Counterproductive U.S. operations in Africa, the Ukraine diplomacy taboo, naval activity around Taiwan, and more.

Out Of Africa

How misguided U.S. counterterrorism policy contributes to African coups and undermines American security

At the end of August, the coastal African country of Gabon became the continent's latest nation to undergo a coup. Rebellion leaders installed a general to succeed the ousted president, who is now under house arrest on corruption charges, and promised stable governance.

It's a promise of which many are understandably skeptical. Gabon joins Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, and Sudan is hosting a successful coup in the past three years. In the U.S., this string of takeovers has often been framed as a blow to American security, as DEFP's Daniel R. DePetris observes at National Review. Niger in particular gets cast as crucial to U.S. counterterrorism efforts.

But, as a new explainer from DEFP Visiting Fellow William Walldorf explains, what the U.S. is doing in Africa is better described as "counterinsurgency"—and troublingly close to nation building—than "counterterrorism," and it isn't necessary to keep Americans safe. On the contrary, it "could be helping to inspire the next generation of global jihadists" and is misusing limited defense resources to boot.

Overreach in Africa

The current U.S. military presence in Africa includes at least 6,500 troops—not counting temporary rotations—as well as airstrikes and 127e activities (advise/assist/accompany operations that are functionally active combat).
Two decades of U.S. counterterrorism in Africa have "not only been disappointing," Walldorf writes, "but counterproductive."
There are two chief problems with our current approach, he contends:

The U.S. "is applying too much force against too little threat." Outside of ISIS-Libya, groups active in Africa do not have global reach.
U.S. counterterrorism is "the primary driver of terrorist recruitment in Africa." Our programs are self-perpetuating and worse than useless.

Research also suggests that "when foreign military leaders receive training from the U.S., the probability of those leaders later carrying out military coups increases significantly." Burkina-Faso, Mali, and Niger—three recent coup sites—are all U.S. partners. [DEFP / Walldorf]

A new strategy for AFRICOM

Use of "force needs to be limited exclusively to global reach terrorist organizations." That means a drawdown of U.S. forces across Africa and consolidation of dozens of U.S. bases.
This would not preclude select "light-footprint military operations like special operations raids and drone strikes launched from" remote bases.
However, any such strikes must be subject to stricter rules, consistently applied, to prevent civilian casualties.
Finally, we should "eliminate most security assistance and military training to African countries" instead of continuing to lay the groundwork for coups yet to come. [DEFP / Walldorf]

Read the full explainer: "Overreach in Africa: Rethinking U.S. counterterrorism strategy"

Quoted

"There are people who are looking with a good-faith effort to try to see if there's a way out of this box. And for their trouble they've basically been lambasted as appeasers or sympathetic to Putin and so on. This has got to stop."

— Rajan Menon, DEFP director of grand strategy, as quoted in "The case for negotiating with Russia." [The New Yorker / Keith Gessen]

Related reading: "As Ukraine's fight grinds on, talk of negotiations becomes nearly taboo" [NYT / Steven Erlanger]

Charted

U.S. naval patrols around Taiwan, 2021-2023

U.S. naval patrols around Taiwan have decreased in recent years while Chinese military activity in the area has increased, FT reports, though surveillance remains constant. As DEFP Fellow Mike Sweeney has explained, it "is at sea where the greatest likelihood exists for a direct clash between Chinese and U.S. forces." He continues:

Specifically, the Western Pacific is the most likely site of open conflict between this era's two most prominent powers—just as the plains of Central Europe once were the central flashpoint between the Soviets and Americans. Accurately calibrating the strengths and weaknesses of Chinese maritime power is therefore essential in determining U.S. risk and potential responses.

Read Sweeney's assessment of China's "powerful, but uneven" naval force here.

Sober Analysis

China ponders Russia's logistical challenges in the Ukraine war

[The Diplomat / Lyle Goldstein and Nathan Waechter]

A saying attributed to General Omar Bradley notes that "amateurs talk strategy, professionals talk logistics." Any attempt by China to use military force to seize Taiwan would be an immense logistical undertaking requiring moving large quantities of troops and materiel across the Taiwan Strait. What then, are Chinese observers learning from the logistical realm of the war in Ukraine? […]
Certainly, in considering an invasion of Taiwan, many of the challenges faced by Russia in Ukraine might be further exacerbated for China in a military campaign focused on capturing an island separated by open ocean and thus completely lacking in direct and relatively simple ground lines of communication for resupply.
However, it's a safe bet that China would be better prepared from the outset of a Taiwan scenario than Russia was at the start of its invasion of Ukraine—not least because PLA planners are closely watching and learning from the Ukraine War.

Read the full analysis here.

You’re invited

What are U.S. objectives in Africa? Has the U.S. strategy successfully achieved them? What are the costs and benefits for the U.S. and the host nations and their people? After more than two decades of effort, what do we know about the most effective ways to prevent terrorist attacks? Are there superior alternative policies the U.S. should consider? Join us for a thoughtful discussion on these issues moderated by VCU's Jessica Trisko Darden.

When: Monday, September 18 @ 1 PM ET

Panelists:

Elizabeth Shackelford, senior fellow, Chicago Council on Foreign Affairs
Tricia Bacon, associate professor, American University
William Walldorf, DEFP visiting fellow

Too much force against too little threat