By Daniel Davis
This analysis picks up in the aftermath of Russia’s first major error, the splitting of its forces into four relatively small axes that allowed Ukraine to slow and then stop all four drives. By the middle of March 2022 it was clear that Russia had penetrated as far into Ukraine as it was going to get—far short of its initial objectives.
Putin’s army at that time was positioned on three sides of Kyiv and to the north of Sumy and Kharkiv, spread over a distance of nearly 500 kilometers. Ukrainian forces had recovered from their initial shock and deployed large formations that attacked Russian armor with anti-tank guided missiles from the west, to great effect. At this moment, Moscow faced a stark choice. It could either significantly reinforce around the three major urban centers in the north, or withdraw its forces from there. Putin chose the latter, and this was Russia’s first good move.
This piece was originally published in 19FortyFive on July 31, 2023. Read more HERE.