Asia, China
Cameron Wilkie
Challenges to Chinese blue-water operations

China has the world’s largest navy, but there are important questions about its ability to contest the United States on a global scale. To do so, China would need more overseas bases than the two it currently has in Djibouti and Cambodia. Similarly, its aircraft carriers cannot sustain high-tempo aviation operations beyond the First Island Chain for an extended period. Developing super-quiet attack submarines would markedly improve China’s ability to conduct blue-water operations. However, to date, China has not fielded submarines that match the technological capabilities of U.S. boats. A careful examination of China’s naval strength shows that while it is well-positioned to wage a war close to its shores, the PLAN is not a global peer of the U.S. Navy.

Challenges to Chinese blue-water operations
NATO, Europe, Grand strategy, Burden shifting, Ukraine
Defense Priorities
Year three: Limiting U.S. ambitions in Ukraine

Despite Russia’s recent capture of Avdiivka, the war in Ukraine is entering its third year at a relative stalemate. Major changes to the 600-mile long frontline are few and far between, with Ukraine and Russia finding offensive warfare costly and resource-intensive. At the same time, neither side is willing to compromise on its maximalist aims, making talks on a ceasefire or end-of-war settlement remote. Yet with additional U.S. military aid to Ukraine stalled in Congress, questions arise as to how long the U.S. can maintain the status quo—and whether it even should. This brief argues that U.S. policy toward Ukraine and Europe overall is in need of significant reform. A combination of defensive security aid to the Ukrainian military, real burden-sharing in Europe and avoiding firm U.S. defense commitments to Ukraine has a better chance of accomplishing the limited U.S. interests at stake with less risk and at reasonable cost.

Year three: Limiting U.S. ambitions in Ukraine
Grand strategy, Middle East
Defense Priorities
Israel-Saudi normalization agreement: What is ...

The Israel-Saudi normalization deal is still alive and still could be a bad deal for the United States. The war in Gaza has pushed the sweeping U.S.-backed diplomatic normalization deal between Saudi Arabia and Israel to the back burner, but both governments are likely to try to revive it at some point. This brief examines the drivers of the normalization deal, analyzes the case for and against it from the perspective of U.S. interests, and concludes that it is not worth much to Americans—nothing like the reported concessions the United States was prepared to make. Security guarantees for Saudi Arabia in particular should be avoided.

Israel-Saudi normalization agreement: What is in it for the U.S.?
Burden sharing, Basing, Grand strategy, Iran, Middle East
Defense Priorities
Understanding the Israel-Hamas war

The Israel-Hamas conflict shows little signs of slowing down, and the risk of a wider war remains credible. This brief examines and addresses the complex dynamics at play that could cause the crisis to expand, and it clearly defines parameters for how the U.S. should navigate the conflict. Washington should avoid direct U.S. military involvement, work with all parties to prevent escalation, and redeploy troops out of Syria—and eventually Iraq—which denies Iran leverage for broadening the war.

Understanding the Israel-Hamas war
Asia, China, Burden sharing
Defense Priorities
Moving to an offshore balancing strategy for ...

The balance of power in East Asia has shifted in China's favor, but it does not follow that China constitutes a major threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of all neighboring states. As DEFP Non-Resident Fellow Peter Harris argues in a new explainer, upholding peace and stability in East Asia does not require U.S. military primacy. U.S. efforts to dominate the region could backfire by intensifying the U.S.-China rivalry and plunging East Asia into a new cold war. A more sensible approach would be to move toward an offshore balancing posture that incentivizes capable regional states to provide for their own defense and deter Chinese aggression.

Moving to an offshore balancing strategy for East Asia

Grand strategy

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Hypotheses on the implications of the Ukraine-Russia War

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Hypotheses on the implications of the Ukraine-Russia War

The Ukraine war will provide a fillip to U.S. activism, as the Europeans seek inexpensive security insurance from the United States and U.S. policymakers succumb to the temptations of invitational hegemony, if only confined to certain regions. At the same time, the notion of a U.S.-led, rules-based, liberal world order is looking pretty threadbare. That intellectual construct was founded on a unipolar structure of power that no longer exists. Instead, we see the reemergence of the U.S.-led Cold War coalition.

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Bases, logistics, and the problem of temptation in the Middle East

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Bases, logistics, and the problem of temptation in the Middle East

The ability to respond rapidly to global trouble sounds good, but it can tempt policymakers to intervene militarily even for non-vital interests. U.S. military bases and logistics hubs in and near the Middle East are the primary examples of this—they make foolish wars too easy to start. Closing bases will therefore make wars more difficult to start, spur public debate about potential interventions, and give diplomacy an opportunity to return as the primary policy option.

