A pair of bad ideas for NATO, U.S. military build-up around Taiwan, the risk in recognizing opposition movements, and more.

Strategic Incoherence

Two dangerous directions for NATO

Whither NATO now?

This month's summit of NATO leaders in Vilnius produceda win for Sweden's membership but no relief via burden-shifting for the United States, the alliance's most overburdened member.

On the contrary, the gathering signaled serious consideration of two dangerous—and strategically incoherent—directions for NATO's future: the eventual inclusion of Ukraine and, looking even farther east, a pivot to Asia.

NATO should not admit Ukraine

"The case for offering Ukraine protection seems simple: Russia attacked Ukraine when it lacked allied protection, and it has never attacked a NATO country," DEFP Policy Director Benjamin H. Friedman and Fellow Christopher McCallionwrite at Politico. "But simple as it is, this argument fails for multiple reasons."

"First, it fails to consider that promises to protect Ukraine provide no benefits to American security and could even undermine it."
"It also ignores how Washington's lack of interest in protecting Ukraine—demonstrated by its refusal to engage directly in the present war—would make it hard for Moscow to believe the U.S. would actually do so in the future."
"And finally, it discards how the West's past feints at protecting Ukraine contributed to Russia's decision to invade in the first place."
"The U.S. should not offer Ukraine security guarantees of any sort—and certainly not NATO membership—now or when the war is over." [Politico / Friedman and McCallion]

► Go deeper with a DEFP explainer:Neutrality, not NATO: Security options for Ukraine

NATO should not pivot to Asia

"For the second consecutive year, Japan and South Korea, which are not NATO members, were invited to attend the annual summit," DEFP Director of Grand Strategy Rajan Menon and Fellow Daniel R. DePetrisobserve at Time, and the NATO joint communique described China as a threat to NATO security. This looks like a pivot to Asia, Menon and DePetris argue, and that's a pivot NATO should not make.

"NATO, it seems, is making a concerted decision to add Asia to its docket at a time when the alliance has its hands full managing Europe's largest war since 1945."
"Enhancing deterrence against a near-peer rival in Russia is now NATO's first, second, and third priority."
"NATO unity will be harder to maintain the further it gets bogged down in Asian security issues."
Moreover, "NATO would struggle to sustain a regular operational presence in Asia."
"One must also ask how focusing on Asia helps the alliance preserve military support to Ukraine. … Europe's defense industrial base, hampered for decades by underinvestment, already struggles to balance Ukraine's ongoing needs with its own."
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization should remain focused on the North Atlantic, not the Indo-Pacific. [Time / Menon and DePetris]

►Go deeper with a DEFP explainer:NATO should defend Europe, not pivot to Asia

Letters

"While it's true that Putin hasn't shown a willingness to negotiate, the entire prospect of a diplomatic settlement at some point in the future will be compromised if Kyiv is given the option of joining [NATO]. After all, why stop fighting if it will inevitably lead to the one thing—a longer NATO-Russia border—Putin desperately wants to prevent?"

—Daniel R. DePetris, DEFP fellow, in a letter to FT.

Mapped

U.S. and allied bases near Taiwan

"The U.S. has a goal to avoid a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, but the overriding U.S. interest is to avoid a ruinous war with China," writes Peter Harris, a DEFP fellow and Colorado State University political scientist, in a DEFP explainer on deterring Chinese invasion of Taiwan. If the "imperative to avoid a conflict with China [takes] priority for U.S. leaders," as it should, we should look very skeptically at plans for U.S. military build-up around the independent island.

"Proposals to deter China by bolstering U.S. military deployments in the Western Pacific are unlikely to succeed and fraught with danger," Harris explains. "China has advantages in terms of geographical proximity to Taiwan and superior commitment to resolving the issue on favorable terms. The United States should not commit to fighting a great-power war at a time of China's choosing."

Read more from Harris here. Learn more about recent U.S. positioning around Taiwan here.

Sober Analysis

Recognizing opposition movements is riskier than it seems

[Inkstick / John Reid Wilcox]

Elevating the profile and status of opposition leaders and activists who have no viable path to power creates serious damage for bilateral relations with U.S. adversaries. Empty rhetorical support often produces the worst of both worlds, and it forecloses the possibility of any transactional diplomatic progress with an adversarial state while failing to create a realistic means of displacing its government.

Even full-fledged efforts at forced regime change, while tremendously dangerous and justifiable only in exceedingly rare cases, can claim to promise some return on investment. In contrast, the current mode of officially promoting long-shot opposition figures with no promise of paving their path to power brings no tangible gains for U.S. interests. Instead, this approach often fuels the worst instincts of repressive regimes, both at home and abroad, and opens the United States to criticism about its own democratic backsliding.

See the full analysis here.

Dangerous directions