Asia, China
Cameron Wilkie
Challenges to Chinese blue-water operations

China has the world’s largest navy, but there are important questions about its ability to contest the United States on a global scale. To do so, China would need more overseas bases than the two it currently has in Djibouti and Cambodia. Similarly, its aircraft carriers cannot sustain high-tempo aviation operations beyond the First Island Chain for an extended period. Developing super-quiet attack submarines would markedly improve China’s ability to conduct blue-water operations. However, to date, China has not fielded submarines that match the technological capabilities of U.S. boats. A careful examination of China’s naval strength shows that while it is well-positioned to wage a war close to its shores, the PLAN is not a global peer of the U.S. Navy.

Challenges to Chinese blue-water operations
NATO, Europe, Grand strategy, Burden shifting, Ukraine
Defense Priorities
Year three: Limiting U.S. ambitions in Ukraine

Despite Russia’s recent capture of Avdiivka, the war in Ukraine is entering its third year at a relative stalemate. Major changes to the 600-mile long frontline are few and far between, with Ukraine and Russia finding offensive warfare costly and resource-intensive. At the same time, neither side is willing to compromise on its maximalist aims, making talks on a ceasefire or end-of-war settlement remote. Yet with additional U.S. military aid to Ukraine stalled in Congress, questions arise as to how long the U.S. can maintain the status quo—and whether it even should. This brief argues that U.S. policy toward Ukraine and Europe overall is in need of significant reform. A combination of defensive security aid to the Ukrainian military, real burden-sharing in Europe and avoiding firm U.S. defense commitments to Ukraine has a better chance of accomplishing the limited U.S. interests at stake with less risk and at reasonable cost.

Year three: Limiting U.S. ambitions in Ukraine
Grand strategy, Middle East
Defense Priorities
Israel-Saudi normalization agreement: What is ...

The Israel-Saudi normalization deal is still alive and still could be a bad deal for the United States. The war in Gaza has pushed the sweeping U.S.-backed diplomatic normalization deal between Saudi Arabia and Israel to the back burner, but both governments are likely to try to revive it at some point. This brief examines the drivers of the normalization deal, analyzes the case for and against it from the perspective of U.S. interests, and concludes that it is not worth much to Americans—nothing like the reported concessions the United States was prepared to make. Security guarantees for Saudi Arabia in particular should be avoided.

Israel-Saudi normalization agreement: What is in it for the U.S.?
Burden sharing, Basing, Grand strategy, Iran, Middle East
Defense Priorities
Understanding the Israel-Hamas war

The Israel-Hamas conflict shows little signs of slowing down, and the risk of a wider war remains credible. This brief examines and addresses the complex dynamics at play that could cause the crisis to expand, and it clearly defines parameters for how the U.S. should navigate the conflict. Washington should avoid direct U.S. military involvement, work with all parties to prevent escalation, and redeploy troops out of Syria—and eventually Iraq—which denies Iran leverage for broadening the war.

Understanding the Israel-Hamas war
Asia, China, Burden sharing
Defense Priorities
Moving to an offshore balancing strategy for ...

The balance of power in East Asia has shifted in China's favor, but it does not follow that China constitutes a major threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of all neighboring states. As DEFP Non-Resident Fellow Peter Harris argues in a new explainer, upholding peace and stability in East Asia does not require U.S. military primacy. U.S. efforts to dominate the region could backfire by intensifying the U.S.-China rivalry and plunging East Asia into a new cold war. A more sensible approach would be to move toward an offshore balancing posture that incentivizes capable regional states to provide for their own defense and deter Chinese aggression.

Moving to an offshore balancing strategy for East Asia

Spheres of influence in a multipolar world

Spheres of influence in a multipolar world

Great powers routinely stake out geographic zones within which they limit the autonomy of weaker states. The prominence of these spheres of influence depends largely on the distribution of power in the international system. During the post-Cold War moment of unipolarity, the U.S. alone was able to assert a sphere of influence. However, with the increase in great power competition, the relevant question now is not if the transition to a world of multiple spheres of influence will take place (given the structural changes at the level of international order, it most certainly will), but how the U.S. should manage this development in ways that are conducive to U.S. interests.

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American interests in the Ukraine war

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American interests in the Ukraine war

Policymakers have poorly defined U.S. strategic interests in the Russia-Ukraine War, and those interests that have been defined do not stand up to scrutiny. Actual U.S. interests in Ukraine are essentially negative: preventing further escalation or spillover of the conflict and limiting a wholesale collapse in U.S.-Russian relations. The limited, core interests the U.S. does have in Ukraine suggest that Washington should try to convince Ukraine and Russia to accept a negotiated settlement.

