Russia, the strongest single military power in Europe, has a say in the continent's security order; rethink U.S. sanctions policy.
BALANCE OF POWER
Russia has a say in the political and security order in Ukraine—and Europe
Russia has demonstrated it is willing to fight a war—and risk Russian lives—to address its security concerns vis-à-vis Ukraine: to prevent Ukraine from aligning with the West, joining NATO, or hosting NATO forces and weaponry. [WotR / Michael Kofman]
The U.S. and Europe's great powers have wisely and repeatedly reaffirmed, through rhetoric and actions, they will not assume such risks. NATO will not defend Ukraine if Russia invades. Nor will the alliance admit Ukraine as a member anytime soon, if ever (though U.S. and NATO leaders refuse to say so publicly). [FT / Polina Ivanova, Victor Mallet, and Roman Olearchyk]
Nobody knows exactly what political outcome Russia requires. However, given the balance of power, which heavily favors Russia over Ukraine, and the imbalance of interests and will (Ukraine is not a NATO ally, nor is it strategically important to the West), Russia will get its way in Ukraine. [Wavell Room / Mike Sweeney]
Russia fields significant, modern military power and has increased its capabilities in recent years. By any measure, Russia's power bests Ukraine's, and the balance of power will dictate the outcome. Russia is poised to invade its neighbor, potentially encircling Kyiv, to force a new agreement on Ukraine and stay until it implements the terms. [WashPost / Paul Sonne, Isabelle Khurshudyan, and Mary Ilyushina]
The most important question is (1) whether the U.S. will negotiate with Russia to agree on an acceptable political and security order in Ukraine, settling this crisis peacefully or (2) whether it will take a Russian invasion to reach that same outcome. [DEFP / Sascha Glaeser]
Russia is Europe's largest single military power, and excluding it from the continent's security order—demonstrated by NATO's continued expansion eastward and holding out prospects for Ukraine (and Georgia) joining the trans-Atlantic alliance—has resulted in recurring crises (predicted by realists). [NYT / George Kennan]
Great powers tend to have the requisite power, particularly near their borders, to shape the political and security order. This goes a long way to explain Russia's behavior, not excuse it. Russia will use its power to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO, hosting NATO forces and weaponry, or generally aligning with the West. But there is still a chance to de-escalate and spare the lives of countless Ukrainians. [Defense One / Rajan Menon and Thomas Graham]
DETERRENCE WORKS
North Korea launched 7 missile tests so far in 2022—but it remains deterred by U.S. and allies' power
FINANCIAL WARFARE
Learn from history: Sanctions result in few successes [FP / Nicholas Mulder]
"There is scarcely a foreign-policy crisis that arises today in which U.S. policymakers do not resort to sanctions," Nicholas Mulder writes in Foreign Policy. But it was not always the case, he adds.
"In the early 20th century, the United States shunned the use of sanctions, while Europeans were very enthusiastic about the economic weapon," Mulder writes, tracing the history of sanctions back to the period between WWI and WWII.
During the interwar period, European countries used sanctions to try to stop interstate war, which worked for a time. After WWII, with European powers weakened and U.S. power ascendant, the use of sanctions shifted.
After 1945, the U.S. used its unrivaled economic power to enact sanctions (unilateral and multilateral) less to prevent interstate war and more to change the internal behavior of countries. The U.S. unleashed sanctions to promote democracy, push for the release of political prisoners, and dissuade nuclear development, among other ends.
The development of the global financial system in the 1980s and 1990s, in which the U.S. dollar was and remains dominant, gave Washington a powerful tool to pressure other countries with sanctions. "But its ability to impose steep costs on rival states has not been matched by a corresponding success in changing their behavior," Mulder cautions.
A review of sanctions in the 20th century finds only around one-third of sanctions implemented were "at least partially successful," Mulder writes. Yet their limited effectiveness has not limited their use—in fact, the opposite: "Sanctions use doubled in the 1990s and 2000s from its level in the period from 1950 to 1985; by the 2010s it had doubled again."
"What began a century ago as an antidote to war has degenerated into an alternative way of waging it: a tool of endless economic war, with few victories within reach and no peace in sight," Mulder concludes.
"CREDIBILITY"
"The United States has a credibility problem in part because its own geopolitical position is so favorable. There are relatively few interests that are truly vital to the United States' independence or prosperity, yet it still maintains a far-flung global presence and has made a lot of promises to protect other countries." [FP / Stephen Walt]
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