Asia, China
Cameron Wilkie
Challenges to Chinese blue-water operations

China has the world’s largest navy, but there are important questions about its ability to contest the United States on a global scale. To do so, China would need more overseas bases than the two it currently has in Djibouti and Cambodia. Similarly, its aircraft carriers cannot sustain high-tempo aviation operations beyond the First Island Chain for an extended period. Developing super-quiet attack submarines would markedly improve China’s ability to conduct blue-water operations. However, to date, China has not fielded submarines that match the technological capabilities of U.S. boats. A careful examination of China’s naval strength shows that while it is well-positioned to wage a war close to its shores, the PLAN is not a global peer of the U.S. Navy.

Challenges to Chinese blue-water operations
NATO, Europe, Grand strategy, Burden shifting, Ukraine
Defense Priorities
Year three: Limiting U.S. ambitions in Ukraine

Despite Russia’s recent capture of Avdiivka, the war in Ukraine is entering its third year at a relative stalemate. Major changes to the 600-mile long frontline are few and far between, with Ukraine and Russia finding offensive warfare costly and resource-intensive. At the same time, neither side is willing to compromise on its maximalist aims, making talks on a ceasefire or end-of-war settlement remote. Yet with additional U.S. military aid to Ukraine stalled in Congress, questions arise as to how long the U.S. can maintain the status quo—and whether it even should. This brief argues that U.S. policy toward Ukraine and Europe overall is in need of significant reform. A combination of defensive security aid to the Ukrainian military, real burden-sharing in Europe and avoiding firm U.S. defense commitments to Ukraine has a better chance of accomplishing the limited U.S. interests at stake with less risk and at reasonable cost.

Year three: Limiting U.S. ambitions in Ukraine
Grand strategy, Middle East
Defense Priorities
Israel-Saudi normalization agreement: What is ...

The Israel-Saudi normalization deal is still alive and still could be a bad deal for the United States. The war in Gaza has pushed the sweeping U.S.-backed diplomatic normalization deal between Saudi Arabia and Israel to the back burner, but both governments are likely to try to revive it at some point. This brief examines the drivers of the normalization deal, analyzes the case for and against it from the perspective of U.S. interests, and concludes that it is not worth much to Americans—nothing like the reported concessions the United States was prepared to make. Security guarantees for Saudi Arabia in particular should be avoided.

Israel-Saudi normalization agreement: What is in it for the U.S.?
Burden sharing, Basing, Grand strategy, Iran, Middle East
Defense Priorities
Understanding the Israel-Hamas war

The Israel-Hamas conflict shows little signs of slowing down, and the risk of a wider war remains credible. This brief examines and addresses the complex dynamics at play that could cause the crisis to expand, and it clearly defines parameters for how the U.S. should navigate the conflict. Washington should avoid direct U.S. military involvement, work with all parties to prevent escalation, and redeploy troops out of Syria—and eventually Iraq—which denies Iran leverage for broadening the war.

Understanding the Israel-Hamas war
Asia, China, Burden sharing
Defense Priorities
Moving to an offshore balancing strategy for ...

The balance of power in East Asia has shifted in China's favor, but it does not follow that China constitutes a major threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of all neighboring states. As DEFP Non-Resident Fellow Peter Harris argues in a new explainer, upholding peace and stability in East Asia does not require U.S. military primacy. U.S. efforts to dominate the region could backfire by intensifying the U.S.-China rivalry and plunging East Asia into a new cold war. A more sensible approach would be to move toward an offshore balancing posture that incentivizes capable regional states to provide for their own defense and deter Chinese aggression.

Moving to an offshore balancing strategy for East Asia

Middle East

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Weighing additional U.S. responses to Houthi Red Sea attacks

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Weighing additional U.S. responses to Houthi Red Sea attacks

Houthi attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden have shown no signs of stopping, as multiple rounds of U.S. airstrikes inside Yemen have only succeeded in prompting more reprisals against merchant vessels. As regional tensions stemming from the Israel-Hamas war continue to build, policymakers must thoroughly consider all aspects of national power in approaching this problem. What policy options are available to the White House in handling this crisis? What do they entail? What are their advantages and drawbacks? This brief presents and evaluates various U.S. policy responses to Houthi attacks and finds that less escalatory prescriptions like diplomacy, buck-passing, and defense stand a better chance at success while carrying fewer risks for the United States than more aggressive options like indefinite military operations in Yemen.

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Withdraw U.S. troops from Syria and Iraq

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Withdraw U.S. troops from Syria and Iraq

The war between Israel and Hamas has increased the threat to U.S. troops in the Middle East, particularly to the 3,400 personnel in Iraq and Syria. But there is no good reason for U.S. forces to be there. The U.S. presence needlessly risks war by allowing Iran and militias it funds to threaten U.S. troops. ISIS’s capabilities have been degraded, capable local actors eagerly hunt the groups’ remnants, and the United States can still strike from a long distance if necessary. U.S. forces should be withdrawn from Iraq and Syria as part of a broader effort to deprioritize the Middle East and avoid an ill-advised conflict with Iran.

