The military's ability to deter threats does not rely on the president's health; 30 years after German reunification, the U.S. needs far fewer troops in Europe.
DETERRENCE HOLDS
U.S. national security is not imperiled by the president's COVID-19 diagnosis
On Friday, President Trump announced he had tested positive for coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2). [AP / Jill Colvin and Zeke Miller]
Some commentators voiced concerns that U.S. adversaries would try to take advantage of the situation through aggression. That concern quickly became hyperbolic, such as the suggestion the diagnosis had thrust the U.S. into a "vortex of potential vulnerability that national security experts said is probably without precedent." [WaPo / Greg Miller and Karen DeYoung]
Thankfully, that is not how international politics works. Foreign leaders do not make decisions about whether to start wars by measuring every perturbation in the U.S.—deterrence is not so brittle. [DEFP / Benjamin H. Friedman]
China, Russia, Iran, and others are highly unlikely to use the president's health as an excuse to gain territory or to attack the U.S. or its allies. The U.S. military's readiness and retaliatory capability is not dependent on the president's well-being. [Defense One / Katie Bo Williams]
This threat-inflation should be ignored. Americans, even those employed in national security, have better things to worry about, such as the pandemic itself. [NBC / Daniel DePetris]
EXITING AFGHANISTAN
"The United States won the counterterrorism war in Afghanistan years ago, even as it embarked on a losing nation-building war. Finally leaving means recognizing that distinction." [DEFP / Benjamin H. Friedman]
TAKE NATO OFF AUTOPILOT
The Cold War is still over—U.S. policy should acknowledge that strategic reality [DEFP / John Cookson]
This past Saturday marked 30 years since East and West Germany reunified, a decisive event in the last days of the Cold War, which also led to the unified German state joining NATO.
U.S. and Soviet officials met often in 1990 to discuss what a united Germany would mean for European security. As many as 300,000 Soviet troops were in East Germany at that time, and U.S. troops in West Germany were a counterbalance.
Europe has changed a lot since then. Today, many U.S. allies, including Germany, are secure and wealthy—capable of shouldering more of the burden for their own defense. Meanwhile, Russia, for all its trouble, remains weak, a shadow of its former power as the USSR.
Yet more than 70,000 U.S. troops remain permanently stationed in Europe, with more on temporary deployments. Far fewer are needed. The recently announced reduction of U.S. forces in Germany is actually a mild and insufficient remedy to the problem of U.S. overinvestment in Europe's security.
Further NATO expansion should halt. It is unwise and dangerous to extend U.S. security guarantees ever eastward—especially to countries such as Ukraine and Georgia—because it dilutes the credibility of existing security commitments and invites blowback.
U.S. policy should reflect NATO's success in the Cold War and Europe's profound safety, rather than cling to a wasteful and outmoded posture.
TRENDING
Time to introduce budget discipline in the Department of Defense
Maximum pressure is holding U.S. policy in the Middle East hostage
The U.S. should diversify its relationships in the Persian Gulf
Arms control is not dead—the obvious next step is to extend New START