The other half of deterrence, what savvy planning looks like for Ukraine, the bipolarity paradox, and more.

STRATEGY

Everyone wants to deter Chinese aggression. But Washington must reassure Beijing, too.

Strengthening U.S. deterrence of Chinese military ambitions—in general, but particularly where Taiwan is concerned—may be the easiest foreign policy sell in Washington these days.

Republicans are split over ongoing Ukraine aid, and Democrats are divided on the Israel-Hamas war. But though polling shows the American public remains broadly wary of sending U.S. troops to defend Taiwan should China invade, rising cross-strait tensions are a consistent source of alarm, and the prospect of arming Taiwan for deterrence is popular.

So the opening call in a new piece from scholars Bonnie S. Glaser, Jessica Chen Weiss, and Thomas J. Christensen at Foreign Affairs—the proposal that Washington "support Taiwan's efforts to develop a defensive 'porcupine strategy'"—will fall on eager ears.

But what about the rest of the piece? What about the call to remember that effective deterrence requires reassurance as much as defense? It's less crowd-pleasing, perhaps, but arguably more strategically necessary in the present moment.

Recommit to reassurance

"As the Nobel Prize–winning economist Thomas Schelling wrote years ago, '"One more step and I shoot" can be a deterrent threat only if accompanied by the implicit assurance, "And if you stop, I won't."'"
"The three parties involved in the Taiwan Strait are not providing one another with sufficient assurances."
"Washington must make clear that it opposes any unilateral change to the status quo" and "avoid giving the impression that it is moving toward restoring formal diplomatic relations or a defense alliance with" Taiwan.
"U.S. military threats will lose their potency if Chinese leaders believe that the United States will take advantage of their restraint."
Washington "should avoid making statements or taking actions that could lead Beijing to conclude that unification can only be achieved through force." [Foreign Affairs / Glaser et al.]

QUOTED

"[The Biden administration] should be looking for ways to end the war, and that means convincing Ukraine that it's not going to get all its territory back. I would try to make a virtue out of the political uncertainty [of U.S. aid to Ukraine. The ambiguity] doesn't mean 'I'm cutting you off,' but it does mean that [Kyiv] should start to expect less and plan accordingly. The idea would be you would get Ukraine's politics moving in the right direction."

– DEFP Policy Director Benjamin Friedman, as quoted in, "Ukraine-aid cutoff would 'kneecap' Kyiv as it fights Russia, White House says. Here's what Biden wants now." [MarketWatch / Chris Matthews]

BY THE NUMBERs

U.S. trade volume with China (2000–2022)

Despite increasing geopolitical tensions and talk of decoupling, bilateral trade between the U.S. and China remains robust. Last year, bilateral trade volume topped $700 billion, so military conflict would be economically devastating for both countries.

Learn more:

Moving to an off-shore balancing strategy for East Asia [DEFP / Peter Harris]
Can the U.S. really decouple from China? [FP / Jeffrey Kucik and Rajan Menon]
Emphasize responsible competition, cooperation with China [DEFP / Lyle Goldstein]

Sober analysis

The bipolarity paradox

[North Korea Review / Lyle Goldstein et al.]

As summarized by Russia Matters, a blog from Harvard's Belfer Center:

Today, the Kremlin's isolation is undoubtedly a deep impetus for rapidly warming North Korea-Russia ties that precipitated the recent landmark Kim-Putin summit. That is indeed a major development, but Beijing's influence is significantly more important, of course. Chinese leaders remain cautious about embracing any kind of troika encompassing Beijing, Moscow, and Pyongyang, since [China] views solidifying bipolarity in Northeast Asia as counter to its conception of regional security and development.
The West and its close allies in East Asia should recognize that the situation is delicate and could suddenly become much more fraught, for example if major quantities of North Korean military equipment or even DPRK "volunteers" were to appear in Donbas. Understanding such major risks of an escalation spiral that a return to the hard bipolarity of the 1950s would entail for the Korean Peninsula, decision-makers on both sides of this divide are urged to act with due caution and restraint.

Read the full analysis here (PDF download available at the link).

The other half of deterrence