Why informal defense entanglements are dangerous, defense dynamics in Ukraine, Iran's uranium stockpile, and more.

Entanglements

The risk of U.S. quasi-alliances with Saudi Arabia and Ukraine

Who is an ally, and why does it matter? That's the question DEFP Policy Director Benjamin H. Friedman and Contributing Fellow Natalie Armbruster considered in depth in a DEFP explainer last fall.

It's also a newly pressing question as Thomas L. Friedman reports in his column at The New York Times that President Joe Biden "is wrestling with whether to pursue the possibility of a U.S.-Saudi mutual security pact"—not to mention ongoing debate over future NATO membership for Ukraine.

As it stands, both Saudi Arabia and Ukraine fit Friedman and Armbruster's category of "quasi-allies," "states the United States is not committed to defend but to which it provides a substantial degree of military and political support." As they explain, this is a dangerous category to maintain—but formalizing each relationship would be imprudent, too.

The Saudi pact rumor

"When I interviewed President Biden in the Oval Office last week," Thomas L. Friedman writes, the president said he was mulling this security guarantee idea and has deputized his team to talk terms with
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud of Saudi Arabia. [NYT]
Though the deal would be intended to resolve Israel-Palestine conflict, it would also more thoroughly involve the U.S. in Saudi activities in Yemen and beyond.
"Even if one ignores the 2018 murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi agents, Saudi Arabia has been a prickly and unhelpful" partner. [FP / Stephen Walt]
"If a mutual defense treaty with Saudi Arabia is on the White House's agenda, it's time to take a pause and ask how such an idea came to look reasonable in the first place." [X / Stephen Wertheim]

The NATO-Ukraine debate

"The U.S. and its NATO allies have thus far avoided fighting directly for Ukraine precisely because they lack an interest vital enough to risk nuclear war." [Politico / Benjamin H. Friedman and Christopher McCallion]
"[F]ake security guarantees would likely degrade Ukraine's security on balance, both by preserving a cause of the war and by encouraging Ukrainian leaders to make dangerous choices based on the false prospect of U.S. protection." [DEFP / Benjamin H. Friedman]
"[E]ven offering Kyiv a membership action plan on the road to full NATO membership runs the risk of lengthening the present conflict." [NRO / Daniel R. DePetris]

Why quasi-allies are such a bad idea

By creating uncertainty about U.S. commitments both at home and abroad, quasi-allies' ambiguous status creates dangers for both the United States and the quasi-allies.
For the United States, the danger is entanglement; having quasi-allies can pull the United States into trouble outside its core interests.
Quasi-allies may suffer a kind of moral hazard; they may falsely believe they have U.S. military protection and fail to secure themselves. [DEFP / Benjamin H. Friedman and Natalie Armbruster]

Quoted

"My view is that defensive warfare has benefitted from modern technology like drones, so it's tough going to take land against even a semi-motivated enemy, especially without air superiority."

—DEFP Policy Director Benjamin H. Friedman, as quoted in "Is the Ukrainian counteroffensive faltering?"

The advantage Friedman describes works for Ukraine's defense, but it's also relevant to Kyiv's slow-moving counteroffensive. However, a "stalemate might lead to major political movement, such as a reopening of talks," Friedman observed. [Yahoo News / Alexander Nazaryan]

Charted

Iran’s Stockpile of enriched Uranium

After U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal during the Trump administration, Tehran began gradually increasing its production of enriched uranium—production that had basically ceased while the deal was intact.

In January, as FT reports, an International Atomic Energy Agency inspection discovered dust containing uranium "enriched to a purity of up to 83.7 per cent, by far the highest level detected in Iran. The finding suggested Tehran was closer than ever to having the capacity to produce nuclear weapons."

That should give new urgency to U.S. diplomatic efforts with Iran, but Washington can also remain confident U.S. deterrence can "ensure core U.S. security objectives in the region are protected," even without a new deal constraining Tehran, as DEFP Fellow Daniel R. DePetrishas argued. Other concrete steps for Iran policy include:

The U.S. should stop using secondary sanctions to prevent others from buying Iranian oil, which alienates many countries without benefit.
The U.S. should not thwart ongoing diplomacy between Iran and the Gulf states.
The U.S. should withdraw remaining troops from the Middle East, whose presence makes them vulnerable to Iranian strikes and undermines, or isn't necessary for, limited U.S. interests there.

Read more from FT here. Read more from DePetris here.

Sober Analysis

Why the U.S. should offer concessions to North Korea

[WaPo / Frank Aum]

The empirical evidence is compelling. When the United States engages North Korea, it behaves significantly better.

A study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies found that, between 1990 and 2017, there was a strong correlation between periods when Washington was negotiating with Pyongyang and a decrease in North Korean provocations. If the study included data from 2017 to today, it would have also shown that North Korea conducted zero nuclear or ballistic missile tests in 2018 when bilateral summitry occurred, and more than 100 missile tests between 2019 and 2023 after diplomacy collapsed.
The problem is that neither side seems particularly interested in talking. The Biden administration has outwardly sought working-level talks with Kim Jong Un's regime multiple times, to no avail. To North Korea, however, U.S. overtures seem insincere and halfhearted when accompanied by aggressive military muscle-flexing and terse messages from President Biden to Kim.

See the full analysis here.

Quasi-allies, real risk