Will Walldorf

Will Walldorf

Senior Fellow

Areas of expertise: Counterterrorism, drone warfare, great power competition, regime change, grand strategy

To request an interview, accredited media can email press@defensepriorities.org.

Will Walldorf is a Visiting Fellow at Defense Priorities and Professor in the Department of Politics and International Affairs as well as Shively Family Faculty Fellow at Wake Forest University.  He focuses on United States foreign policy, grand strategy, great power politics, military intervention, and counterterrorism. His work devotes special attention to domestic factors and politics in the foreign policymaking process. He is the author of Just Politics: Human Rights and the Foreign Policy of Great Powers (Cornell University Press, 2008) and To Shape Our World For Good:  Master Narratives and Forceful Regime Change in United States Foreign Policy, 1900-2011 (Cornell University Press, 2019). Will is currently writing a book, titled America’s Forever Wars:  Why So Long, Why End Now, What Comes Next, that among other things develops a comprehensive strategy for over-the-horizon counterterrorism in U.S. foreign policy. Will has published articles on topics related to United States foreign policy and grand strategy in several edited volumes as well as International Security, The European Journal of International Relations, Security Studies, Political Science Quarterly, Washington Quarterly, National Interest, Defense One, Democracy Paradox, and Huffington Post.  He is co-editor of the Oxford Companion to American Politics. Will received his BA from Bowdoin College and his MA and PhD in Politics from the University of Virginia.

Research and writing

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From Reagan to Obama, presidents have left office with 'strategic regret'—Will leaving troops in Iraq and Syria be Biden or Trump's?
From Reagan to Obama, presidents have left office with 'strategic regret'—Will leaving troops in Iraq and Syria be Biden or Trump's?

U.S. presidents often leave the White House expressing “strategic regret” over perceived foreign policy failures.

Lyndon Johnson was haunted by the Vietnam War. Bill Clinton regretted the failed intervention in Somalia and how the “Black Hawk Down” incident contributed to his administration’s inaction over the Rwandan genocide. Barack Obama said the Libyan intervention was “the worst mistake” of his presidency. And after a tragic bombing killed 241 U.S. service personnel in 1983 at a Marine Corps barracks in Beirut, President Ronald Reagan called his decision to send troops to Lebanon “my greatest regret and my greatest sorrow.”

As the U.S. heads into a presidential election that will, in all likelihood, end the future White House ambitions of one of its two latest inhabitants—Joe Biden and Donald Trump—it is fair to ask whether either or both will end up similarly experiencing “strategic regret.”

As an expert on U.S. foreign policy and grand strategy, I believe that if history is any guide, a possible answer can be found in both men’s decisions to keep U.S. troops in Syria and Iraq.

The pragmatic steps the United States needs to take in the Red Sea
The pragmatic steps the United States needs to take in the Red Sea

Involvement in a broader war in the Middle East would not only bring serious economic pain and strategic overstretch to the United States, but, given the unpopularity of war at home, it would also create a degree of national disillusionment that would do significant damage to Americans’ willingness to protect sea-lanes going forward. In short, too much commitment to principle today might kill the U.S. commitment to principle tomorrow. To avoid this, the United States needs to take three pragmatic steps: adopt a firm defensive strategy in the Red Sea, reduce targets for proxy attacks, and push Israel toward a ceasefire in Gaza.

The U.S. public has never been more anti-war. Biden isn’t taking note
The U.S. public has never been more anti-war. Biden isn’t taking note

The U.S. is creeping toward war in the Middle East. A drone attack at a U.S. base on Sunday killed 3 American troops and injured 34 others. The attack—claimed by Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which opposes Washington’s support for Israel—has prompted President Joe Biden to vow retaliation. His Administration is readying retaliatory strikes “over the course of several days” that mark a dangerous escalation that could spiral out of control.

Are Americans ready for war? Not at all.

Pro-Israel sentiments aside, the U.S. public and its leaders are deeply divided today about Middle East policy. War will not only lead to recession and drain U.S. resources to the benefit of China, but divisions at home could do harm to U.S. foreign policy for years to come. It’s time, then, for Biden to de-escalate tension and push Israel toward peace.

