By Ben Friedman
Exactly one year after the United States finally left Afghanistan, a common refrain in Washington is that the withdrawal damaged U.S. credibility. The manner, if not the fact, of the U.S. departure, according to a host of pundits, journalists, and political leaders, undermined confidence in U.S. global leadership. Allies, we’re told, worried they could not count on U.S. support; enemies were emboldened. Even Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February resulted from a whiff of U.S. weakness, according to some analysts — reportedly including President Biden’s own intelligence briefers.
This argument is backwards. In fact, since the withdrawal U.S. allies and partners have grown more eager to accept U.S. protection than before — indeed most remain overly dependent. New allies — Sweden and Finland — have crowded under the U.S. security umbrella, while Middle Eastern clients seek greater U.S. protection.
It’s fair enough to note that the United States abandoned their Afghan allies to be routed by the Taliban, creating the chaotic evacuation at Kabul’s airport. It was an ugly and tragic end. But it’s absurd to treat the end of a two-decade war as evidence of fickleness. And if there was a display of U.S. incompetence in Afghanistan, it was due to the stubborn attempt to prop up a rotten state — not in the liquidation of that unsound position.
Credibility to fight for allies, according to the key scholarship on the topic, results from your capability and interests to do so, not from what you do in dissimilar circumstances. So the U.S. didn’t need to fight in Vietnam to prove to the Soviets it would defend Germany, where its interests were far greater. Nor does deterring great power war turn on extending a foolish war in Afghanistan into its third decade.
This piece was originally published in UnHerd on August 30, 2022. Read more HERE.