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Iran deal negotiations and U.S. options if talks collapse

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Iran deal negotiations and U.S. options if talks collapse

U.S.-Iran nuclear diplomacy is on the brink of collapse. A year after President Trump withdrew from the JCPOA, Iran restarted and advanced its nuclear program. Despite re-engaging with Tehran diplomatically, the Biden administration has so far failed to revive the JCPOA in large part because the administration continues its predecessor’s approach of maximum pressure. If the administration doesn’t shift course, it will likely destroy the JCPOA, and Iran will move toward a bomb. This predictable failure, however, would not justify preventive military strikes that could result in U.S.-Iran war.

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War is a choice, not a trap: The right lessons from Thucydides

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War is a choice, not a trap: The right lessons from Thucydides

A careful reading of the Greek Thucydides’ The History of the Peloponnesian War suggests that a U.S.-China war is hardly inevitable. Such a war is a choice, not a trap—and selecting the appropriate U.S. grand strategy is the way to avoid it. Despite China’s rise, the United States and its regional allies are in a strong position to maintain a regional balance of power that keeps a peace and serve U.S. interests in Asia.

Implications of a melting Arctic

Implications of a melting Arctic

Melting ice is poised to make the Arctic more accessible for commercial and military activity. But neither that shift nor competition with Russia and China elsewhere translate into a threat to the United States in the Arctic. Washington should base U.S.-Arctic policy on the reality that the United States enjoys a strong conventional and nuclear deterrent, a robust network of Arctic allies, and favorable geography. With this in mind, the United States should avoid mistaking the Arctic for a new arena for military competition.

Cyber as statecraft, not war

Cyber as statecraft, not war

A continued military-centric approach to cyber issues risks underservicing the other core competencies of U.S. statecraft—intelligence, diplomacy, law enforcement, and other tools—necessary to address illicit cyber activity like ransomware and state-backed hacking. The most persistent and enduring threats from the cyber domain are best addressed through investments in civil infrastructure, public-private resiliency, and international coalitions and less through military superiority.

At the end of its tether: U.S. grand strategy of advancing democracy

At the end of its tether: U.S. grand strategy of advancing democracy

Over the past several decades, U.S. foreign policy has increasingly become devoted to democratizing the world, by force if necessary. Recent rhetoric about a global struggle between autocracy and democracy is a reflection of this. The United States should return to its founding ethos where its foreign policy tries to make the world safe for self-determination, and hence democracy, rather than trying to democratize the world. This will again make the U.S. an advocate of peace and stability, rather than a revolutionary power that promotes instability. It will also improve U.S. security.

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Questions concerning Finnish membership in NATO

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Questions concerning Finnish membership in NATO

Admitting Finland into NATO constitutes a permanent defense commitment by the alliance. In the case of the United States, it also entails a further extension of its nuclear umbrella. Such moves warrant a fulsome public debate, not a rush to action. U.S. forces cannot be everywhere at once. New, permanent security commitments in northern Europe should be examined relative to other U.S. global priorities and take into account Finland’s defensibility—not just now, but in the face of a revitalized, long-term Russian threat.

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Ukraine-Russia War military analysis

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Ukraine-Russia War military analysis

In the opening rounds of the war, Russian armed forces made major errors in both the operational and tactical realm. In recent weeks though, Russia has made slow, methodical progress on the northern shoulder of Donbas. If Russia defeats Ukraine in the Battle of Donbas, Kyiv will face a difficult choice: (1) dig in and continue fighting, even though much of its most effective forces will have been captured or killed or (2) negotiate with Russia to trade territory lost since 2014 to stanch further losses of Ukrainian lives and territory.

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Hypotheses on the implications of the Ukraine-Russia War

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Hypotheses on the implications of the Ukraine-Russia War

The Ukraine war will provide a fillip to U.S. activism, as the Europeans seek inexpensive security insurance from the United States and U.S. policymakers succumb to the temptations of invitational hegemony, if only confined to certain regions. At the same time, the notion of a U.S.-led, rules-based, liberal world order is looking pretty threadbare. That intellectual construct was founded on a unipolar structure of power that no longer exists. Instead, we see the reemergence of the U.S.-led Cold War coalition.

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Deterring a Chinese invasion of Taiwan: Upholding the status quo

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Deterring a Chinese invasion of Taiwan: Upholding the status quo

The United States has an interest in avoiding a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, but America’s overriding concern is to avoid a ruinous war with China. Proposals to deter China by bolstering U.S. military deployments in the Western Pacific are unlikely to succeed and fraught with danger. Instead, the United States should encourage Taiwan and other regional actors to develop their own means of deterring a Chinese invasion. If calibrated correctly, Taiwan and others may be able to threaten a response severe and credible enough to deter Beijing.

