For those following the crisis between the U.S. and Iran, the past few days have been bewildering. On Friday, the six-week-old ceasefire seemed doomed. Donald Trump skipped his son’s wedding to remain in the White House and was reportedly contemplating renewed military strikes on Iran. On Saturday, apprehension was replaced by optimism. Trump announced that an agreement with Iran would be concluded “shortly”. On Sunday, the U.S. secretary of state, Marco Rubio, added to the hope by saying that there would soon be “good news”.
Iran’s leaders soon dampened the optimism. The country’s media dismissed Trump’s social media post as propaganda, and Iranian officials highlighted several remaining points of dispute. As Tehran began revealing—in very general terms—its conception of a deal, the gap between it and Washington became even more evident.
The Trump administration wants an immediate re-opening of the strait of Hormuz. It also insists on the removal of Iran’s entire stockpile of enriched uranium and a ban on enrichment. The Iranians, however, want to proceed in two phases. In phase one, the ceasefire, which would include Lebanon, would be extended for 60 days. The strait would be opened without ships being required to pay tolls, and the U.S. would lift its naval blockade and begin unfreezing Iranian assets and lifting economic sanctions.
Even this first phase could fail. Israel, alarmed by the deal, wants to preserve its freedom of action in Lebanon. And it’s hard to fathom how Washington’s insistence on a free and open strait can be squared with Iran’s 18 May unveiling of a Persian Gulf Strait Authority that will oversee maritime traffic and levy tolls on shipping.
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