The necessity of restraint in counterterrorism, Americans' priorities in Ukraine, Moscow and the U.S. exit from Afghanistan, and more.

SIMMER DOWN

What U.S. restraint looks like in the Israel-Hamas war—and why it's vital

"The response to a terrorist atrocity is best conducted carefully but actively over a period of months. Hasty action leads to mistakes and losing public sympathy," writes Tim Willasey-Wilsey of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). "However, the atmosphere in crisis meetings does not lend itself to restraint"—and terrorism itself, as its name implies, is meant to induce an emotional and imprudent response.

That "restraint in counterterrorism is so important, yet so hard to achieve," as Willasey-Wilsey puts it, is a lesson the United States should have learned from our post-9/11 misadventures in the greater Middle East. It is also a lesson we—and our Israeli allies—would do well to apply now, as the Israel-Hamas conflict threatens to spread across borders and become a regional conflagration, maybe even one with direct U.S. involvement.

THE NECESSITY OF RESTRAINT

"[G]overnments make their biggest blunders in the aftermath of a terrorist attack, and then spend years trying to undo the harm caused." [RUSI / Willasey-Wilsey]
Mistaken or careless retribution is "a sure-fire way of radicalizing a population."
- We saw this "with some of the early U.S. bombing errors in Afghanistan. Whole communities, many of which had no sympathy for either the Taliban or al-Qaeda, were alienated."
- Likewise, after al-Qaeda embassy attacks in 1998, "the over-hasty and ineffective U.S. response of launching Cruise missiles at Afghan camps and a Sudanese pharmaceutical factory soon eclipsed the outrage at the original offense." [RUSI / Willasey-Wilsey]
That said, "Restraint does not mean inertia," Willasey-Wilsey notes. To argue that Israel should proceed with prudence, care, and realistic, clearly defined strategic objectives is not to argue that Israel should not act.
For the U.S., the most immediately necessary step toward restraint in counterterrorism right now is closing bases and hubs that needlessly put U.S. troops at risk and "make foolish wars too easy to start." [DEFP / Benjamin Denison]
Also, here and elsewhere, Washington shouldn't be "backing U.S. allies to the hilt and inheriting their conflicts as our own, costs and risks be damned." [NYT / Stephen Wertheim]

Rumbles of escalation

Israeli defense officials are warning of a potential new front on the Israel-Lebanon border. "What we can do in Gaza, we can also do in Beirut," said Israel's defense minister. [WSJ / Omar Abdel-Baqui and Dov Lieber]
In interviews, Hamas leadership described deliberate pursuit of regional chaos, boasting that "no one in the region is experiencing calm" and hoping for permanent war "on all the borders." [NYT / Ben Hubbard and Maria Abi-Habib]
The DoD on Sunday announced a U.S. airstrike on Iran-linked facilities in Syria last week. That was the third such U.S. retaliatory strike in a period of about two weeks.
- Around the same time, a U.S. drone was "shot down off the coast of Yemen by militants armed by, and closely aligned with, Tehran." [WaPo / Dan Lamothe et al.]
- "[A]t least 40 separate drone and rocket attacks that have been launched at U.S. forces by Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and Syria over the past three weeks." [Reuters / Phil Stewart et al.]
The U.S. should avoid direct involvement in this war, work to contain its spread, and withdraw U.S. forces in the region—especially in Syria—at risk of unwanted implication in this conflict. [DEFP / Michael DiMino]

QUOTED

"To make genuine and lasting improvements in bilateral ties and steer the relationship away from militarized rivalry would require not a brief meeting on the sidelines of a multilateral summit, but instead the sustained, high-level attention of an annual U.S.-China summit lasting at least two full days."

– DEFP Director of Asia Engagement Lyle Goldstein, as quoted in "Xi and Biden meet amid a fracturing world." [WaPo / Ishaan Tharoor]

Survey says

In Ukraine, Americans prioritize avoiding direct war with Russia

The Eurasia Group Foundation reports:

Survey takers were asked to select the two most important goals of America's support for Ukraine. A plurality think the United States should prioritize avoiding a direct war with Russia, and a third or more selected preventing Ukrainian suffering, defending democratic countries from authoritarian governments, or preserving Ukraine's sovereignty. The least frequently selected goal was weakening Russia to punish it.

Read more from the Eurasia Group Foundation here.

Sober analysis

America's withdrawal from Afghanistan did not spur Russia's invasion of Ukraine

[Foreign Affairs / Peter Schroeder]

Many U.S. policymakers have drawn the wrong lessons by believing that U.S. weakness, displayed in the pullout from Afghanistan, factored heavily in Putin's choice. But, in fact, a close analysis of Russia's actions and Putin's comments in the summer of 2021—as well as subsequently revealed information—indicates that the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan had no influence on Putin's calculus. Putin had likely already decided to invade Ukraine in the late spring of 2021, well before the U.S. withdrawal.
During that time frame, the United States had shown notable strength on behalf of its partner Ukraine. Putin was almost certainly not trying to take advantage of perceived U.S. weakness. It is more likely that he was acutely concerned about U.S. strength.
Putin decided to proceed with a large-scale invasion of Ukraine despite witnessing a show of U.S. resolve. This demonstrates that deterring him is not a simple matter of projecting strength. It may even show that in some circumstances, U.S. displays of strength can backfire.

Read the full analysis here.

A necessity anew