Taiwan's election results and U.S.-China relations, U.S. airstrikes on Houthis in Yemen, a defensive vision for victory in Ukraine, and more.

Election analysis

Peace is still the chief U.S. interest in Taiwan

"Mr. President," a reporter asked Saturday on the south lawn of the White House, "do you have a reaction to the Taiwan election?"

"We do not support independence," President Biden replied.

The simplicity and clarity of Biden's comment was welcome—particularly given his past pattern of rhetorically committing the U.S. to Taiwan's defense, then his aides immediately walking his comments back. And it followed shortly after a strikingly sensible statement on Taiwan from a senior administration official.

Here's a rundown of what happened in Taiwan's election, what those results mean, and where U.S. interests in the situation lie.

The election results

Taiwan's presidential election was won by the Democratic Progress Party (DPP), which already held power. Beijing has called William Lai, the president-elect, a "separatist through and through." [Axios / Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian]
The DPP's founder argues Taiwan is "already, in fact, independent, because its people had won their democratic self-determination." [NYT / Chris Buckley and Amy Chang Chien]

What they mean

"The result shows voters backing the DPP's view that Taiwan is a de facto sovereign nation that should bolster defenses against China's threats and deepen relations with fellow democratic countries." [CNN / Eric Cheung et al.]
"Taiwan's election result poses major challenges for regional and global security," said DEFP Director of Asia Engagement Lyle Goldstein. "China has repeatedly made it clear that it regards DPP rule as anathema, since DPP leaders insist that Taiwan has already achieved independence."

Where U.S. interests lie

Biden's comment on the lawn came two days after a longer statement from an unnamed official, shared in a background press call on Thursday, which is worth quoting at length:

The United States and China of course have had differences on cross-Strait issues, but over the last 40 years we have managed these differences.

When President Biden met with President Xi in San Francisco this past November, he made clear that U.S. policy toward Taiwan has not and will not change. He reiterated that we are committed to our longstanding One China policy which is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the Three Joint Communiqués, and the Six Assurances.

He indicated that we oppose any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side. We do not support Taiwan independence. We support cross-Strait dialogue, and we expect cross-Strait differences to be resolved by peaceful means, free from coercion, in a manner that is acceptable to the people on both sides of the Strait. We do not take a position on the ultimate resolution of cross-Strait differences, provided they are resolved peacefully.

This one remark does not negate past missteps on Taiwan from the Biden administration, of course. Nor can it substitute for long-term, working level diplomacy or rectify the U.S. force posture in East Asia, which is bloated with worse-than-useless outposts and should move toward an offshore balancing model, as DEFP's Peter Harris recently argued.

But it does hit on three crucial points:

The status quo of Taiwan vis-à-vis China is certainly not ideal, but both Taiwan and the U.S. can live with it—and indeed have lived with it for decades.
Though the cause of formal Taiwanese independence is undoubtedly sympathetic, it is not Washington's prerogative to initiate change to that status quo. That could pull the United States into a war with China that we should be laboring to avoid.
For all that sympathy, the chief U.S. interest here is not independence for Taiwan but peace, and especially avoidance of a catastrophic U.S.-China war.

One immediate implication: The Biden administration would do well to cancel its planned post-election delegation visit to Taiwan. The trip will antagonize Beijing without meaningfully enhancing Taipei's security.

Go deeper with DEFP's explainers:

QUOTED

"After Houthi attacks on shipping targets continued into this week, Ben Friedman, policy director at Defense Priorities, a think tank which advocates restraint in U.S. foreign policy, sighed in frustration. The Biden administration is 'left deciding whether to back down and look feckless, or pointlessly escalate.' He added: 'The only way out of this is diplomatic.'"

– DEFP Policy Director Benjamin Friedman, as quoted in, "What Yemen's Houthis gain through their Red Sea strikes." [The Washington Post / Ishaan Tharoor]

MAPPED

Countries with U.S. forces engaged in combat, 2021–2023

"Nearly a quarter-century after the U.S. launched its response to 9/11, the Pentagon continues to pursue military actions in the Middle East and in many more parts of the world than Americans may realize," USA Today reports, based on a new report from the Costs of War project at the Watson Institute at Brown University.

"The findings cover the first three years of the Biden administration and show the range of globe-spanning operations where U.S. troops have engaged in direct combat" and other military interventions. The nine countries reported to have seen U.S. combat operations in the Biden years are Afghanistan, Iraq, Kenya, Mali, Somalia, Syria, Tanzania, UAE, and Yemen.

Read more from USA Today, or see the full report from the Watson Institute (PDF).

Sober analysis

How Ukraine can win through defense

[Foreign Affairs / Emma Ashford and Kelly A. Grieco]

Much of the aid to Ukraine over the last two years has focused on offensive capabilities—advanced Western tanks, mine-clearing equipment, and long-range missiles—in a bid to push Russia back. But victory for Kyiv and its Western partners does not necessarily require gaining back specific chunks of territory. It simply requires that Russian President Vladimir Putin be denied his goal of subjugating Ukraine.

If Ukraine can defend the territory it controls in the coming months by using capabilities such as antitank mines and concrete fortifications, it can deny Russia a path to complete victory and perhaps even open the door for negotiations. Putin evidently believes that time is on his side; a strong, sustainable Ukrainian defense would prove him wrong.

Read the full analysis here.

Our interest in Taiwan