Time to drawdown from Syria
Time to drawdown from Syria

As part of the fallout from the war in Gaza, U.S. forces in Syria and Iraq have come under attack more than fifty times from Iranian-backed militias since early October.  At least fifty-six military personnel have been injured. In response, the U.S. launched retaliatory air strikes and has sent about 900 more troops to the region.

This bolstering of forces is the wrong move. In fact, the U.S. is overdue to drawdown its forces from Syria. 

Why drawdown completely?  The answer is simple.  The small contingent of U.S. forces in Syria, especially, are sitting ducks for further attacks in support of missions where the costs of continuing those missions now far outstrip their strategic benefits.  Recent attacks bring this mismatch between costs and benefits into sharp relief.  These incidents should also serve as a warning for potential dangers if U.S. policy fails to change course. 

To avoid another 'Black Hawk Down' incident, U.S. policy in West Africa has to change
To avoid another 'Black Hawk Down' incident, U.S. policy in West Africa has to change

After a brief hiatus following the coup there in late July, the United States has resumed military operations in Niger. Drones and manned aircraft are back at work. U.S. defense officials hope full ground operations and training will resume at some point soon as well.

None of this is good news. Thirty years ago, 18 U.S. soldiers died and were dragged through the streets of Mogadishu in what’s known as the Black Hawk Down incident. Especially with France now pulling all forces out of Niger, the unsettling possibility of that happening again runs high today if U.S. troops remain in West Africa. Anti-Western sentiment and violence are on the rise in the region. U.S. troops will likely get caught in the crossfire, as in Somalia. It’s time for President Joe Biden and his administration to follow France’s lead and pull back U.S. forces from combat zones in West Africa. 

Time to change U.S. policy toward Niger and its West African neighbors
Time to change U.S. policy toward Niger and its West African neighbors

The coup in Niger last week should be a wake-up call for U.S. policymakers: the current approach to security in West Africa isn’t working. The United States is using too much force against too little threat in the region. Leaders must resist the temptation to escalate in the current crisis. Instead, they should draw down forces from Niger, limit missions to reconnaissance, and focus on peacemaking in conflict zones. 

Today, there are about 1,100 U.S. soldiers in Niger on two bases. These troops are the centerpiece to a decade-long U.S. effort to fight terrorist groups affiliated with the Islamic State and al-Qaeda in Niger and West Africa generally. U.S. special forces train, assist, and accompany Nigerien forces on combat missions against local jihadists. These missions are not risk-free for U.S. soldiers. In 2017, four U.S. commandos died in an ambush near Tongo Tongo.

The Iraq war wasn't simply a mistake
The Iraq war wasn't simply a mistake

It’s cynical but true: domestic politics usually play an important role in decisions by leaders of the United States to launch major wars, including the 2003 Iraq War. In 1950, reelection concerns were a big reason for President Harry Truman’s reluctant decision to send troops across the 38th parallel in the Korean War. Along with his domestic agenda, similar concerns pressed President Lyndon Johnson to escalate militarily in Vietnam in 1964 and 1965. Similarly, domestic politics stood front and center for Bush (along with many others, like House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt (D-Mo.) and Senator Hillary Clinton (D-N.Y.)) with the 2003 decision to invade Iraq.

Ukraine: A boon or bust for U.S. power? It’s complicated
Ukraine: A boon or bust for U.S. power? It’s complicated

Is the war in Ukraine a boon or bust for U.S. power?  Despite Ukraine’s remarkable success, NATO’s increased unity, and Russia’s poor military performance, the answer to that question is more complicated than some might think. 

Especially in a war’s early stages, assessing the impact on the power of a participating or associated state, like the United States in Ukraine today, can be tricky business. Though not always the case, early gains in a war sometimes prove a mirage, eclipsed by losses further down the line that turn the war from boon to bust.  If not careful, that could easily be the course the Ukraine war takes for U.S. power in the coming months and years.