At last year’s NATO summit, members pledged to spend 5 percent of GDP on defense by 2035. While President Trump has touted this pledge as a victory for the U.S., Washington has also undermined Europe’s ability to shoulder its own defense burden.
In this DEFP Q&A, Non-Resident Fellow Thomas Cavanna discusses his new explainer on why it’s in America’s interests to let Europe rearm. (This interview has been lightly edited for clarity. Watch the full interview here.)
Can NATO members realistically meet their 5 percent pledge?
Cavanna: There are three reasons to be cautious about the 5 percent pledge. The first concerns how we evaluate whether the pledge is met. The 5 percent breaks down into 3.5 percent for core defense purposes and 1.5 percent for non-traditional defense investments, such as cybersecurity and protecting critical infrastructure. This 1.5 percent is important, but it’s not exactly military spending in a traditional sense.
There is also the fact that the pledge is about a share of GDP. The problem with that kind of indicator is that it can be arbitrary and easily distorted. If a country records a very large increase or decrease in its GDP, it’s going to distort the ratio. As a result, the picture you have of the defense situation is not what it seems. There is a 10-year implementation timeframe, and there are loopholes that could tempt some governments to cook the books or be a little creative with their accounting, potentially distorting the results.
The second reason to be cautious concerns whether Europe will be able to deliver. Europe’s economies have stagnated since the 2008 financial crisis. GDP growth is very low, welfare systems are struggling, national debt is very high in some countries, and there is widespread popular discontent.
There is a history of European free-riding on American investments and a track record of European leaders overpromising and underdelivering. The last defense spending pledge NATO members made was to reach 2 percent in 2014, after Russia annexed Crimea. Fast forward to today and there are still a number of NATO members below that threshold. So NATO members still need to take a big step up if they want to reach the 5 percent mark in one decade.
The third reason to be skeptical relates to converting investments into combat capability. Europeans have underspent on defense for decades, so they will have to spend a lot of money for a long time to close this deficit. Until recently, Europe mostly focused its spending on preparing for humanitarian interventions and counterinsurgency campaigns, rather than on traditional military capabilities. There is also the ever-pervasive problem of coordination between 30 countries. Even if they all reach the spending level, there is no assurance that the overall result will be coordinated and coherent.
But I am reasonably optimistic about Europe’s power potential, given its large population, industrial development, and technological capabilities. Europe should be able to defend itself—especially considering that its main security threat emanates from Russia, which has a smaller population and economy and spends less on defense.
Another reason to be optimistic is European leaders’ shifting mindset. Europeans are starting to realize that they have to step up and that the U.S. will not always do the heavy lifting. Many European countries have already increased their defense budgets and the European Union has advanced promising defense initiatives. Even if Europeans don’t reach the 5 percent mark by 2035, they may reach 3 or 4 percent, which would still be a win for the U.S. and the transatlantic relationship.
How has the Trump administration compounded European weaknesses and undermined Europe’s ability to achieve strategic autonomy?
Cavanna: Since the Trump administration returned to office, Washington has done some things to move in the right direction. The president and other American officials have been very clear that Europeans have to step up and that U.S. support is not to be taken for granted, even though those statements have been unnecessarily aggressive.
However, there are many reasons to doubt the Trump administration’s commitment to retrenchment. Within the America First coalition, there are different ideas about U.S. foreign policy. Some are not interested in restraint or retrenchment and want to perpetuate American primacy. President Trump is pushing for a major increase in America’s military budget next year. The war in Iran demonstrates Trump’s interventionist impulses. Instead of the U.S. really giving Europeans space to build their defense autonomy, one could argue that the Trump administration wants Europe to do more to alleviate America’s burden without sacrificing its hegemony. The ultimate goal should be for the U.S. to do less regardless of whether Europeans do more.
Trump administration policies are compounding Europe’s military dependence on the United States. The U.S. military footprint in Europe hasn’t changed much since the Biden administration; there are still about 80,000 troops on the continent. Although the U.S. has handed over some leadership positions in NATO, it maintains control over many NATO commands. That doesn’t help Europe militarily. Many Trump administration policies are undermining the economic and industrial-military foundations of a European defense buildup. Tariffs and the Iran war are two stark examples. The administration has also sought to entrench Europe’s dependency on the U.S. in key economic sectors, such as energy and technology.
At the industrial-military level, one of the most important measures the Trump administration has taken in the last year was to impose “buy American” requirements, requiring Europeans to invest a huge chunk of their military spending on American military gear, technologies, and hardware. This policy is not going to help build Europe’s fragmented military industries, which need European investment. Meanwhile, the Trump administration has aggressively opposed any significant European effort to consolidate its defense sector, which is self-defeating in regard to the 5 percent pledge.
How can the U.S. help Europe unlock its considerable defense potential and why is that good for U.S. interests?
Cavanna: There are three levels of analysis to look at here: strategic, industrial-military, and operational. The core of the problem at each of those levels is very deep European weaknesses. But there is also an American strategy to remain dominant in Europe and to suppress any serious effort by the Europeans to step up.
At the strategic level, the U.S. should renounce, or at least scale down, its hegemonic ambitions. For Europeans to assume more responsibility, America must give them the space and incentives to do so. As long as the U.S. maintains the same hegemonic policies, that’s not going to happen. Washington should also encourage European efforts to overcome divisions, invest more in defense and related domains, and assert a strategic voice independent of the U.S.
At the industrial-military level, the U.S. should consider ending the aggressive economic measures it has taken against Europe and reflect on how other measures have indirectly hurt European economies. The Iran war is a good example of this. The U.S. should also renounce its “buy American” requirements in the energy and military hardware domains. As discussed above, Washington should stop suppressing and opposing European efforts to achieve greater industrial-military integration.
Finally, at the operational level, the U.S. needs to get serious about reducing its military footprint in Europe. The U.S. could start by withdrawing military capabilities that Europeans can now or easily replace. Relatedly, the U.S. should relinquish more command and leadership positions within NATO.
Europeans have had a wake-up call in Europe over the last 18 months. Still, even after the Greenland controversy and the Iran war, they remain deeply divided and ambivalent about making the real sacrifices needed for a true defense buildup. Some European leaders have a deep desire to repair the transatlantic relationship at all costs.
The U.S. would reap numerous gains if Europe expanded its defense capabilities, saving dozens of billions of dollars by withdrawing some of its troops and capabilities from the European continent. From a strategic perspective, Europe is less important than it used to be, especially compared to the Indo-Pacific and the Western Hemisphere. Focusing less on Europe would allow the U.S. to reallocate its strategic bandwidth and policy focus to these other regions.
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