Mike Sweeney

Mike Sweeney

Non-Resident Fellow

Areas of expertise: U.S. national security, NATO relations and enlargement, Russian military and doctrine, long-range defense planning scenarios, and U.S. overseas presence and basing options, Middle Eastern politics and security relations

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Mike Sweeney is a non-resident fellow at Defense Priorities. Prior to joining Defense Priorities, Sweeney spent 13 years as think tank analyst in Washington, DC, where he focused on U.S. foreign policy and defense planning, undertaking research and studies, including for the Department of Defense. His areas of research include U.S. national security, such as NATO relations and enlargement, Middle Eastern politics and security relations, Russian military and doctrine, long-range defense planning scenarios, and U.S. overseas presence and basing options. From 2001 to 2005, he served as the rapporteur for the Defense Policy Board. He is the co-author of the monograph, Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning (2004) and two books published by Brassey’s, Strategic Paradigms 2025 (1999) and Strategic Dynamics in the Nordic-Baltic Region (2000). His articles and essays have appeared on sites such as Divergent Options, West Point’s Modern War Institute, War on the Rocks, among other outlets.

Research and writing

Featured
How would Europe defend itself?
How would Europe defend itself?

It needs to be acknowledged that U.S. contributions to NATO could be scaled back in the face of contending domestic priorities or competing demands for military resources in Asia. In either event, Europe would need to take up the primary burden for its defense. Realistic discussions of what that could look like in practice are therefore prudent. A serious effort to enhance European defensive autonomy would open the door to a range of issues—including the need for increased European defense spending, difficult questions of command arrangements, and complex issues related to nuclear-sharing and deterrence. None of these matters present easy answers, but what follows is an exploration of issues that would need to be addressed to make greater European defensive autonomy a reality.

Questions concerning Finnish membership in NATO
Questions concerning Finnish membership in NATO

Admitting Finland into NATO constitutes a permanent defense commitment by the alliance. In the case of the United States, it also entails a further extension of its nuclear umbrella. Such moves warrant a fulsome public debate, not a rush to action. U.S. forces cannot be everywhere at once. New, permanent security commitments in northern Europe should be examined relative to other U.S. global priorities and take into account Finland’s defensibility—not just now, but in the face of a revitalized, long-term Russian threat.

How militarily useful would Taiwan be to China?
How militarily useful would Taiwan be to China?

Amid the debate over U.S. policy toward Taiwan, advocates of an overt declaration to defend the island tend to assign Taiwan significant value, while proponents of abrogating U.S. defense commitments often downplay its utility. The truth is somewhere in the middle. The military value of Taiwan to China must be viewed in the aggregate. Occupying Taiwan would offer China some important military advantages, but China’s current technical deficiencies limit Taiwan’s overall utility to China, and occupying Taiwan could stress Chinese military and security forces.

Considering the utility of an Iranian nuclear bomb
Considering the utility of an Iranian nuclear bomb

There are practical constraints on the military and strategic value of Iran building a nuclear arsenal. At least initially, the arsenal would be significantly limited in the number of warheads and weapon yield. The process itself would likely necessitate other provocative and detectable steps, such as Iran restarting its heavy water reactor at Arak or conducting nuclear testing. And even with a weapon, Iran’s ability to reliably deliver it by missile—against Israel, for example—is not certain.

Assessing Georgia’s prospects for NATO membership
Assessing Georgia’s prospects for NATO membership

Official U.S. policy still endorses the notion of Georgia someday joining NATO. An essential question is whether the alliance could successfully defend it through conventional means. A number of factors argue against this, including Georgia’s proximity to Russia, its limited military capabilities, and its relative geographic isolation. Absent an effective conventional defense, the only means available to NATO and the United States for protecting Georgia would be to resort to nuclear threats, possibly even nuclear use. But does Georgia warrant the United States extending its nuclear umbrella?

Why a Taiwan conflict could go nuclear
Why a Taiwan conflict could go nuclear

As discussion intensifies over U.S. policy toward Taiwan, including debates over the future of strategic ambiguity, nuclear concerns should be at the forefront. In the event of setbacks in a conflict over Taiwan, China could find itself willing to use nuclear weapons, even if it had not intended to do so before the start of hostilities. The U.S., too, could be forced to contemplate nuclear use in certain scenarios. The potential for miscalculation by each side is higher than commonly acknowledged.

A plan for U.S. withdrawal from the Middle East
A plan for U.S. withdrawal from the Middle East

Over four years, the U.S. could reduce its presence in the Middle East by as many as 50,000 military personnel, mainly by drawing down its forces in four key states—Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE—and ending regular deployments to the region by carrier battle groups. Moving to the region’s periphery—drawing on existing bases and access agreements with Jordan and Oman—could position the U.S. to return to a role as offshore balancer with an option to completely withdraw from the region.

Assessing Chinese maritime power
Assessing Chinese maritime power

It is at sea where the risk is greatest for a direct clash between Chinese and U.S. forces. But a closer look at Chinese maritime capabilities reveals a fleet that is powerful, but uneven and geographically constrained, with important capability gaps. This reality affords the U.S. time and strategic flexibility to pursue prudent policies that advance U.S. interests while avoiding a needless conflict.

Reconsidering U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe
Reconsidering U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe

NATO’s tactical nuclear weapons—particularly the estimated 150 U.S. B61 nuclear bombs in Europe—are dangerous relics. Whereas during the Cold War tactical nuclear weapons were believed to help bolster deterrence, today, they serve no functional purpose other than to unnecessarily escalate a local crisis, such as in the Baltic states, into a potential strategic calamity. Moreover, the removal of the nuclear warheads could serve as a gesture to restart a constructive dialogue with Russia on reducing risks, including nuclear threats, in Europe.

Saying “no” to NATO—options for Ukrainian neutrality
Saying “no” to NATO—options for Ukrainian neutrality

Ukraine today has inherited Poland’s status as Europe’s reigning victim of geography. Kyiv needs politics and a security strategy to match this complex position. It must be mindful of its powerful neighbor Russia while also satisfying a population with divided beliefs about where Ukraine’s orientation should lie—east or west. In light of these facts, the U.S. and NATO should abandon their public position supporting Ukraine’s eventual membership in the alliance. That would encourage Kyiv to focus on more realistic options, such as some form of neutrality or non-alignment.

Considering the “zero option”
Considering the “zero option”

During the Cold War, the U.S. operated just two major bases in the Middle East. Today, even though the region is of vastly diminished strategic importance, the U.S. maintains an expansive network of bases. The “zero option”—reducing U.S. military bases in the region to zero—should be responsibly considered. It would force decision makers to rethink the means-end chain for securing U.S. interests. Employing other levers of power would free up resources—military and otherwise—and avoid costly entanglements in the region. Removing immediate U.S. military protection would also prompt partners to reconsider their own positions and conduct their external relations with greater circumspection.