Asia, China
Cameron Wilkie
Challenges to Chinese blue-water operations

China has the world’s largest navy, but there are important questions about its ability to contest the United States on a global scale. To do so, China would need more overseas bases than the two it currently has in Djibouti and Cambodia. Similarly, its aircraft carriers cannot sustain high-tempo aviation operations beyond the First Island Chain for an extended period. Developing super-quiet attack submarines would markedly improve China’s ability to conduct blue-water operations. However, to date, China has not fielded submarines that match the technological capabilities of U.S. boats. A careful examination of China’s naval strength shows that while it is well-positioned to wage a war close to its shores, the PLAN is not a global peer of the U.S. Navy.

Challenges to Chinese blue-water operations
NATO, Europe, Grand strategy, Burden shifting, Ukraine
Defense Priorities
Year three: Limiting U.S. ambitions in Ukraine

Despite Russia’s recent capture of Avdiivka, the war in Ukraine is entering its third year at a relative stalemate. Major changes to the 600-mile long frontline are few and far between, with Ukraine and Russia finding offensive warfare costly and resource-intensive. At the same time, neither side is willing to compromise on its maximalist aims, making talks on a ceasefire or end-of-war settlement remote. Yet with additional U.S. military aid to Ukraine stalled in Congress, questions arise as to how long the U.S. can maintain the status quo—and whether it even should. This brief argues that U.S. policy toward Ukraine and Europe overall is in need of significant reform. A combination of defensive security aid to the Ukrainian military, real burden-sharing in Europe and avoiding firm U.S. defense commitments to Ukraine has a better chance of accomplishing the limited U.S. interests at stake with less risk and at reasonable cost.

Year three: Limiting U.S. ambitions in Ukraine
Grand strategy, Middle East
Defense Priorities
Israel-Saudi normalization agreement: What is ...

The Israel-Saudi normalization deal is still alive and still could be a bad deal for the United States. The war in Gaza has pushed the sweeping U.S.-backed diplomatic normalization deal between Saudi Arabia and Israel to the back burner, but both governments are likely to try to revive it at some point. This brief examines the drivers of the normalization deal, analyzes the case for and against it from the perspective of U.S. interests, and concludes that it is not worth much to Americans—nothing like the reported concessions the United States was prepared to make. Security guarantees for Saudi Arabia in particular should be avoided.

Israel-Saudi normalization agreement: What is in it for the U.S.?
Burden sharing, Basing, Grand strategy, Iran, Middle East
Defense Priorities
Understanding the Israel-Hamas war

The Israel-Hamas conflict shows little signs of slowing down, and the risk of a wider war remains credible. This brief examines and addresses the complex dynamics at play that could cause the crisis to expand, and it clearly defines parameters for how the U.S. should navigate the conflict. Washington should avoid direct U.S. military involvement, work with all parties to prevent escalation, and redeploy troops out of Syria—and eventually Iraq—which denies Iran leverage for broadening the war.

Understanding the Israel-Hamas war
Asia, China, Burden sharing
Defense Priorities
Moving to an offshore balancing strategy for ...

The balance of power in East Asia has shifted in China's favor, but it does not follow that China constitutes a major threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of all neighboring states. As DEFP Non-Resident Fellow Peter Harris argues in a new explainer, upholding peace and stability in East Asia does not require U.S. military primacy. U.S. efforts to dominate the region could backfire by intensifying the U.S.-China rivalry and plunging East Asia into a new cold war. A more sensible approach would be to move toward an offshore balancing posture that incentivizes capable regional states to provide for their own defense and deter Chinese aggression.

Moving to an offshore balancing strategy for East Asia

Europe

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Year three: Limiting U.S. ambitions in Ukraine

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Year three: Limiting U.S. ambitions in Ukraine

Despite Russia’s recent capture of Avdiivka, the war in Ukraine is entering its third year at a relative stalemate. Major changes to the 600-mile long frontline are few and far between, with Ukraine and Russia finding offensive warfare costly and resource-intensive. At the same time, neither side is willing to compromise on its maximalist aims, making talks on a ceasefire or end-of-war settlement remote. Yet with additional U.S. military aid to Ukraine stalled in Congress, questions arise as to how long the U.S. can maintain the status quo—and whether it even should. This brief argues that U.S. policy toward Ukraine and Europe overall is in need of significant reform. A combination of defensive security aid to the Ukrainian military, real burden-sharing in Europe and avoiding firm U.S. defense commitments to Ukraine has a better chance of accomplishing the limited U.S. interests at stake with less risk and at reasonable cost.

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Neutrality not NATO: Assessing security options for Ukraine

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Neutrality not NATO: Assessing security options for Ukraine

Even as the war with Russia continues, Ukraine is demanding NATO membership, or at least a path to it, and some lesser security guarantees in the interim. The United States should say no, closing the door to committing to fight a future war for Ukraine. The benefits of fighting for Ukraine are lacking—Ukraine is neither a prize that Russia can use to rebuild its Soviet empire nor an example that will destabilize global politics. The risks of fighting for Ukraine meanwhile are severe—entailing a real prospect of nuclear war and mass destruction. Because of these risks, the United States has not and will not directly fight Russia on behalf of Ukraine. That means U.S. commitments to militarily defend Ukraine, even through NATO, will not be credible; they will be an obvious bluff. Such false promises will not only leave Ukraine exposed to Russia, they will increase its peril, by preserving a cause of war and encouraging Ukraine to make poor choices based on the false hope of western protection. Armed neutrality, where the United States and its allies continue to arm Ukraine to deter future Russia aggression is a safer and more credible alternative.

