. Instead, realist theories of international relations consider Russia’s security concerns and warnings, highlight the problems posed by post-Cold War NATO expansion, and accurately predicted a conflict between the neighboring countries. This paper compares the realist and liberal explanations for the war’s outbreak and argues U.S. policy should give greater consideration to realist views going forward.
It needs to be acknowledged that U.S. contributions to NATO could be scaled back in the face of contending domestic priorities or competing demands for military resources in Asia. In either event, Europe would need to take up the primary burden for its defense. Realistic discussions of what that could look like in practice are therefore prudent. A serious effort to enhance European defensive autonomy would open the door to a range of issues—including the need for increased European defense spending, difficult questions of command arrangements, and complex issues related to nuclear-sharing and deterrence. None of these matters present easy answers, but what follows is an exploration of issues that would need to be addressed to make greater European defensive autonomy a reality.
U.S. leaders often express the fear that leaving the Middle East or removing U.S. forces from warzones there and in other parts of the world will leave “vacuums,” which adversaries will fill. This fear misunderstands international politics. Vacuum fears imagine a precarious global balance of power where minor gains by U.S. adversaries create grave dangers, but in reality, the U.S. is quite secure and does not need to worry about its adversaries potentially making minor gains by rushing into U.S.-made vacuums.
NATO was founded to deter a Soviet attack on Western Europe. However, U.S. military presence in Europe today lacks a clear mission beyond sustaining U.S. dominance in Europe. Washington has frequently talked about the need for burden sharing with its European allies, but a more far-reaching approach of burden shifting is needed. The explainer presents recommendations for how to implement burden shifting and explains how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has made burden shifting even more prudent.
The ongoing Russo-Ukraine war is analogous to a hypothetical war between China and Taiwan. Taiwan cannot assume the United States will fight on its behalf and should invest in anti-access, area-denial weaponry. While Taiwan can expect global support if attacked, challenges exist for aid to be delivered and employed. Sanctions against China are unlikely to deter them if they choose to invade Taiwan. Taiwan should learn applicable lessons from the war in Ukraine and use them to secure their continued safety and prosperity.
The United States is obligated by treaty to defend 51 countries with military force. Beyond its formal allies, the United States also has several quasi-allies, or states the U.S. is not explicitly committed to defend but to which it provides substantial amounts of military and political support. While many experts assume more allies means the United States is more secure, quasi-allies present clear dangers for U.S. interests. The United States should be wary of the risks quasi-allies pose and avoid loose talk and policy that may commit it to a quasi-ally’s defense.
Many experts have expressed fears that China could either stage a hostile takeover of Taiwan’s semiconductor chip-manufacturing capacity or effect a critical disruption of chip supplies as a secondary consequence of a blockade or protracted invasion of the island. Some have therefore argued that these “nightmare scenarios” provide additional reasons for the United States to defend Taiwan. Neither of these scenarios, however, justify an explicit commitment to defend Taiwan or the risk of a great power war with China.
Great powers routinely stake out geographic zones within which they limit the autonomy of weaker states. The prominence of these spheres of influence depends largely on the distribution of power in the international system. During the post-Cold War moment of unipolarity, the U.S. alone was able to assert a sphere of influence. However, with the increase in great power competition, the relevant question now is not if the transition to a world of multiple spheres of influence will take place (given the structural changes at the level of international order, it most certainly will), but how the U.S. should manage this development in ways that are conducive to U.S. interests.
Policymakers have poorly defined U.S. strategic interests in the Russia-Ukraine War, and those interests that have been defined do not stand up to scrutiny. Actual U.S. interests in Ukraine are essentially negative: preventing further escalation or spillover of the conflict and limiting a wholesale collapse in U.S.-Russian relations. The limited, core interests the U.S. does have in Ukraine suggest that Washington should try to convince Ukraine and Russia to accept a negotiated settlement.
U.S.-Iran nuclear diplomacy is on the brink of collapse. A year after President Trump withdrew from the JCPOA, Iran restarted and advanced its nuclear program. Despite re-engaging with Tehran diplomatically, the Biden administration has so far failed to revive the JCPOA in large part because the administration continues its predecessor’s approach of maximum pressure. If the administration doesn’t shift course, it will likely destroy the JCPOA, and Iran will move toward a bomb. This predictable failure, however, would not justify preventive military strikes that could result in U.S.-Iran war.
A careful reading of the Greek Thucydides’ The History of the Peloponnesian War suggests that a U.S.-China war is hardly inevitable. Such a war is a choice, not a trap—and selecting the appropriate U.S. grand strategy is the way to avoid it. Despite China’s rise, the United States and its regional allies are in a strong position to maintain a regional balance of power that keeps a peace and serve U.S. interests in Asia.
Melting ice is poised to make the Arctic more accessible for commercial and military activity. But neither that shift nor competition with Russia and China elsewhere translate into a threat to the United States in the Arctic. Washington should base U.S.-Arctic policy on the reality that the United States enjoys a strong conventional and nuclear deterrent, a robust network of Arctic allies, and favorable geography. With this in mind, the United States should avoid mistaking the Arctic for a new arena for military competition.
A continued military-centric approach to cyber issues risks underservicing the other core competencies of U.S. statecraft—intelligence, diplomacy, law enforcement, and other tools—necessary to address illicit cyber activity like ransomware and state-backed hacking. The most persistent and enduring threats from the cyber domain are best addressed through investments in civil infrastructure, public-private resiliency, and international coalitions and less through military superiority.
Over the past several decades, U.S. foreign policy has increasingly become devoted to democratizing the world, by force if necessary. Recent rhetoric about a global struggle between autocracy and democracy is a reflection of this. The United States should return to its founding ethos where its foreign policy tries to make the world safe for self-determination, and hence democracy, rather than trying to democratize the world. This will again make the U.S. an advocate of peace and stability, rather than a revolutionary power that promotes instability. It will also improve U.S. security.
Admitting Finland into NATO constitutes a permanent defense commitment by the alliance. In the case of the United States, it also entails a further extension of its nuclear umbrella. Such moves warrant a fulsome public debate, not a rush to action. U.S. forces cannot be everywhere at once. New, permanent security commitments in northern Europe should be examined relative to other U.S. global priorities and take into account Finland’s defensibility—not just now, but in the face of a revitalized, long-term Russian threat.
In the opening rounds of the war, Russian armed forces made major errors in both the operational and tactical realm. In recent weeks though, Russia has made slow, methodical progress on the northern shoulder of Donbas. If Russia defeats Ukraine in the Battle of Donbas, Kyiv will face a difficult choice: (1) dig in and continue fighting, even though much of its most effective forces will have been captured or killed or (2) negotiate with Russia to trade territory lost since 2014 to stanch further losses of Ukrainian lives and territory.
