Realistic victory in Ukraine?

An acceptable and attainable peace in Ukraine, the bigger NATO conversation, why the U.S. can't have it all, and more.

Unhappy anniversary

Ukraine's defense is in dire straits. What would a realistic victory look like?

The second anniversary of Russia's invasion of Ukraine sees Moscow riding high: battlefield gains for Russian and "extremely difficult" conditions for Ukraine, the prison death of opposition leader Aleksei Navalny, a Russian economy unexpectedly resilient under sanctions, rumors of Russian space nukes, and U.S. aid to Ukraine tied up in a divided Congress.

Ukrainians' courage and dogged self-defense have won sympathy and support the world over. But we do Ukraine no favors if we are unrealistic about political and military realities, however grim they may be. At the two-year mark, it is unfortunately necessary to ask: Can Ukraine still win? Or perhaps we should say: What would an acceptable and attainable peace look like in Ukraine—and what would it take to get there?

Conditions at the two-year mark

  • A year ago, many "thought Russia might be on the verge of strategic defeat in Ukraine. … Now that optimism appeared premature at best, faintly delusional at worst." [NYT / David E. Sanger and Steven Erlanger]

  • This month, "Russia made its first major gain in Ukraine in nearly a year, taking the ruined city of Avdiivka, at huge human cost to both sides, the bodies littered along the roads a warning, perhaps, of a new course in the two-year-old war." [NYT / Sanger and Erlanger]

  • "Without dominant hills, larger rivers or extensive fortifications of the kind it built around Avdiivka over the better part of a decade, Ukraine will probably have to cede more ground to hold back Russian units." [NYT / Thomas Gibbons-Neff]

  • "[D]isaffection about Ukraine aid in the United States really isn't a Russian plot, as some pundits are starting to claim. It's about broad-based unhappiness about the amount of money that's being sent over there, the question of why European states aren't contributing more, and why the Biden administration appears to have no endgame for resolving the conflict." [FP / Emma Ashford]

  • "People came to very strong conclusions based off the first month of the war," said Rob Lee of the Foreign Policy Research Institute. "And I think a lot of those conclusions were wrong." [The New Yorker / Keith Gessen]

Toward an acceptable and attainable peace

  • Seek a realistic victory: "You have to create the space for Ukraine to claim victory under less-than-ideal conditions. Because, if you say the only thing that is victory is the Russians go home entirely from Crimea and Donbas, Ukraine is in NATO, and Moscow somehow disappears off the face of the earth—that's an unrealistic goal," said Olga Oliker of the International Crisis Group. [The New Yorker / Keith Gessen]

  • Focus on defense: "[V]ictory for Kyiv and its Western partners does not necessarily require gaining back specific chunks of territory. It simply requires that Russian President Vladimir Putin be denied his goal of subjugating Ukraine," and that denial in turn can "open the door for negotiations." [Foreign Affairs / Emma Ashford and Kelly A. Grieco]

  • Plan for diplomacy: "[T]he United States could be doing more to enable diplomacy. […] Laying the groundwork for eventual negotiations could reduce the risk of … dangerous outcomes and help chart a path toward ending the war." [Foreign Affairs / Samuel Charap and Miranda Priebe]

  • Consider an armistice: "Embracing a 'Korean Scenario' may provide the best prospect for both the Ukrainian people and a return to global stability. It would allow both sides to stop fighting with an immediate armistice along the present line of contact, while putting aside most of the complexities of peacemaking." [RS / Lyle Goldstein]

  • Think beyond NATO: "Guaranteeing Ukraine's security serves no major U.S. interest and would increase the risk of a U.S. or NATO war with Russia and nuclear escalation." [DEFP / Benjamin H. Friedman]

Trendlines

"Though public support for Ukraine in the West remains high, there are growing concerns in Kyiv about the depth of U.S. commitment," The Wall Street Journal reports. "A Pew Research Center survey of U.S. adults found that the percentage of people saying Washington is providing too much support rose to 31 percent in December from 7 percent at the start of the war."

See more data on the war in Ukraine from the WSJ.

Quoted

"Does Trump sound like a mafia don running a protection racket? He sure does. But is there something more to this debate? I think so. The polite establishmentarian wing of the policy community has made these complaints too. The rude, boorish mafia don Trump version of this, sad to say, may be required to get the Europeans' attention. Trump has gotten the Europeans' attention."

– Justin Logan, director of defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, as quoted in "Trump didn't quit NATO, but a potential second term alarms allies." [WaPo / Isaac Arnsdorf]

livestream

Can Ukraine still win? Evaluating U.S. interests and policy options

Defense Priorities hosted a live discussion on Tuesday, February 20 on how U.S. policy should adjust to deal with Ukraine's changed fortunes. Panelists were Michael Kofman, Emma Ashford, Daniel Davis, and moderated by Benjamin Friedman.

Sober Analysis

Why America can't have it all

[Foreign Affairs / Stephen Wertheim]

American officials bear responsibility for making a failed wager of their own. They hoped entire regions of the world would sit still because they preferred to turn their gaze elsewhere, even as the United States remained ensconced in those regions' security arrangements. The Biden administration wanted to prioritize what in its view mattered most while declining to disentangle the United States from what mattered less.

This is a form of wishful thinking—perhaps as naive as invading countries to liberate them—and ought to be recognized as such. […] Going forward, the options are stark: the United States can selectively retrench and control costs and risks, or it can stick with global primacy and lurch from crisis to crisis.

Read the full analysis here.

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