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Assessing realist and liberal explanations for the Russo-Ukrainian war

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Assessing realist and liberal explanations for the Russo-Ukrainian war

Understanding the underlying causes and conditions that led to the Russo-Ukrainian war may help resolve the conflict and avoid future crises. Dominant narratives, which blame the pathologies of the Russian government and its opposition to Ukraine’s democratic efforts, fail to adequately account for what led to the invasion. Instead, realist theories of international relations consider Russia’s security concerns and warnings, highlight the problems posed by post-Cold War NATO expansion, and accurately predicted a conflict between the neighboring countries. This paper compares the realist and liberal explanations for the war’s outbreak and argues U.S. policy should give greater consideration to realist views going forward.

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How would Europe defend itself?

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How would Europe defend itself?

It needs to be acknowledged that U.S. contributions to NATO could be scaled back in the face of contending domestic priorities or competing demands for military resources in Asia. In either event, Europe would need to take up the primary burden for its defense. Realistic discussions of what that could look like in practice are therefore prudent. A serious effort to enhance European defensive autonomy would open the door to a range of issues—including the need for increased European defense spending, difficult questions of command arrangements, and complex issues related to nuclear-sharing and deterrence. None of these matters present easy answers, but what follows is an exploration of issues that would need to be addressed to make greater European defensive autonomy a reality.

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American interests in the Ukraine war

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American interests in the Ukraine war

Policymakers have poorly defined U.S. strategic interests in the Russia-Ukraine War, and those interests that have been defined do not stand up to scrutiny. Actual U.S. interests in Ukraine are essentially negative: preventing further escalation or spillover of the conflict and limiting a wholesale collapse in U.S.-Russian relations. The limited, core interests the U.S. does have in Ukraine suggest that Washington should try to convince Ukraine and Russia to accept a negotiated settlement.

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Questions concerning Finnish membership in NATO

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Questions concerning Finnish membership in NATO

Admitting Finland into NATO constitutes a permanent defense commitment by the alliance. In the case of the United States, it also entails a further extension of its nuclear umbrella. Such moves warrant a fulsome public debate, not a rush to action. U.S. forces cannot be everywhere at once. New, permanent security commitments in northern Europe should be examined relative to other U.S. global priorities and take into account Finland’s defensibility—not just now, but in the face of a revitalized, long-term Russian threat.

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Ukraine-Russia War military analysis

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Ukraine-Russia War military analysis

In the opening rounds of the war, Russian armed forces made major errors in both the operational and tactical realm. In recent weeks though, Russia has made slow, methodical progress on the northern shoulder of Donbas. If Russia defeats Ukraine in the Battle of Donbas, Kyiv will face a difficult choice: (1) dig in and continue fighting, even though much of its most effective forces will have been captured or killed or (2) negotiate with Russia to trade territory lost since 2014 to stanch further losses of Ukrainian lives and territory.

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Hypotheses on the implications of the Ukraine-Russia War

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Hypotheses on the implications of the Ukraine-Russia War

The Ukraine war will provide a fillip to U.S. activism, as the Europeans seek inexpensive security insurance from the United States and U.S. policymakers succumb to the temptations of invitational hegemony, if only confined to certain regions. At the same time, the notion of a U.S.-led, rules-based, liberal world order is looking pretty threadbare. That intellectual construct was founded on a unipolar structure of power that no longer exists. Instead, we see the reemergence of the U.S.-led Cold War coalition.

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To prevent war and secure Ukraine, make Ukraine neutral

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To prevent war and secure Ukraine, make Ukraine neutral

A solution to the current crisis centered on the agreed neutrality of Ukraine will serve the United States’ main goals, and Ukraine's and Russia's as well. Neutrality deals have worked well in the past, and solutions that omit Ukrainian neutralization will fail. The stakes at issue in Ukraine are too small to justify a costly conflict. Hence, finding a compromise to resolve things should take priority for the United States.

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NATO should defend Europe, not pivot to Asia

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NATO should defend Europe, not pivot to Asia

In recent years, three of Europe’s biggest powers—the United Kingdom, France, and Germany—have issued Indo-Pacific strategies and sailed naval ships to the region to show maritime presence. European forays into the Indo-Pacific do not help the United States, but they do weaken NATO’s ability to defend Europe. The United States should discourage European deployments to the Indo-Pacific and shift the burden for the defense of Europe to Europeans.

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A new and better security order for Europe

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A new and better security order for Europe

Changes in the global balance of power and in Europe’s security environment demand prevailing U.S.-Europe strategy change fundamentally. What is needed is a reduction in U.S. security commitments on the continent. A drawdown of U.S. obligations will help the U.S. preserve resources and refocus on the Indo-Pacific. It will also benefit Europeans by encouraging them to pursue strategic autonomy. However, while European strategic autonomy is important, a reduction in U.S. commitments in Europe should not be predicated on Europeans’ readiness to defend themselves.

