By Daniel DePetris
This year has proven to be an especially busy time for North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and his country’s defense industrial base. North Korea has launched more than 40 missiles of various types and ranges in 2022. Six of those tests occurred this month, including an October 12 launch of two cruise missiles that traveled more than 1,200 miles before landing in the East Sea (Sea of Japan). North Korea’s decision to resume intercontinental ballistic missile tests in March, which broke a nearly four-year unilateral moratorium of such activities, was not only the beginning of a more aggressive testing schedule, but was a direct repudiation of the benign atmosphere that has existed since 2018.
It’s becoming increasingly clear that Kim is neither interested in nor eager to resume nuclear negotiations with the United States. As such, additional North Korean missile tests are assured. Kim’s January 2021 guidance to transform the country’s missile inventory into a lighter, faster and more lethal force, thereby enhancing its second-strike capabilities in the process, will proceed based on the North’s own schedule.
This poses a unique problem for Japan, a country that, over the last decade, has largely prioritized China over every other security issue, including North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. The October 4 test of an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) over Japan’s northernmost islands, the first in five years, caused a mini-crisis for the young tenure of Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and a stark reminder of how the North’s advancing capabilities. It brought the issue of North Korea back to the forefront of Japanese foreign and defense policy and is now driving efforts to increase Japan’s defenses.
This piece was originally published in 38 North on October 21, 2022. Read more HERE.