Why Washington needs a restrained response to China-Taiwan turmoil, Ukraine's breakthrough problem, a U.S.-trained coup, and more.

DIRE STRAITS

Beijing may lash out over Taiwan's veep visiting America. Washington should play it cool.

Taiwanese Vice President Lai Ching-Te will land in New York on Saturday en route to Paraguay, then stop over in San Francisco on his return trip next week. Beijing said it was a "priority" to prevent the visit when it was announced last month, with Chinese Ambassador to the U.S. Xie Feng describing the trip as a threat "like a grey rhino charging at us" and, last week, a state media outlet labeling it a new example of American provocation.

The Biden administration returned the charge, warning that Beijing "should not use as a pretext any transit by Vice President Lai for brazen coercion or other provocative activities." But realistically, whatever the White House says, Chinese military exercises in and around the Taiwan Strait should be expected in coming weeks. In fact, they've already begun.

For Washington, a commitment to prudent restraint is the name of the game. China's actions may be provocative, but the U.S. should refuse to be provoked into any escalation that could make open war—especially one in which the U.S. is a combatant—more likely.

Gauging Chinese power

It's not yet obvious to what extent China will grow into its long-projected role as a rival to the U.S., as Harvard political scientist Stephen M. Walt has explained. [FP]
- "China's economy is now facing growing headwinds that are unlikely to abate."
- "[T]he more power [Chinese President Xi Jinping] amasses, the worse his policy judgments seem to be."
- However, "a balancing coalition in Asia faces significant collective action problems." [FP / Walt]
Recent high-ranking ousters in Beijing—Xi replaced his foreign minister and two top nuclear officials—have raised eyebrows. [NYT / Chris Buckley]

Assessing U.S. interests

Much as in Ukraine, "U.S. interests at stake are too low and the risks too high to justify war" with China over Taiwan, as DEFP's Sascha Glaeser has written. [DEFP]
- Three key reasons to avoid U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan, Glaeser says, are the "lack of a formal security commitment, the profound costs of a conventional conflict, and the very real risk of nuclear escalation or miscalculation."
- By contrast, Beijing "views the integration of Taiwan with the mainland" as a vital interest and therefore would be "willing to endure great costs … to achieve this goal."
- Even a non-nuclear conflict would be enormously damaging, and "a U.S. victory is not assured." [DEFP / Glaeser]

Committing to restraint

Pragmatic, working-level diplomacy with Beijing continues to be vital.
- Pentagon efforts to establish crisis communications channels with China are wise and should continue. [Defense News / Bryant Harris]
- Reported progress on "two working groups to focus on Asia-Pacific regional issues and maritime issues, and a possible third group to focus on broader areas" is welcome news. [FT / Demetri Sevastopulo]
"The U.S. has a goal to avoid a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, but the overriding U.S. interest is to avoid a ruinous war with China," DEFP's Peter Harris has argued. [DEFP]
- "Proposals to deter China by bolstering U.S. military deployments in the Western Pacific are unlikely to succeed and fraught with danger."
  "America's role should be to support Taiwanese-led efforts to deter China while working to convince all sides that the status quo is sustainable."[DEFP / Harris]

Sober Analysis

Ukraine has a breakthrough problem

[FP / Barry Posen]

The breakthrough problem emerged during the First World War, when European countries first became rich and populous enough to defend very long fronts—in some cases nearly their entire borders. They were assisted in this effort by vast improvements in firepower, including range, rate, accuracy, and lethality, which augmented the typical advantage that defenders have: the ability to choose the terrain on which they will fight, to construct fortifications, and to arrange their forces in ways that allow the most effective use of firepower—for example, by ambushing.

The perfection of the tank, fighter aircraft, and radio allowed skilled attackers to overcome defenses early in World War II, but over time, defenders found ways to employ the same assets. […] A military rule of thumb emerged that at least a 3-to-1 advantage in combat power is necessary to have a reasonable chance of success against a well-crafted defense.

See the full analysis here.

Quoted

"My view is that defensive warfare has benefitted from modern technology like drones, so it's tough going to take land against even a semi-motivated enemy, especially without air superiority."

—DEFP Policy Director Benjamin H. Friedman, as quoted in "Is the Ukrainian counteroffensive faltering?"

The advantage Friedman describes works for Ukraine's defense, but it's also relevant to Kyiv's slow-moving counteroffensive. However, a "stalemate might lead to major political movement, such as a reopening of talks," Friedman observed. [Yahoo News / Alexander Nazaryan]

Charted

Chinese military aircraft in Taiwan's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), by month

"Chinese aircraft have been making larger and larger aerial displays around the island," observed DEFP Director of Asia Engagement Lyle Goldstein at The National Interest in 2021, when the above chart’s upward trend began:

Unquestionably, rising Chinese nationalism is partly to blame for this volatile situation.
However, Americans are not blameless in this situation, and the current round of grave tensions really goes back to former President Donald Trump's foolish decision to take a phone call immediately after his 2016 election from Taiwan’s leader, Tsai Ing-wen, in brazen defiance of the "one-China policy" that has been the foundation of U.S.-China relations since 1972.
Other measures, such assendingsenior-level officials to the island, increasingarms sales, completing a $255 million "mammoth new complex" in Taipei in 2018 that resembles an embassy, andparadingwarships through the Taiwan Strait, have been duly noted in Beijing.

Read more from Goldstein here. Read more about recent Chinese ADIZ incursions here.

DEBATABLE

Does U.S. military training embolden coup plotters in Africa?

[FP / Emma Ashford and Matthew Kroenig]

At FP, the Stimson Center's Emma Ashford and the Atlantic Council's Matthew Kroenig debate whether the U.S. should continue the kind of training for foreign military personnel afforded to Brig. Gen. Moussa Salaou Barmou, one of the leaders of the recent coup in Niger:

ASHFORD: The Niger coup marks yet another occasion in which U.S.-trained military personnel—the officers that we are educating and training—have sponsored or directly supported an antidemocratic coup. It's a long list, including Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Gambia, Burkina Faso, and Sudan, all since 2008.

These aren't just low-level troops who've been trained in combat techniques. These are often coup leaders, the cream of the crop of foreign militaries, trained here in the United States at our top service academies. Washington hosts tens of thousands of foreign students from around the world each year, at a cost of hundreds of millions of dollars. It doesn't seem like America is getting its money's worth, does it?

See the full analysis here

Play it cool