For decades, U.S. military bases in the Middle East were sanctuaries. America’s adversaries lacked missiles accurate enough to threaten them. That era is over. The precision revolution, once a U.S. monopoly, has spread to Iran and beyond.
In this DEFP Q&A, Policy Director Ben Friedman discusses his new paper on the precision revolution and what it means for the United States’ global military posture. (This interview has been lightly edited for clarity. Watch the full interview here.)
What is the precision revolution and how did accuracy spread from the U.S. to Iran and its partners?
Friedman: At the dawn of the missile age, during World War II and the early Cold War, ballistic missiles could hit targets within a few kilometers. Aircraft had trouble finding targets and sometimes even the city they were aiming at, depending on the weather, let alone hitting a particular building. That meant you had to use a lot of missiles or bombs if you wanted to destroy something, or you had to have incredible yield, like nuclear weapons.
The precision revolution was a U.S. phenomenon that emerged during the Cold War, with gravity bombs becoming exponentially more accurate—to the point that, instead of a few kilometers, smart bombs could be dropped on a specific building. Now, we have ballistic missiles that can fly into space, come down, and hit something within maybe 40 meters, according to the U.S. military. And it’s probably even more accurate than that.
After the Gulf War, some of these capabilities spread to China and later to Russia. They developed satellite constellations, like our GPS, that allowed them to guide their missiles. But it was only more recently that some developing countries, and even in some cases non-state actors, developed precision capabilities. These advances came largely because of microchip computing power, which allows missiles to use inertial guidance that provides far greater accuracy, similar to what the United States has. Developing countries now have cruise missiles, which are very accurate, and one-way drones, which are easier to intercept but also very accurate.
It was clear five or six years ago that Iran had developed these capabilities. In response to the U.S. assassination of Iranian Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani, Iran launched successful strikes on U.S. bases in Iraq, hitting precise targets several hundred kilometers from the Iranian border. That was a warning that the United States could no longer count on its bases in the region as sanctuaries. During this year’s war with Iran, the United States moved some assets from U.S. bases, but, as I discussed in the paper, a significant amount of equipment was left in the open and destroyed.
The war fully exposed the vulnerability of U.S. bases in the region, particularly air bases, adding to an already compelling case for the United States to close down most, if not all, of these facilities. Beyond their vulnerability, the bases support unnecessary missions and are costly. It’s time for the United States to operate from farther away, if it is going to operate at all in the region.
What does the war demonstrate about the utility of the United States’ sprawling basing presence in the region?
Friedman: The dramatic improvement in accuracy means air power is far more efficient—one aircraft or missile can be counted on to cause significant damage because it’s more likely to hit its target than ever before. In the past, a U.S. bomber taking off from the United States or from an aircraft carrier in theater didn’t have this capability. If it dropped 20 bombs, it might hit a couple of targets. Now, there is confidence that most of the bombs will hit, if not exactly, then at least close to the intended target. It’s much more efficient. Cruise missiles and Tomahawks fired by submarines and U.S. ships will also produce similar results. Precision-guided land-based weapons can inflict damage from farther away than ever.
In the paper, I recommend that the United States take advantage of this precision revolution and stop relying on local air bases. This would mean primarily making use of carrier-based air power and even surging the number of carriers in the region from two or three to four or even five if the United States was really pressed. The U.S. military can also use bombers that launch cruise missiles from where they’re not vulnerable and launch cruise missiles from ships. In the paper, I calculate that by using that approach, without relying on regional bases, the United States could hit as many or even more targets than it has in Iran since the beginning of the war.
I didn’t present this alternative approach, which makes U.S. assets much less vulnerable, to suggest the United States should have launched the war in Iran in a better way. The point is that the United States can still operate in the Middle East without having these bases, which are political headaches. We now know how vulnerable these bases are.
What are the big-picture implications for U.S. grand strategy beyond the Middle East?
Friedman: If the United States were to get rid of its bases in the Middle East, Asia, or Europe, critics of this approach would argue it hurts U.S. interests by diminishing access to these theaters. But today, most of the military operations we conduct can be done from farther away. It might be more difficult to get back into any given region—if you’re using aircraft carriers, it takes time for them to get where they’re going. But that’s not a bad thing: it should be more difficult to start a war. The United States’ current basing presence provides access and flexibility, and the president has wide latitude to decide whether to go to war. No one envisioned this when the U.S. Constitution was written. We want it to be hard to start wars. So that’s a benefit, not a cost of this plan.
But the bigger point is that the vulnerability of U.S. bases is part of the decline in U.S. military dominance. Precision capabilities are proliferating, making our bases around the world, including in Asia, more vulnerable. If U.S. bases in the Middle East are vulnerable to the Iranians, consider what the Chinese, who have far greater capability, can do.
The United States is overdue for a reevaluation of its global posture. Washington should seriously assess the utility of U.S. bases vis-à-vis American interests and ask whether this globe-spanning presence is truly necessary. The paper tackles a technical issue related to the proliferation of accuracy, but it’s connected to a major shift in global politics.
Military and economic capabilities are increasingly diffused among more powers. This isn’t just about China catching up to U.S. dominance. The bigger story is that a growing number of states, including our allies, can access this technology. That means the United States can shift many of its security responsibilities to its allies, lowering U.S. burdens and costs.
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