What can Russia’s failure in Afghanistan teach us about its war in Ukraine?

By Gil Barndollar

In the years leading up to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, onlookers were incessantly reminded that the modern Russian military was a far cry from its Red Army forebear. The Russian Armed Forces, coming off successful (if limited) interventions in Crimea and Syria, were on the march. Their record contrasted powerfully with America’s two decades of futility and failure in the Middle East and Central Asia. A certain breed of American politician was even apt to fall for the recruiting commercials, contrasting the virile, fit, aggressive Russians with woke, weak, and inclusive American soldiers.

What a difference six months makes. After two seasons of fighting, Russia’s military has been exposed as a hollow force.

The vaunted Russian army has been blunted, and may yet be broken, by the regular and irregular troops of the poorest country in Europe. Russia’s battered force has lost perhaps a third of its soldiers and thousands of tanks and armored vehicles, quickly abandoned its drive on Kyiv, and at the time of this writing is on its heels, the victim of an unexpected Ukrainian offensive near Kharkiv. The Russians may be lucky just to salvage some modest territorial gains in southeast Ukraine.

This piece was originally published in The Critic on September 25, 2022. Read more HERE.