The futility of U.S.-Syria policy, how the Israel-Gaza war affects Ukraine, China's naval ambitions, and more.

Escalation

Is America at risk of being pulled into a broadened Israel-Hamas war?

"As a former CIA officer who has personally worked a number of major crises in the Middle East, I've repeatedly warned the risk of direct U.S. involvement in the Israel-Hamas war is higher than most people realize," DEFP Public Policy Manager Michael DiMino has argued. "Once that box is opened—even if due to accident or miscalculation—it can't easily be closed."

It's very unlikely, as DiMino and others have observed, that the Biden administration has any appetite for that kind of American involvement in this conflict. But sometimes, "intent isn't enough to prevent things from spiraling out of control."

Hints of a larger conflict

There's no prudence in exaggerating the possibility that the U.S. will somehow join this fight. But neither is that scenario inconceivable, as many recent reports suggest:
- U.S. forces were attacked last week by drones thought to be controlled by Iran-backed militias. [Air & Space Forces / Chris Gordon]
- The U.S. has sent a carrier strike group and missile defense systems to the Persian Gulf. [CBS / Faris Tanyos]
- The White House has reportedly “been discussing the possibility of using military force if Hezbollah joins the war in Gaza." [Axios / Barak Ravid]
- And the secretaries of defense and state have signaled their expectation that the war "escalate through involvement by proxies of Iran," promising U.S. reprisal if U.S. troops are targeted. [AP / Darlene Superville]
- "Never before have we talked to so many top government officials who, in private, are so worried" about this conflict (and others) spiraling into something larger, Axios reports. [Jim VandeHei and Mike Allen]

But talk about "spiraling" may suggest accidental U.S. involvement is the most likely scenario. The greater risk is a chosen war with Iran—especially while U.S. troops remain in Iraq and Syria.

These forces "have little to achieve, but are vulnerable to attack and are sources of potential escalation with Syria's government, Iran, Russia, and even Turkey," as DEFP Policy Director Ben Friedman recently said. And the "terrible case for leaving these troops in place only got worse with the war in Israel."

Strategies for de-escalation

Escalation in this kind of situation can happen very rapidly, DiMino notes, so "even if it's a minimal risk, it's one that we should take seriously and that we should steel ourselves against." Here, as elsewhere, entering an overseas war is a choice, not an inevitability, for the United States. To make it less likely, we should be:

Keeping a realistic view of U.S. capacity to influence the course of events as "a third party located on the other side of the world." [TAC / Robert Moore]
Foregrounding the fact that as "bad as this situation is in Israel, it will be significantly worse if the war spreads to include additional parties." [Newsweek / Daniel L. Davis]
Looking beyond the failed foreign policy playbook of the post-9/11 era:
- The Biden team has many "skilled mechanics," but "they are stuck in an outdated vision of America's global role," including "its handling of its various Middle East clients." [FP / Stephen Walt]
- "Biden may despise endless wars and unnecessarily foreign entanglements," but he still sees the U.S. as the "indispensable nation" against authoritarians worldwide. That encourages intervention. [The Spectator / Daniel R. DePetris]
"We should be holding our policymakers to account to ensure that any" U.S. involvement in this war is done "with a mind to de-escalate." [RS / DiMino]
"[W]e want to ultimately have a responsible foreign policy that does less in the Middle East. To the extent that we can have reasonable engagement with the Saudis, the Israelis, the Iranians, the Emiratis, whoever else, that's in America's best interest in the long term." [RS / DiMino]

Quoted

"[President Joe Biden] will need to utilize all of the avenues available to send Tehran a message: The U.S. has no intention of entering the conflict and that it’s in Iran's best interest to stay out as well. Otherwise, U.S. moves meant to deter escalation could be miscalculated."

– DEFP fellow Daniel R. DePetris, as quoted in "Biden equates Hamas with Putin, asks Americans to support Israel, Ukraine" [VOA / Patsy Widakuswara]

Mapped

Syria's normalizing relations with its neighbors

However much Washington objects, the Middle East has moved on from trying to oust or reform the Assad regime and is instead living with the political reality of Assad's rule. The United States' policy is the opposite: insensitive to changed circumstances and detached from achievable objectives. U.S. partners in the region recognize the United States' inflexibility and are trying to work around U.S. restrictions. This means hardline U.S. policies are not only brutal for ordinary Syrian civilians; they're also ineffective for inducing change in Syria's government.

Read more about the need to reset U.S.-Syria policy here.

Sober analysis

The failed lessons of Libya

[UnHerd / Rajan Menon]

[Libya's current dysfunction] can be traced to the NATO-led intervention launched on March 19, 2011. Libya's state didn't passively "fail;" the West triggered its failure through its program of so-called humanitarian interventionism. […]
The humanitarian intervention movement … was motivated by a high-minded mission: eliminating or at least mitigating the persistent, serious harm of mass atrocities committed mainly by governments. Yet the lesson offered by Libya—and Iraq and Afghanistan too—is that deploying military force in other countries in order to stop bloodshed and oppression can unwittingly promote prolonged disorder and violence, upending the lives of the intended beneficiaries.
Perhaps Western leaders have learned this lesson. Then again, the hubris produced by overweening power dies hard.

Read the full analysis here.

A new Mideast war?