Why joining NATO won't help Kyiv, no such thing as limited war, how strategic overreach impacts military readiness, and more.

Spring fighting season

Why NATO membership won't help Ukraine—and what to pursue instead

It's true that the U.S. and our NATO allies owe Ukraine an answer on the alliance membership question, DEFP Fellow Daniel R. DePetris wrote in a letter published by WaPo. Washington should "give the Ukrainians an answer: Thanks, but no thanks."

To understand why it doesn't make sense for Ukraine to join NATO, as well as what U.S. policymakers should pursue instead, let's start with a look at notable recent developments in this conflict.

Notable developments

Late last month, French President Emanuel Macron raised the possibility of sending troops into Ukraine. [WSJ / Stacy Meichtry et al.]
- Soon after, Russian President Vladimir Putin threatened nuclear reprisal if NATO troops enter Ukraine. [WaPo / Francesca Ebel and Robyn Dixon]
- Is Washington "seriously going to discuss" nuclear controls, Putin asked, "while at the same time trying to inflict, as [U.S. leaders] themselves say, a 'strategic defeat' on Russia?" [NYT / David E. Sanger]
- A German military leak last week suggested U.K. troops are already in Ukraine. [The Guardian / Dan Sabbagh and Kate Connolly]
"Kyiv is bracing for a Russian spring offensive" while "short on fresh soldiers and ammunition." [WSJ / Matthew Luxmoore and Daniel Michaels]
"Russia appears on track to produce nearly three times more artillery munitions than the US and Europe." [CNN / Katie Bo Lillis et al.]
However, some "Western analysts say Moscow's arms-production figures mask various challenges and could be misleading." [WSJ / Alistair MacDonald and Kate Vtorygina]

What about letting Ukraine in NATO?

"The conventional wisdom holds that Ukraine's long-term security is best accomplished by bringing Kyiv under the NATO umbrella," DePetris argued. "But this is wrong":

"First, it would likely lengthen the duration of the war, not shorten it," because keeping Ukraine out of NATO is a major incentive for Putin to "stop waging war, let alone negotiate peace."
"Second, even if Ukraine did join NATO, it's not clear Russia would believe that the United States and its European allies would fight on Kyiv's behalf."
"Instead of continually teasing Ukraine with phantom NATO membership at some undefined point in the future, the alliance should be honest" with Kyiv. [WaPo / DePetris]

Harvard's Stephen M. Walt made a similar case at Foreign Policy, pushing for more U.S. aid to Ukraine but arguing that "bringing Ukraine into NATO now is a bad idea that will prolong the war and leave Kyiv in an even worse position over time," in no small part because "one of the main reasons Putin launched his illegal invasion in February 2022 was to prevent Ukraine from gravitating closer to the West and eventually joining the alliance." [FP / Walt]

As DEFP's Benjamin H. Friedman has argued, "Guaranteeing Ukraine's security serves no major U.S. interest and would increase the risk of a U.S. or NATO war with Russia and nuclear escalation. Moreover, "U.S. security guarantees will likely damage Ukraine's security overall by antagonizing Russia, preserving a cause of the war, and encouraging Ukraine to take risks in expectation of help that will not come."

Looking ahead to talks

Friedman's case for neutrality—and Walt's grimly realistic assessment of Ukraine's battlefield prospects—should inform any discussion of diplomacy.
It's still early for actual negotiations, say Samuel Charap and Jeremy Shapiro at Foreign Affairs, but "it's time to talk about talking":
- "Ukraine and its Western backers have precious little common ground with Russia. Yet all the key players seem to agree on one critical issue: The war in Ukraine will end in negotiations."
- "If neither side begins this process, the warring parties will likely remain stuck where they are today—fiercely battling over inches of territory, at a terrible cost to human life and regional stability, for years to come." [Foreign Affairs / Charap and Shapiro]

QUOTable

"Escalation of violence is in no one's interest, and there is no such thing as a limited war."

– U.S. Special Envoy Amos Hochstein on the prospect of war on the Israel-Lebanon border. [Reuters]

TALKING HEADS

How strategic overreach impacts military readiness

What compounds U.S. military readiness problems, DEFP Fellow Ret. Col. Daniel L. Davis said on a Fox News panel, is "that we want to do everything all over the place. We want to stay forever in the Ukraine war; we want to keep our troops in Iraq and Syria."

For Ukraine alone, Davis continued, Washington has sent thousands of military vehicles and millions of rounds of ammunition. "We can't continue that without seriously degrading our ability to defend ourselves."

Watch the full clip here, or go deeper with two recent DEFP explainers:

Sober Analysis

Don't overstate THE Army's role in the Pacific

[U.S. Naval Institute / Matthew C. Mai]

[It] is not clear how adding more forward [U.S.] presence [inside the first island chain] will credibly bolster deterrence against China, especially considering the vulnerabilities of the current U.S. posture to Chinese long-range missiles. A resilient and survivable posture that can withstand and recover from the initial volley of Chinese strikes requires dispersion and distance.

Surging more ground forces to the first island chain to "influence" the local environment with support installations would just present Chinese planners with additional targets rather than give U.S. planners meaningful warfighting capability.

Read the full analysis here.

What Ukraine needs instead of NATO