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Home / China / A fourth joint communique would benefit Washington’s China policy
China, Asia

August 16, 2024

A fourth joint communique would benefit Washington’s China policy

By Quinn Marschik

August marks the 42nd anniversary of President Ronald Reagan’s Third U.S.-China Joint Communique. Reagan accomplished this feat during a period of intense debate over the United States’ relationship with China to avoid a cross-Strait crisis. While today’s debate appears to reject hard-nosed diplomacy, interest-based and clear-eyed diplomacy with China is needed to restore stability to the relationship. A fourth communique would be a bold and beneficial tool to reorient U.S.-China relations to focus on national interests and avoid conflict.

Both Washington and Beijing use the Three Communiques as the framework for relations. A new one could establish additional guidance for the conduct and goals of each country’s policy.

It should begin with focusing on issues and tension points in the U.S.-China relationship, namely trade, national security, and political affairs. Both countries should acknowledge that trade and investment restrictions—including Chinese market access and fair treatment and U.S. technology trade controls and tariffs—have created tension and distrust. Recognizing key national security issues, such as Chinese espionage and support for Russia’s war in Ukraine and U.S. military operations near China, are important to clearing the air. Even mentioning different interpretations of human rights and political systems as a source of distrust in the relationship would signal that despite the existing political chasm, Washington and Beijing are willing to talk.

Each country’s redlines should be clearly defined, setting the guardrails of the U.S.-China relationship. Like with the previous Three Communiques creating a flexible Taiwan policy which has preserved regional peace, inclusion of redlines should be specific enough for each country to know when to back down, but vague enough to allow interpretation to meet domestic political needs. Washington should unequivocally affirm its vital interests are safeguarding U.S. sovereignty and territorial integrity (including its overseas territories), economic prosperity, and political system. Likewise, Beijing should restate its core interests of sovereignty (meaning rejecting outside interference in China’s domestic political affairs), territorial integrity, and economic development.

Read at RealClearWorld

Author

Quinn
Marschik

Former Contributing Fellow

Defense Priorities

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