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Bases, logistics, and the problem of temptation in the Middle East

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Bases, logistics, and the problem of temptation in the Middle East

The ability to respond rapidly to global trouble sounds good, but it can tempt policymakers to intervene militarily even for non-vital interests. U.S. military bases and logistics hubs in and near the Middle East are the primary examples of this—they make foolish wars too easy to start. Closing bases will therefore make wars more difficult to start, spur public debate about potential interventions, and give diplomacy an opportunity to return as the primary policy option.

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How militarily useful would Taiwan be to China?

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How militarily useful would Taiwan be to China?

Amid the debate over U.S. policy toward Taiwan, advocates of an overt declaration to defend the island tend to assign Taiwan significant value, while proponents of abrogating U.S. defense commitments often downplay its utility. The truth is somewhere in the middle. The military value of Taiwan to China must be viewed in the aggregate. Occupying Taiwan would offer China some important military advantages, but China’s current technical deficiencies limit Taiwan’s overall utility to China, and occupying Taiwan could stress Chinese military and security forces.

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Raising the minimum: Explaining China’s nuclear buildup

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Raising the minimum: Explaining China’s nuclear buildup

China’s recent nuclear expansion, consisting of new ICBMs, submarine-launched weapons, and a new generation of strategic bombers, suggests a significant recalibration of Beijing’s traditional “minimum deterrence” strategy. Washington should avoid overreacting to this shift in Chinese strategy, prioritize preserving a strong nuclear deterrent that focuses on survivability, and accompany any modernization efforts with attempts at dialogue, arms control, and the development of crisis management mechanisms.

The wisdom of U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan

The wisdom of U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan

The U.S. was right to leave Afghanistan. By withdrawing militarily from the country, the U.S. extracted itself from a costly war that did not protect Americans from terrorism or help Afghanistan transition to a healthy democracy. Now, with the resources freed up by withdrawal, the U.S. is better able to honor commitments elsewhere and invest at home.

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Apply the logic of the Afghanistan withdrawal to Syria

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Apply the logic of the Afghanistan withdrawal to Syria

The United States should apply the lessons learned in Afghanistan to Syria and pull out its ground forces. President Biden noted two key reasons for exiting Afghanistan: military missions should have achievable objectives and strikes and raids from afar, instead of permanent occupation, are sufficient to thwart foreign terrorism against United States. Both conditions also apply to Syria, where the original mission to dismantle ISIS’s territorial caliphate, once achieved, morphed into an open-ended campaign with murky objectives divorced from U.S. security and from counterterrorism.

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To prevent war and secure Ukraine, make Ukraine neutral

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To prevent war and secure Ukraine, make Ukraine neutral

A solution to the current crisis centered on the agreed neutrality of Ukraine will serve the United States’ main goals, and Ukraine's and Russia's as well. Neutrality deals have worked well in the past, and solutions that omit Ukrainian neutralization will fail. The stakes at issue in Ukraine are too small to justify a costly conflict. Hence, finding a compromise to resolve things should take priority for the United States.

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NATO should defend Europe, not pivot to Asia

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NATO should defend Europe, not pivot to Asia

In recent years, three of Europe’s biggest powers—the United Kingdom, France, and Germany—have issued Indo-Pacific strategies and sailed naval ships to the region to show maritime presence. European forays into the Indo-Pacific do not help the United States, but they do weaken NATO’s ability to defend Europe. The United States should discourage European deployments to the Indo-Pacific and shift the burden for the defense of Europe to Europeans.

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A new and better security order for Europe

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A new and better security order for Europe

Changes in the global balance of power and in Europe’s security environment demand prevailing U.S.-Europe strategy change fundamentally. What is needed is a reduction in U.S. security commitments on the continent. A drawdown of U.S. obligations will help the U.S. preserve resources and refocus on the Indo-Pacific. It will also benefit Europeans by encouraging them to pursue strategic autonomy. However, while European strategic autonomy is important, a reduction in U.S. commitments in Europe should not be predicated on Europeans’ readiness to defend themselves.

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Reevaluating U.S. targeted killing policy

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Reevaluating U.S. targeted killing policy

Targeted killings, usually by drone and air strikes from afar, are an overused tool in U.S. counterterrorism policy. They prioritize short-term results over longer-term outcomes, tactics over strategic effect. The U.S. does face threats, and the correct number of targeted killings abroad is unlikely to ever reach zero. Yet U.S. strikes should be limited to exceptional circumstances, where taking life stops terrorists with the intent and capability to attack the U.S.