The necessary balance of assurance and deterrence for Beijing, realistic prospects in Gaza, U.S. views of diplomacy, and more.

BALANCING ACT

Is America at risk of being pulled into a broadened Israel-Hamas war?

"For a half-century," Stanford and AEI fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro recently argued at The New York Times, "America has avoided war with China over Taiwan largely through a delicate balance of deterrence and reassurance." But in recent years, that balance has been upset, Mastro contends: The U.S. military footprint in the Indo-Pacific is expanding, but reassurance has been neglected.

That's a serious risk, Mastro argues, and matters more than Washington seems to realize (not least as Beijing's focus shifts toward security, as DEFP's Andrew Latham details at The Hill). Understanding—and restoring—the balance will help steer clear of war.

Deterrence

Maintaining credible deterrence requires prioritization, even for America. Our adversaries can tell when we're doing too much:
- "[T]he U.S. is stretched dangerously thin. [The Israel-Hamas war]—and the ongoing war in Ukraine—is really testing the Biden administration's assertion that the United States can still do everything." [FP / Emma Ashford]
- "If we do more, everywhere, then our capabilities will be so stretched that we cannot actually make a credible deterrent threat." [FP / Emma Ashford]
"The United States might be able to build the necessary military power in the region to deter a Chinese war of choice. But the level of dominance needed to stop [Chinese President Xi Jinping] from launching a war he sees as necessary might be impossible to achieve." [NYT / Mastro]

Reassurance

In meetings with Chinese officials, Mastro found Beijing "far less" concerned about U.S. deterrence "than with the political rhetoric" suggesting the U.S. "is moving away from past ambiguity" on Taiwan. [NYT / Mastro]
Provocations from Congress and the Trump and Biden administrations "put great pressure on Mr. Xi, who won't tolerate going down in history as the Chinese leader to have lost Taiwan." [NYT / Mastro]
Remember: "A war between the United States and China over Taiwan could be the most brutal since World War II. As politically difficult as it may be, U.S. leaders have a duty to try to prevent conflict." [NYT / Mastro]

A win for the taking

Deterrence is not reckless. It must be prudent and wary of missteps. Restoring U.S.-Chinese military communications, which the Pentagon reportedly hopes to begin next week, is vital. [WSJ / Alastair Gale]
Beijing is also "willing to develop military relations with the U.S.," China's most senior military official said Monday, but only "based on mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win co-operation." [FT / Kathrin Hille]
This is an offer of talks in exchange for assurance, and it's an eminently practical win Washington should take.

Quoted

"I understand the desire to destroy the Hamas apparatus, but I just don't think it's doable. If you envision any degree of Palestinian self-rule, then I think some version of Hamas 2.0 remains in power, and Gaza goes back to what it was, but with fewer people and buildings."

– DEFP Policy Director Benjamin Friedman, as quoted in "Israel aims to defeat Hamas, then leave Gaza. Who would fill the vacuum?" [CSM / Howard LaFranchi]

See more from DEFP experts on quandaries of the Israel-Hamas war:

DIPLOMACY

Most Americans say the U.S. should talk to adversaries

While policymakers sometimes cast willingness to negotiate with adversaries as weakness, Americans are not similarly squeamish about the necessary but messy work of diplomacy, a new survey suggests.

"Adroit diplomacy with allies as well as adversaries is critical for securing U.S. interests," the Eurasia Group Foundation report says. "Most Americans (67 percent)—regardless of political leaning—support negotiations with adversaries, even if they are human rights abusers, dictators, or home to terrorist organizations."

Read more from the Eurasia Group Foundation here.

Sober analysis

The return of nuclear escalation

[Foreign Affairs / Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press]

[O]ptimists in the United States argue that the risk of nuclear war remains low. Their reasoning is straightforward: the countries that are building up and brandishing their nuclear capabilities are bluffing. Nuclear weapons cannot paper over conventional military weakness because threats to escalate—even by a desperate enemy—are not credible. According to the optimists, giving credence to the nuclear bluster of weak enemies is misguided and plays squarely into their hands.
Unfortunately, the optimists are wrong. The risk of nuclear escalation during conventional war is much greater than is generally appreciated. [...] The United States will be in grave danger if it underestimates the will of desperate, nuclear-armed adversaries.

Read the full analysis here.

Off-kilter China policy