Assessing U.S. grand strategy at the end of 2023, pushing east of the Dnipro, Israel-Saudi normalization, and more.
GRAND STRATEGY
America is ending 2023 with overstretched defenses and needless risk
The first year of President Joe Biden's foreign policy was dominated by the remnants of the post-9/11 era, most notably the overdue U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. Nearly three years into his tenure, though U.S. drawdown from longstanding conflicts in the greater Middle East is far from complete, the overall picture looks markedly different.
Now, as DEFP Fellow Christopher McCallion contends in a carefully argued new article for CNN, "America currently finds itself embroiled in three major geopolitical crises, in three distant parts of the world, pitting it against three consequential powers"—Russia, China, and Iran—"on behalf of three countries"—Ukraine, Taiwan, and Israel—"that are not treaty allies of the United States."
Now, in fact, "Biden is making more foreign policy messes than he's fixing." U.S. grand strategy is due for review and reform.
THree global crises
Russia's invasion of Ukraine: "In Eastern Europe, the U.S. is essentially engaged in a proxy war with Russia over the latter's invasion of Ukraine."
Rising tensions over Taiwan: "In East Asia, the U.S. risks a catastrophic showdown with China over the political status of Taiwan."
The Israel-Hamas war: "U.S. forces are still on hand in the Middle East to deter Iran and Hezbollah from intervening against Israel in its war with Hamas, putting American troops at risk and threatening to pull the U.S. into another major war in the region."
Israel is conventionally spoken of as a U.S. "ally," but there is no U.S.-Israel mutual defense treaty.
As DEFP's Natalie Armbruster and Benjamin Friedman explain, Israel is one of several "'major non-NATO allies,' a legal status that 'provides military and economic privileges,' but 'does not entail any security commitments to the designated country.'"
This is a unilateral U.S. designation which does not obligate the recipient country to come to American defense.
A FLAWED THEORY OF LEADERSHIP
The theory behind our current strategy is as tired as it is predictable—and dangerous.
These "flashpoints are interconnected fronts" in "a global struggle between democracy and autocracy," Biden said in October. "American leadership is what holds the world together," he argued then, reiterating the theory in a WaPo op-ed this month.
"These claims do not stand up to scrutiny," McCallion writes, "America's entanglement in these crises is only further overstretching its capabilities, courting unnecessary risks, inflaming local enmities, and depriving the American people of resources better used at home."
A BETTER STRATEGY
"The U.S. should adopt a more restrained grand strategy," McCallion concludes, "one that would more rigorously set priorities among foreign interests, entail fewer risks of entanglement, be less prone to provoke distant rivals, and be more aligned with America’s domestic resources and needs."
"First, the U.S. should not maintain eternal allies and enemies."
"Second, the U.S. should stop uniting its adversaries."
"Third, the United States should shift the burden of managing regional threats over to its regional partners."
"Finally, if the U.S. wants to advance democratic values around the world, it should do so by providing a compelling model of successful democracy at home."
► Read McCallion's full analysis here ◄
QUOTED
"It's certainly an important accomplishment [for Ukraine] to get a foothold east of the Dnipro, less for the pure military value than the ability to argue that they are still making progress and can still evict Russia from their land by force. [But] it's not likely to be a prelude to any breakthrough. So I think it's a bit helpful politically to buck up Western supporters, but won't matter much."
– DEFP Policy Director Benjamin Friedman as quoted in, "Ukraine makes small—but significant—gains in counteroffensive against Russia" [Yahoo News / Alexander Nazaryan]
MAPPED
Territorial control in Syria's civil war (2017–2023)
After 12 years of civil war, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's government has consolidated its power. The anti-Assad armed opposition is relegated to the northwestern province of Idlib, and after the defeat of its territorial caliphate, ISIS remnants only pose a local threat.
In this context, keeping hundreds of U.S. forces in Syria in perpetuity exposes us to risks—including sporadic attacks and escalation with various actors—which outweigh any rewards.
Read more about the reset that U.S. strategy in Syria needs.
Sober analysis
What good does Israel-Saudi normalization do for the U.S.?
[DEFP / Michael DiMino and Daniel DePetris]
The question isn't whether normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia should be supported—it's how much the U.S. should pay for it. If normalization were instrumental to achieve core U.S. objectives in the Middle East, then perhaps the U.S. should meet Riyadh's demands. But this isn't the case. The U.S. should instead consider any KSA demands on an ad hoc basis by their proportional ability to serve American interests and alleviate U.S. involvement in the region.
Read the full analysis here.
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Crossing the Taiwan Strait with the U.S. Navy