By Gavin Wilde
When Secretary of State Antony Blinken arrived in South Africa on Aug. 8, 2022, he had a clear message for countries across the continent: “The United States will not dictate Africa’s choices, and neither should anyone else.” Despite Blinken’s denials, it was widely speculated that this diplomatic tour was aimed at highlighting global food shortages linked to the Putin regime’s war on Ukraine — and Russian political influence across Africa broadly. This appears to be correct, but there is more than food prices on the agenda.
A primary vector of Moscow’s influence has been Russian private military companies (PMCs). On top of running disinformation campaigns and weaponizing loans, these corporate mercenary outfits have deployed across Africa, in Mali, Sudan, the Central African Republic, Mozambique, and Madagascar. Russian PMC activity also goes far beyond Africa, providing bodyguard services to Venezuelan dictator Nicolas Maduro, reclaiming Syrian oil fields for the Assad regime, and fighting in the ongoing, illegal Kremlin war on Ukraine.
Russian PMCs will only continue to be a growing threat to global security — whether companies act at the Kremlin’s explicit direction, or independently profit from overseas subversion and exploitation. And technology is poised to be a key part of their activities. As we describe in a new issue brief for the Atlantic Council, the proliferation of private hacking, surveillance, and social media manipulation tools — and at least one Russian PMC’s buildout of an in-house cyber unit — demands attention from US policymakers to address this mechanism of Kremlin proxy warfare.
This piece was originally published in Inkstick on August 30, 2022. Read more HERE.