China has the world’s largest navy, but there are important questions about its ability to contest the United States on a global scale. To do so, China would need more overseas bases than the two it currently has in Djibouti and Cambodia. Similarly, its aircraft carriers cannot sustain high-tempo aviation operations beyond the First Island Chain for an extended period. Developing super-quiet attack submarines would markedly improve China’s ability to conduct blue-water operations. However, to date, China has not fielded submarines that match the technological capabilities of U.S. boats. A careful examination of China’s naval strength shows that while it is well-positioned to wage a war close to its shores, the PLAN is not a global peer of the U.S. Navy.
Despite Russia’s recent capture of Avdiivka, the war in Ukraine is entering its third year at a relative stalemate. Major changes to the 600-mile long frontline are few and far between, with Ukraine and Russia finding offensive warfare costly and resource-intensive. At the same time, neither side is willing to compromise on its maximalist aims, making talks on a ceasefire or end-of-war settlement remote. Yet with additional U.S. military aid to Ukraine stalled in Congress, questions arise as to how long the U.S. can maintain the status quo—and whether it even should. This brief argues that U.S. policy toward Ukraine and Europe overall is in need of significant reform. A combination of defensive security aid to the Ukrainian military, real burden-sharing in Europe and avoiding firm U.S. defense commitments to Ukraine has a better chance of accomplishing the limited U.S. interests at stake with less risk and at reasonable cost.
The Israel-Saudi normalization deal is still alive and still could be a bad deal for the United States. The war in Gaza has pushed the sweeping U.S.-backed diplomatic normalization deal between Saudi Arabia and Israel to the back burner, but both governments are likely to try to revive it at some point. This brief examines the drivers of the normalization deal, analyzes the case for and against it from the perspective of U.S. interests, and concludes that it is not worth much to Americans—nothing like the reported concessions the United States was prepared to make. Security guarantees for Saudi Arabia in particular should be avoided.
The Israel-Hamas conflict shows little signs of slowing down, and the risk of a wider war remains credible. This brief examines and addresses the complex dynamics at play that could cause the crisis to expand, and it clearly defines parameters for how the U.S. should navigate the conflict. Washington should avoid direct U.S. military involvement, work with all parties to prevent escalation, and redeploy troops out of Syria—and eventually Iraq—which denies Iran leverage for broadening the war.
The balance of power in East Asia has shifted in China's favor, but it does not follow that China constitutes a major threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of all neighboring states. As DEFP Non-Resident Fellow Peter Harris argues in a new explainer, upholding peace and stability in East Asia does not require U.S. military primacy. U.S. efforts to dominate the region could backfire by intensifying the U.S.-China rivalry and plunging East Asia into a new cold war. A more sensible approach would be to move toward an offshore balancing posture that incentivizes capable regional states to provide for their own defense and deter Chinese aggression.
Nothing about the Middle East warrants an enduring U.S. military presence there. Of the few important interests there—preventing major terrorist attacks, stopping the emergence of a market-making oil hegemon, curbing nuclear proliferation, and ensuring no regional actor destroys Israel—not one requires a permanent garrison of American troops. The roughly 60,000 U.S. military personnel in the region should come home.
The COVID-19 pandemic and efforts to manage it ravaged the U.S. economy and government finances, raising demand for domestic spending, cutting revenue, and increasing debt. U.S. grand strategy—long overly ambitious—should be restrained to manage these budgetary pressures. Domestic needs should take greater priority because the U.S. is fundamentally secure. Restraint prioritizes vital interests, abandons peripheral missions, shifts the burden of securing other regions to allies, and ends military overstretch—it provides more security at lower cost and aids the difficult task of domestic rebuilding.
The U.S. rightly went to war in Afghanistan after 9/11 to decimate Al-Qaeda and punish the Taliban. Following a swift victory, however, the mission transformed into a nation building venture, doomed to strategic failure, that has continued for more than 18 years. U.S. leaders incorrectly feared the failure of the Kabul government could create a safe haven for terrorists. But the U.S. is safe from terrorism because of its capability to gather intelligence on, and strike, anti-U.S. terrorists anywhere. This capability has only grown more sophisticated since 9/11. As tragic as it is, violence in Afghanistan should not be confused with U.S. security—and it should not slow the overdue withdrawal of all U.S. forces.
During the Cold War, the U.S. operated just two major bases in the Middle East. Today, even though the region is of vastly diminished strategic importance, the U.S. maintains an expansive network of bases. The “zero option”—reducing U.S. military bases in the region to zero—should be responsibly considered. It would force decision makers to rethink the means-end chain for securing U.S. interests. Employing other levers of power would free up resources—military and otherwise—and avoid costly entanglements in the region. Removing immediate U.S. military protection would also prompt partners to reconsider their own positions and conduct their external relations with greater circumspection.
