By Matthew Mai
“The invasion of Ukraine was the brainchild of Putin and a tiny group of highly paranoid men around him who became convinced that a pre-emptive blow against Western aggression was necessary for Russia’s survival.” This is the argument that Owen Matthews, previously a Russia-based correspondent for Newsweek and now writing for the Spectator, offers to explain Vladimir Putin’s decision to go to war in Overreach: The Inside Story of Putin and Russia’s War Against Ukraine. In writing one of the first comprehensive accounts about the conflict, Matthews has set a high bar for those that follow.
Matthews identifies the source of Russia’s insecurities as a deep dissatisfaction with the post-Cold War European security order. Although Washington and Moscow pledged to cooperate on establishing a “common and comprehensive security” arrangement in the Euro-Atlantic space, U.S. policymakers too often discounted Russian geopolitical sensitivities throughout the NATO enlargement process. Post facto efforts were made to include Russia in the new security architecture—the creation of the NATO-Russia Council in 2002 was one such example—but not on a “fair, egalitarian basis,” as Boris Yeltsin outlined in 1997. In 2000, Putin even spoke of Russia joining NATO if “Russia’s interests will be reckoned with, if it will be an equal partner.”
Yeltsin and Putin’s statements reflected widespread aspirations shared by everyday Russians. Matthews cites a poll conducted by Levada, an independent Russian research organization, showing that at the end of Yeltsin’s presidency in 1999, “respondents had two main wishes of their new president: to end the economic crisis and to restore Russia to the status of superpower.”
This piece was originally published in 19FortyFive on December 15, 2022. Read more HERE.