The notion the U.S. will risk nuclear Armageddon over eastern Europe is a bluff; Europe should take primary responsibility for European affairs.
BLUFFING OVER MASS DESTRUCTION
NATO is about U.S. nuclear weapons—that's a reason not to admit Ukraine
Russia may move its annual nuclear military exercise from fall to this month, according to U.S. officials. While not a threat itself, the exercise reminds us of the central role of nuclear weapons in the U.S.-Russia conflict over Ukraine—a conflict could result in nuclear war. [FT / Demetri Sevastopulo]
U.S. extended deterrence—the promise the U.S. will fight a nuclear war on behalf of another nation—is the heart of NATO's defense guarantee to member states. U.S. forces in Europe are reassurance of that promise to make it "credible": Americans (tripwire forces) would necessarily die and ensure the U.S. responds to any attack, with nuclear weapons if necessary. [TNSR / Dan Reiter and Paul Poast]
U.S. nuclear weapons—even more than U.S. troops—deter Russia, which has its own massive arsenal. This is especially true in new areas of the alliance, like the Baltics and potentially Ukraine, where conventional defenses are far more difficult. [RAND / Paul K. Davis et al.]
But extended nuclear deterrence is uncertain. While the U.S. has thousands of nuclear weapons and even deploys at least 100 in Europe, would it really use one against Russia if Russian forces invaded, for instance, a Baltic state? The answer is almost certainly no. [DEFP / Mike Sweeney]
The U.S. using a nuclear weapon would result in Russia retaliating in kind, setting off a spiral into mass devastation. That the U.S. would willingly sacrifice its cities to nuclear incineration in response to an incursion in eastern Europe, so far away and so divorced from its own security and prosperity, is not credible. [Newsweek / William Arkin and Marc Ambinder]
One reason (among many) NATO should not admit Ukraine is that doing so doubles down on the flawed and dangerous commitment of extended nuclear deterrence. NATO membership for Ukraine would, in effect, be a bluff that the U.S. would wage nuclear war for Ukraine. But the U.S. has no interest there that would justify such a risk. [DEFP / Sascha Glaeser]
NATO is a military alliance: security considerations should take priority. The U.S. acknowledging the unacceptable risk of admitting Ukraine to the alliance, because of the nuclear stakes, would be wise at any time. Doing so now—and committing to it as part of U.S.-Russia talks—has the added virtue of perhaps forestalling another Russian invasion of Ukraine. [DEFP / Rajan Menon]
STRATEGIC STABILITY
Nearly 9 of every 10 nuclear weapons in the world are held by the U.S. and Russia—avoiding conflict between nuclear superpowers is paramount
AUTONOMY IS STRENGTH
Europe has no say in the Ukraine-Russia crisis [ECFR / Jeremy Shapiro]
European powers are bystanders in the Ukraine-Russia crisis, reduced to little more than requesting consultations with the U.S., writes Jeremy Shapiro. Yet this lack of European agency accurately reflects the growing power imbalance in the trans-Atlantic alliance.
The U.S. has pulled ahead of Europe economically (a measure of potential military power). "Since the 2008 financial crisis, the U.S. has become ever more powerful relative to its European allies," Shapiro explains. "From rough parity in 2008, America's economy is now one-third bigger than that of the E.U. and the U.K. combined."
U.S. military power outpaces Europe's, too. While some European states increased their military spending after Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea, the U.S. increased its spending even more, and especially on weapons. "U.S. spending on new defense technologies is more than seven times that of all E.U. member states combined."
"Europeans have become more dependent on the U.S. than at any time since the early stages of the Cold War," Shapiro writes. "Overall, the situation seems to verify the Russian view that there is no need to engage with Europeans and one should just talk to Americans," he adds.
In part, U.S. administrations have encouraged Europe's dependence on the U.S., Shapiro explains, "even decrying some European defense efforts as protectionist or duplicative." But the U.S. fostering European dependence is nonsensical at a time when the U.S. has higher priorities at home and in Asia.
Europe's great powers are wealthy and capable of defending themselves. Instead of dependence, which drains U.S. resources, the U.S. "will need European allies that manage European security affairs with less U.S. assistance. In other words, it will need a more sovereign, more powerful Europe," Shapiro concludes.
QUOTE
"I think the United States doesn't really want Europe to grow up. Because being the protector of Europe, Japan, South Korea, and Australia has the merit of establishing a status as a world leader." [Libération / Rajan Menon]
TRENDING
Spheres of influence are a reality
Overly broad U.S. counterterrorism training laid the groundwork for another coup