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Israel-Saudi normalization agreement: What is in it for the U.S.?

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Israel-Saudi normalization agreement: What is in it for the U.S.?

The Israel-Saudi normalization deal is still alive and still could be a bad deal for the United States. The war in Gaza has pushed the sweeping U.S.-backed diplomatic normalization deal between Saudi Arabia and Israel to the back burner, but both governments are likely to try to revive it at some point. This brief examines the drivers of the normalization deal, analyzes the case for and against it from the perspective of U.S. interests, and concludes that it is not worth much to Americans—nothing like the reported concessions the United States was prepared to make. Security guarantees for Saudi Arabia in particular should be avoided.

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Understanding the Israel-Hamas war

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Understanding the Israel-Hamas war

The Israel-Hamas conflict shows little signs of slowing down, and the risk of a wider war remains credible. This brief examines and addresses the complex dynamics at play that could cause the crisis to expand, and it clearly defines parameters for how the U.S. should navigate the conflict. Washington should avoid direct U.S. military involvement, work with all parties to prevent escalation, and redeploy troops out of Syria—and eventually Iraq—which denies Iran leverage for broadening the war.

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Don’t fear vacuums: It’s safe to go home

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Don’t fear vacuums: It’s safe to go home

U.S. leaders often express the fear that leaving the Middle East or removing U.S. forces from warzones there and in other parts of the world will leave “vacuums,” which adversaries will fill. This fear misunderstands international politics. Vacuum fears imagine a precarious global balance of power where minor gains by U.S. adversaries create grave dangers, but in reality, the U.S. is quite secure and does not need to worry about its adversaries potentially making minor gains by rushing into U.S.-made vacuums.

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Iran deal negotiations and U.S. options if talks collapse

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Iran deal negotiations and U.S. options if talks collapse

U.S.-Iran nuclear diplomacy is on the brink of collapse. A year after President Trump withdrew from the JCPOA, Iran restarted and advanced its nuclear program. Despite re-engaging with Tehran diplomatically, the Biden administration has so far failed to revive the JCPOA in large part because the administration continues its predecessor’s approach of maximum pressure. If the administration doesn’t shift course, it will likely destroy the JCPOA, and Iran will move toward a bomb. This predictable failure, however, would not justify preventive military strikes that could result in U.S.-Iran war.

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Bases, logistics, and the problem of temptation in the Middle East

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Bases, logistics, and the problem of temptation in the Middle East

The ability to respond rapidly to global trouble sounds good, but it can tempt policymakers to intervene militarily even for non-vital interests. U.S. military bases and logistics hubs in and near the Middle East are the primary examples of this—they make foolish wars too easy to start. Closing bases will therefore make wars more difficult to start, spur public debate about potential interventions, and give diplomacy an opportunity to return as the primary policy option.

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Apply the logic of the Afghanistan withdrawal to Syria

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Apply the logic of the Afghanistan withdrawal to Syria

The United States should apply the lessons learned in Afghanistan to Syria and pull out its ground forces. President Biden noted two key reasons for exiting Afghanistan: military missions should have achievable objectives and strikes and raids from afar, instead of permanent occupation, are sufficient to thwart foreign terrorism against United States. Both conditions also apply to Syria, where the original mission to dismantle ISIS’s territorial caliphate, once achieved, morphed into an open-ended campaign with murky objectives divorced from U.S. security and from counterterrorism.

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Reevaluating U.S. targeted killing policy

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Reevaluating U.S. targeted killing policy

Targeted killings, usually by drone and air strikes from afar, are an overused tool in U.S. counterterrorism policy. They prioritize short-term results over longer-term outcomes, tactics over strategic effect. The U.S. does face threats, and the correct number of targeted killings abroad is unlikely to ever reach zero. Yet U.S. strikes should be limited to exceptional circumstances, where taking life stops terrorists with the intent and capability to attack the U.S.

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Phantom Empire: The illusionary nature of U.S. military power

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Phantom Empire: The illusionary nature of U.S. military power

U.S. bases and troops abroad no longer translate into influence, making America’s far-flung garrison a “Phantom Empire.” The refusal of U.S. leaders to countenance drawdowns in most cases removes what leverage U.S. troops might provide over host nations. U.S. commitments in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia yield example after example of countries whose close defense relationship with the United States does not prevent them from going their own way geopolitically.

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"Maximum pressure" harms diplomacy and increases risks of war with Iran

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"Maximum pressure" harms diplomacy and increases risks of war with Iran

Supporters of the U.S. “maximum pressure” strategy on Iran said sanctions would compel Tehran to accede to U.S. demands, but the strategy failed. Iran resumed enriching uranium at higher levels and increased its aggression in the Middle East. The U.S. can offer some relief from specific sanctions now, unwinding the failed strategy and helping to return both sides to compliance with the JCPOA. No matter what happens in current nuclear talks, however, U.S.-Iran diplomacy should continue, and the U.S. should avoid unnecessary war with Iran.