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Phantom Empire: The illusionary nature of U.S. military power

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Phantom Empire: The illusionary nature of U.S. military power

U.S. bases and troops abroad no longer translate into influence, making America’s far-flung garrison a “Phantom Empire.” The refusal of U.S. leaders to countenance drawdowns in most cases removes what leverage U.S. troops might provide over host nations. U.S. commitments in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia yield example after example of countries whose close defense relationship with the United States does not prevent them from going their own way geopolitically.

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The futility of U.S. military aid and NATO aspirations for Ukraine

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The futility of U.S. military aid and NATO aspirations for Ukraine

The U.S. provided $2.5 billion in military aid to Ukraine since 2014 and U.S. leaders regularly voice support for Ukraine joining NATO. Both policies poison U.S.-Russia relations. Neither advances U.S. security. Each risks drawing the U.S. into open conflict, even nuclear war, with Russia. And these policies prevent a realistic settlement and prolong suffering in Ukraine.

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Global Posture Review 2021: An opportunity for realism and realignment

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Global Posture Review 2021: An opportunity for realism and realignment

The Biden Administration’s forthcoming Global Posture Review—a top-to-bottom examination of all overseas U.S. military bases and deployments—should jumpstart a needed shift in U.S. strategic thinking away from the leftover assumptions of the Cold War and the War on Terror. Through balancing and burden sharing in Asia, major troop reductions in Europe and the Middle East, and limiting presence deployments to preserve military readiness, the United States can realign its military posture to sustainably confront the challenges ahead.

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Assessing Georgia’s prospects for NATO membership

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Assessing Georgia’s prospects for NATO membership

Official U.S. policy still endorses the notion of Georgia someday joining NATO. An essential question is whether the alliance could successfully defend it through conventional means. A number of factors argue against this, including Georgia’s proximity to Russia, its limited military capabilities, and its relative geographic isolation. Absent an effective conventional defense, the only means available to NATO and the United States for protecting Georgia would be to resort to nuclear threats, possibly even nuclear use. But does Georgia warrant the United States extending its nuclear umbrella?

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The imperative of prudent U.S.-Russia policy

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The imperative of prudent U.S.-Russia policy

The U.S. must find a way to co-exist with Russia to advance U.S. interests and avoid a nuclear conflict. Endless cycles of sanctions, diplomatic expulsions, antipathy, and saber-rattling obscure an important reality. Inflating the threat Russia poses to the U.S., or confusing its violations of liberal values with hard security interests, risks conflict that could go nuclear. The good news for the U.S. is that Russia is not the Soviet Union, and while Russia still fields a formidable military, its overall power is limited and best held in check by European powers, not by the U.S. military.

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U.S. foreign policy priorities for the next four years

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U.S. foreign policy priorities for the next four years

The next four years are an opportunity for the U.S. to pursue a new, more realistic foreign policy. In addition to the urgent task of ending endless wars, the U.S. should focus on narrow missions in the Middle East to thwart anti-U.S. terror threats. In Europe, the U.S. should shift burdens to NATO members. And in East Asia, it should encourage allies to invest in defensive capabilities to strengthen deterrence. In all, abandoning the failed status quo in favor of a foreign policy based on restraint will mean a stronger America with more security at less cost and risk.

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Revisiting the U.S. role in NATO 30 years after German reunification

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Revisiting the U.S. role in NATO 30 years after German reunification

October 3, 2020, marks 30 years since East and West Germany reunified. Europe today is a different continent than it was in 1990. Germany, along with many of its allies, is wealthy and capable of shouldering a larger burden for defense. A residual Cold War mentality, 30 years after German reunification, should not be permitted to undermine U.S. security and prosperity for the next 30 years. Toward this end, the U.S. should station fewer U.S. troops on the continent and halt the extension of new U.S. security guarantees through NATO.

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Saying “no” to NATO—options for Ukrainian neutrality

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Saying “no” to NATO—options for Ukrainian neutrality

Ukraine today has inherited Poland’s status as Europe’s reigning victim of geography. Kyiv needs politics and a security strategy to match this complex position. It must be mindful of its powerful neighbor Russia while also satisfying a population with divided beliefs about where Ukraine’s orientation should lie—east or west. In light of these facts, the U.S. and NATO should abandon their public position supporting Ukraine’s eventual membership in the alliance. That would encourage Kyiv to focus on more realistic options, such as some form of neutrality or non-alignment.

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Burden shifting to fix outdated alliances

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Burden shifting to fix outdated alliances

U.S. alliances are outdated. Alliances that early in the Cold War served U.S. security have become permanent subsidies to allies capable of doing more. Instead of backing allies and getting them to provide for the bulk of their defense, U.S. forces too often man their front lines, encouraging allies to “free ride” on U.S. support or sometimes take provocative risks. Instead of pleading with allies to bear a greater burden, the U.S. should do less and shift burdens by reducing deployed forces.