The U.S. should not keep troops in Syria and Iraq to fight ISIS’s remnants. ISIS’s loss of territory left its fighters operating in small groups, struggling to survive, and devastated its capacity to plot attacks. Local forces—Syria, Iraq, Kurds, Iran, and Shia militias—eagerly attack ISIS’s remnants. Misgovernment and sectarian divides might allow ISIS or some other radical Sunni jihadist entity to regain capability. But deployed U.S. forces do little to prevent that and risk sparking war with Iran or another state. If an ISIS dangerous to the U.S. does re-emerge, U.S. airstrikes and local allies can again target it.
Maximum pressure is an escalation strategy that courts war with Iran. It has already led to direct U.S.-Iran conflict and leaves U.S. soldiers in Iraq and Syria especially vulnerable to Iranian reprisals. Instead of the U.S. dictating the terms of engagement, keeping U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria allows Iran and other adversaries to target Americans at will. The likelihood for American fatalities to trigger a prolonged and costly war with Iran, combined with growing local hostility to the U.S. presence, makes it imperative to withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq and Syria.
The death of ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi during a U.S. special forces raid follows the decisive military victory over ISIS’s caliphate. The raid’s success highlights U.S. intelligence capabilities—the globe’s most robust and well-funded—to locate anti-U.S. terrorists and the military’s ability to strike targets anywhere in the world, even without a local presence. With ISIS’s caliphate destroyed, the U.S. military mission is over. The U.S. should avoid being ensnared in another permanent policing mission, and instead methodically withdraw all remaining forces from Syria.
The fall of ISIS's caliphate should have concluded the military mission in Syria and led to a withdrawal of all U.S. forces. Failure to do so encouraged the Kurds to seek autonomy rather than protection from Damascus, which would have kept Turkey out, ISIS down, and the Kurds reasonably safe. Staying entangled in Syria has precipitated a crisis between Turkey and the Kurds, and left the U.S. with no appealing options. While the U.S. and Kurdish forces forged a partnership of convenience and mutual benefit to defeat a common adversary, the U.S. did not agree to adopt other Kurdish interests, nor should it. An orderly withdrawal of all U.S. forces is the only way to promote a sustainable status quo.
The origins of the heightened crisis with Iran can be traced back to “maximum pressure,” the Saudi war in Yemen, and the broader Sunni-Shiite fight between Riyadh and Tehran. The recent attacks on Saudi Arabia’s oil infrastructure should come as no surprise. But it is a major warning to de-escalate. As realists predicted, economic sanctions are strangling Iran’s economy, but it is resulting in increasingly risky, belligerent behavior—the exact opposite of its intent. Any military response could spiral into a regional war. Unwinding economic sanctions and pursuing strong diplomacy would best safeguard U.S. interests.
The U.S. was right to punish and deter Al-Qaeda and the Taliban for harboring them following 9/11. But after swift victory, Washington transformed the mission to an unnecessary, costly nation-building effort. The outlines of a U.S.-Taliban agreement rest on four pillars: (1) the Taliban renounce Al-Qaeda and all terrorists, (2) a cease-fire covering all parties, (3) the Taliban agree to negotiate with the Afghan government, and (4) the U.S. military will draw down its forces. But only a full withdrawal is necessary for U.S. security, and that requires no agreement with the Taliban.
Like most Middle East nations, Iran is guilty of malign behavior—but it is weak, regionally isolated, and unable to meaningfully project power. Its undesirable local activities pose no direct threat to the United States, and it lacks the capability to cause significant disruptions to the flow of oil. The threat Iran does pose is easily checked by its more powerful neighbors. “Maximum pressure” is a risky strategy that could provoke a war instead of negotiations. Normalizing relations with Iran would enhance U.S. security, extricate the U.S. from the region’s disputes, and avoid a potentially catastrophic war.
When President Obama, without congressional authorization, ordered U.S. forces to intervene in Syria, the mission was clear: liberate ISIS-held territory. That mission has been achieved. Leaving behind U.S. forces in Syria involves large risks without any security upside: it threatens to drive adversaries into allying against the United States; to inflame Islamist-nationalist sentiments in Iraq and Syria, making U.S. forces targets; and to risk U.S. conflict with Russia, Iran, Turkey, and Syria for no good reason. Staying also ties down U.S. forces and limits their focus on core missions. With ISIS’s “caliphate” destroyed, U.S. troops have achieved all they reasonably can and should be fully withdrawn.
The Saudi-UAE-led intervention in Yemen’s civil war undermines U.S. interests: It prolongs and exacerbates a civil war that has increased Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s (AQAP) presence there, needlessly breeds new enemies and resentment toward the United States, and undermines U.S. standing as an exemplar of liberal values. None of our limited interests in the Middle East, and no achievable security or prosperity gains in Yemen, justify our involvement. U.S. military support for the Saudi-UAE-led coalition should end.