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Global Posture Review 2021: An opportunity for realism and realignment

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Global Posture Review 2021: An opportunity for realism and realignment

The Biden Administration’s forthcoming Global Posture Review—a top-to-bottom examination of all overseas U.S. military bases and deployments—should jumpstart a needed shift in U.S. strategic thinking away from the leftover assumptions of the Cold War and the War on Terror. Through balancing and burden sharing in Asia, major troop reductions in Europe and the Middle East, and limiting presence deployments to preserve military readiness, the United States can realign its military posture to sustainably confront the challenges ahead.

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Leaving Iraq serves U.S. interests

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Leaving Iraq serves U.S. interests

U.S. forces deployed to Iraq in 2014 to help annihilate ISIS’s territorial caliphate there, which was achieved more than three years ago. No core U.S. interest today requires a military presence in Iraq. The U.S. can minimize the risks of war, dissolve unnecessary commitments, and focus on higher priorities by withdrawing the remaining 2,500 troops and allowing Iraqi security forces to take responsibility for Iraq’s security.

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It is time for U.S. troops to leave Syria

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It is time for U.S. troops to leave Syria

U.S. forces originally deployed to Syria to help annihilate ISIS’s territorial caliphate, which was achieved more than two years ago. No core U.S. interest today requires a military presence in Syria. Maintaining the current deployment needlessly prolongs the civil war, exacerbates suffering there as a result of the war's continuation, and risks drawing the U.S. into wider conflict.

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Not an ally: Recalibrating U.S.-Saudi Relations

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Not an ally: Recalibrating U.S.-Saudi Relations

The U.S. and Saudi Arabia are not treaty allies and never have been. Moreover, today the U.S. can meet its narrow interests in the Middle East without providing unconditional support to Saudi Arabia. Catering excessively to the kingdom’s demands, supporting its foreign policy, and stationing U.S. troops on Saudi soil undermine U.S. interests. Instead, the U.S. should recalibrate Saudi relations to maintain a less accommodating, more balanced and business-like relationship.

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After “maximum pressure”: Returning to deterrence and diplomacy with Iran

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After “maximum pressure”: Returning to deterrence and diplomacy with Iran

The Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” strategy against Iran was supposed to lead to a better nuclear deal and moderate Iran’s foreign policy. It has achieved the opposite, with diplomacy halted and tensions spiking across an array of areas. Instead of continuing with maximum pressure, the Biden administration should set a new strategy, one based on deterrence and diplomacy. Restoring the nuclear deal offers a natural place to begin, but it should build from there to reflect that U.S. interests are limited and easily achieved.

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A plan for U.S. withdrawal from the Middle East

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A plan for U.S. withdrawal from the Middle East

Over four years, the U.S. could reduce its presence in the Middle East by as many as 50,000 military personnel, mainly by drawing down its forces in four key states—Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE—and ending regular deployments to the region by carrier battle groups. Moving to the region’s periphery—drawing on existing bases and access agreements with Jordan and Oman—could position the U.S. to return to a role as offshore balancer with an option to completely withdraw from the region.

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End U.S. support for war in Yemen

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End U.S. support for war in Yemen

Two U.S. administrations in a row have supported the Saudi-led coalition’s intervention in Yemen’s civil war, a violent caldron for local and regional grievances. U.S. participation in this war prolongs it; exacerbates human suffering; and gives the main U.S. concern in Yemen, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, greater space to operate. Involvement in this proxy war undermines U.S. interests and values—ending our support would encourage Saudi Arabia to settle and help end the conflict.

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End the war in Afghanistan and unwind post-9/11 mistakes

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End the war in Afghanistan and unwind post-9/11 mistakes

Plans to reduce U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan and Iraq to 2,500 are responsible—it would be irresponsible not to continue to zero. The ongoing U.S. military occupations are costly mistakes that come at the expense of higher defense priorities. In Afghanistan, the February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement set a timeline to remove all U.S. forces by May 2021. Nothing should derail progress toward bringing all U.S. troops home by that deadline.

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U.S. foreign policy priorities for the next four years

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U.S. foreign policy priorities for the next four years

The next four years are an opportunity for the U.S. to pursue a new, more realistic foreign policy. In addition to the urgent task of ending endless wars, the U.S. should focus on narrow missions in the Middle East to thwart anti-U.S. terror threats. In Europe, the U.S. should shift burdens to NATO members. And in East Asia, it should encourage allies to invest in defensive capabilities to strengthen deterrence. In all, abandoning the failed status quo in favor of a foreign policy based on restraint will mean a stronger America with more security at less cost and risk.