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To prevent war and secure Ukraine, make Ukraine neutral

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To prevent war and secure Ukraine, make Ukraine neutral

A solution to the current crisis centered on the agreed neutrality of Ukraine will serve the United States’ main goals, and Ukraine's and Russia's as well. Neutrality deals have worked well in the past, and solutions that omit Ukrainian neutralization will fail. The stakes at issue in Ukraine are too small to justify a costly conflict. Hence, finding a compromise to resolve things should take priority for the United States.

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A new and better security order for Europe

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A new and better security order for Europe

Changes in the global balance of power and in Europe’s security environment demand prevailing U.S.-Europe strategy change fundamentally. What is needed is a reduction in U.S. security commitments on the continent. A drawdown of U.S. obligations will help the U.S. preserve resources and refocus on the Indo-Pacific. It will also benefit Europeans by encouraging them to pursue strategic autonomy. However, while European strategic autonomy is important, a reduction in U.S. commitments in Europe should not be predicated on Europeans’ readiness to defend themselves.

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The folly of a democracy-based grand strategy

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The folly of a democracy-based grand strategy

Making democracy promotion abroad a centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy is a mistake that counterintuitively harms the ability to spread democracy and advance U.S. interests. China, Russia, and other non-democracies—informed by years of U.S. military and non-military actions—view democracy promotion and regime change as linked threats to regime security. Promoting democracy, outside of serving as an exemplar, is counterproductive since regimes often respond to this outside pressure by suppressing democracy at home and aggressing against U.S. interests.

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Phantom Empire: The illusionary nature of U.S. military power

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Phantom Empire: The illusionary nature of U.S. military power

U.S. bases and troops abroad no longer translate into influence, making America’s far-flung garrison a “Phantom Empire.” The refusal of U.S. leaders to countenance drawdowns in most cases removes what leverage U.S. troops might provide over host nations. U.S. commitments in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia yield example after example of countries whose close defense relationship with the United States does not prevent them from going their own way geopolitically.

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Perils of pushing Russia and China together

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Perils of pushing Russia and China together

While much has changed since the Cold War, it remains in the U.S. interest to avoid Russia and China—the only two near-peer, nuclear-armed U.S. competitors—combining their economic and military power. The current U.S. approach of dual containment encourages their cooperation. Mounting a global campaign pitting democracies against autocracies adds to that pressure. The U.S. should focus on reducing tension with Moscow to improve the chances of productive diplomacy and limit incentive for Russia to cooperate with China against the U.S.

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Global Posture Review 2021: An opportunity for realism and realignment

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Global Posture Review 2021: An opportunity for realism and realignment

The Biden Administration’s forthcoming Global Posture Review—a top-to-bottom examination of all overseas U.S. military bases and deployments—should jumpstart a needed shift in U.S. strategic thinking away from the leftover assumptions of the Cold War and the War on Terror. Through balancing and burden sharing in Asia, major troop reductions in Europe and the Middle East, and limiting presence deployments to preserve military readiness, the United States can realign its military posture to sustainably confront the challenges ahead.

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“Great power competition” as an anachronism

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“Great power competition” as an anachronism

Today, “great power competition” is too often invoked by advocates of a more militarily assertive foreign policy. The phrase represents a view of the world that is to a great extent zero-sum, in which the U.S. must constantly confront China and Russia abroad. This view is dangerously outdated; changes in the international system such as nuclear weapons and the end of territorial expansion mean that the great powers should move toward more cooperative relations.

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U.S. foreign policy priorities for the next four years

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U.S. foreign policy priorities for the next four years

The next four years are an opportunity for the U.S. to pursue a new, more realistic foreign policy. In addition to the urgent task of ending endless wars, the U.S. should focus on narrow missions in the Middle East to thwart anti-U.S. terror threats. In Europe, the U.S. should shift burdens to NATO members. And in East Asia, it should encourage allies to invest in defensive capabilities to strengthen deterrence. In all, abandoning the failed status quo in favor of a foreign policy based on restraint will mean a stronger America with more security at less cost and risk.

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Restraint: A post-COVID-19 U.S. national security strategy

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Restraint: A post-COVID-19 U.S. national security strategy

The COVID-19 pandemic and efforts to manage it ravaged the U.S. economy and government finances, raising demand for domestic spending, cutting revenue, and increasing debt. U.S. grand strategy—long overly ambitious—should be restrained to manage these budgetary pressures. Domestic needs should take greater priority because the U.S. is fundamentally secure. Restraint prioritizes vital interests, abandons peripheral missions, shifts the burden of securing other regions to allies, and ends military overstretch—it provides more security at lower cost and aids the difficult task of domestic rebuilding.