How to answer a new round of North Korean provocation, rising China-Philippines tensions, U.S. military bases in Asia, and more.

ROCKET MAN

Realistic diplomacy should've been our answer to Pyongyang's provocation in 2017. And 2019. And 2022. It's still the right answer in 2024.

North Korea's isolated and repressive regime kicked off the new year with a fresh round of saber rattling at its southern neighbor—and the United States.

Dictator Kim Jong-un pledged Monday to "thoroughly annihilate" the U.S. if provoked, per state media reporting. Kim's government also announced plans to "scrap its efforts to reunify the Korean Peninsula due to South Korea's 'collusion with foreign forces.'" And in 2024, he promised, Pyongyang will "launch three additional military spy satellites, produce more nuclear materials, and introduce attack drones."

Kim will almost certainly make good on his promise of armament: This fresh bellicosity follows a new round of ICBM testing last month, and Kim has spent years honing the "treasured sword" of his nuclear arsenal.

For Washington, as ever when Kim lashes out, it would be foolish to meet provocation with provocation. The right strategic response remains a pivot to realistic diplomacy backed by confidence that U.S. deterrence will hold.

Don't panic

"The U.S. retains overwhelming nuclear and conventional military superiority with respect to North Korea. Deterrence has worked against North Korea for seven decades and will continue to work." [DEFP / Lyle Goldstein]
- Kim talks wildly, but he has a consistent and serious interest in regime (and personal) survival, and he understands that attacking the U.S. or South Korea guarantees his own destruction. [The Spectator / Daniel R. DePetris]
- "If North Korea dared to launch an ICBM at the U.S., North Korea would be destroyed. Pyongyang is extremely unlikely to commit national suicide in this way." [DEFP / Lyle Goldstein]
"Because its nuclear deterrent keeps it safe and provides leverage for negotiations with major powers, it is exceedingly unlikely the DPRK will denuclearize. But deterrence means a deal to remove the DPRK's weapons is not essential to U.S. security." [DEFP]

Do negotiate

The very survival instinct that keeps Kim from launching an unprovoked attack also makes current U.S. strategy—the maximalist demand of "complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization" (CVID) as a baseline for U.S.-North Korea talks—totally nonviable.
- "It's exceedingly unlikely the United States, under any president, can bribe or compel the North Koreans to disarm" due to "the Kim dynasty's prioritization of regime stability above all else."
- "While it leaves a bad taste in the mouth to concede the point, nuclear weapons remain the best deterrent to a foreign attack, which is why handing them over is strongly resisted in Pyongyang." [MSNBC / Daniel R. DePetris]
U.S.-North Korea relations will remain at a standstill so long as CVID is the only outcome Washington will countenance. An incremental approach to diplomacy would be more prudent and effective.
- The U.S. should negotiate for "more attainable objectives and [tie] the normalization of relations and economic sanctions relief to concessions the Kim dynasty may be open to exploring." [MSNBC / Daniel R. DePetris]
- Those concessions could include a moratorium on ICBM development, domestic and economic liberalization, a nuclear freeze, and more.
- Such smaller shifts would increase stability, help secure the peace, and perhaps increase quality of life for ordinary North Koreans at little risk or cost for the U.S. [DEFP]

QUOTED

"We shouldn't be encouraging the Philippines to get into a fight with China—they are likely to lose that fight. We do have a treaty with the Philippines […] but that treaty should be read very narrowly [… and] we should not even consider going to war over rocks and reefs or different interpretations of the law of the sea. That would be extremely foolish and reckless, and it would be very hard to explain to American taxpayers."

–DEFP Director of Asia Engagement Lyle Goldstein, as quoted in, "U.S. policies pushing China, Philippines to brink of conflict." [Responsible Statecraft / Mark Episkopos]
Related reading:

Philippines says it is not provoking conflict, accuses China of 'extremely dangerous' behavior [Reuters]
Why China is stepping up its maritime attacks on the Philippines [FP / Elisabeth Braw]
The China-Philippines face-off requires restraint [The Diplomat / Sarang Shidore]

MAPPED

U.S. military bases in Asia

The U.S. has a robust network of military bases across Asia, but their proliferation has not consistently enhanced our security. A better strategy is offshore balancing, in which Washington would reduce its military presence while encouraging friendly regional partners to play a greater role in maintaining the status quo. The first step in that direction must be U.S. military drawdowns—that is, a dramatic change to the map above.

Learn more in DEFP's explainer, "Moving to an offshore balancing strategy in East Asia."

Sober analysis

Withdraw U.S. troops from Syria and Iraq

[DEFP / Daniel R. DePetris]

With 46,000 troops spread across a network of bases throughout the Middle East, the United States has far more force there than necessary to serve its key interests of defending against anti-U.S. terrorist threats, preventing disruptions to the flow of oil, and ensuring no regional power can achieve hegemonic status. The United States can meet these narrow interests without the high cost and baggage of a bloated force posture. […]
Once viewed as critical assets to accomplish counterterrorism goals, U.S. bases in Syria and Iraq have turned into liabilities and enable U.S. adversaries, including Iran and Russia, the opportunity to dial up the pressure.

Read the full explainer here.

Answering Kim Jong-un