Asia, China
Cameron Wilkie
Challenges to Chinese blue-water operations

China has the world’s largest navy, but there are important questions about its ability to contest the United States on a global scale. To do so, China would need more overseas bases than the two it currently has in Djibouti and Cambodia. Similarly, its aircraft carriers cannot sustain high-tempo aviation operations beyond the First Island Chain for an extended period. Developing super-quiet attack submarines would markedly improve China’s ability to conduct blue-water operations. However, to date, China has not fielded submarines that match the technological capabilities of U.S. boats. A careful examination of China’s naval strength shows that while it is well-positioned to wage a war close to its shores, the PLAN is not a global peer of the U.S. Navy.

Challenges to Chinese blue-water operations
NATO, Europe, Grand strategy, Burden shifting, Ukraine
Defense Priorities
Year three: Limiting U.S. ambitions in Ukraine

Despite Russia’s recent capture of Avdiivka, the war in Ukraine is entering its third year at a relative stalemate. Major changes to the 600-mile long frontline are few and far between, with Ukraine and Russia finding offensive warfare costly and resource-intensive. At the same time, neither side is willing to compromise on its maximalist aims, making talks on a ceasefire or end-of-war settlement remote. Yet with additional U.S. military aid to Ukraine stalled in Congress, questions arise as to how long the U.S. can maintain the status quo—and whether it even should. This brief argues that U.S. policy toward Ukraine and Europe overall is in need of significant reform. A combination of defensive security aid to the Ukrainian military, real burden-sharing in Europe and avoiding firm U.S. defense commitments to Ukraine has a better chance of accomplishing the limited U.S. interests at stake with less risk and at reasonable cost.

Year three: Limiting U.S. ambitions in Ukraine
Grand strategy, Middle East
Defense Priorities
Israel-Saudi normalization agreement: What is ...

The Israel-Saudi normalization deal is still alive and still could be a bad deal for the United States. The war in Gaza has pushed the sweeping U.S.-backed diplomatic normalization deal between Saudi Arabia and Israel to the back burner, but both governments are likely to try to revive it at some point. This brief examines the drivers of the normalization deal, analyzes the case for and against it from the perspective of U.S. interests, and concludes that it is not worth much to Americans—nothing like the reported concessions the United States was prepared to make. Security guarantees for Saudi Arabia in particular should be avoided.

Israel-Saudi normalization agreement: What is in it for the U.S.?
Burden sharing, Basing, Grand strategy, Iran, Middle East
Defense Priorities
Understanding the Israel-Hamas war

The Israel-Hamas conflict shows little signs of slowing down, and the risk of a wider war remains credible. This brief examines and addresses the complex dynamics at play that could cause the crisis to expand, and it clearly defines parameters for how the U.S. should navigate the conflict. Washington should avoid direct U.S. military involvement, work with all parties to prevent escalation, and redeploy troops out of Syria—and eventually Iraq—which denies Iran leverage for broadening the war.

Understanding the Israel-Hamas war
Asia, China, Burden sharing
Defense Priorities
Moving to an offshore balancing strategy for ...

The balance of power in East Asia has shifted in China's favor, but it does not follow that China constitutes a major threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of all neighboring states. As DEFP Non-Resident Fellow Peter Harris argues in a new explainer, upholding peace and stability in East Asia does not require U.S. military primacy. U.S. efforts to dominate the region could backfire by intensifying the U.S.-China rivalry and plunging East Asia into a new cold war. A more sensible approach would be to move toward an offshore balancing posture that incentivizes capable regional states to provide for their own defense and deter Chinese aggression.

Moving to an offshore balancing strategy for East Asia

Counterterrorism

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Withdraw U.S. troops from Syria and Iraq

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Withdraw U.S. troops from Syria and Iraq

The war between Israel and Hamas has increased the threat to U.S. troops in the Middle East, particularly to the 3,400 personnel in Iraq and Syria. But there is no good reason for U.S. forces to be there. The U.S. presence needlessly risks war by allowing Iran and militias it funds to threaten U.S. troops. ISIS’s capabilities have been degraded, capable local actors eagerly hunt the groups’ remnants, and the United States can still strike from a long distance if necessary. U.S. forces should be withdrawn from Iraq and Syria as part of a broader effort to deprioritize the Middle East and avoid an ill-advised conflict with Iran.

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Overreach in Africa: Rethinking U.S. counterterrorism strategy

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Overreach in Africa: Rethinking U.S. counterterrorism strategy

The recent coup in Niger—home to over 1,000 U.S. forces—shed light on one of the many counterterrorism missions the United States is waging across Africa with little scrutiny or oversight.

In a new explainer, Visiting Fellow C. William Walldorf Jr. explains why and how U.S. counterterrorism policy in Africa needs to change. U.S. policy there has been not just disappointing but counterproductive, exacerbating the problem of Islamic terrorism. As terrorists continue to operate in Africa and local U.S. partners become less popular the dangers of mission creep have risen. U.S. forces across the continent are applying too much force against too little of a threat, and U.S. security assistance has failed to address the issues that breed terrorism in the first place. Indeed, in many cases, local partners have used U.S. training and aid to launch coups, commit human rights abuses against their own people, and shore up corrupt governments.

U.S. interests would be better served if U.S. forces were withdrawn from Africa and security assistance to local partners was curbed. Rather than perpetuate a failed policy, Washington needs to end these decades-long missions and revise its assessment of the threat posed by Islamic terrorism.

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Reevaluating U.S. targeted killing policy

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Reevaluating U.S. targeted killing policy

Targeted killings, usually by drone and air strikes from afar, are an overused tool in U.S. counterterrorism policy. They prioritize short-term results over longer-term outcomes, tactics over strategic effect. The U.S. does face threats, and the correct number of targeted killings abroad is unlikely to ever reach zero. Yet U.S. strikes should be limited to exceptional circumstances, where taking life stops terrorists with the intent and capability to attack the U.S.

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Global Posture Review 2021: An opportunity for realism and realignment

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Global Posture Review 2021: An opportunity for realism and realignment

The Biden Administration’s forthcoming Global Posture Review—a top-to-bottom examination of all overseas U.S. military bases and deployments—should jumpstart a needed shift in U.S. strategic thinking away from the leftover assumptions of the Cold War and the War on Terror. Through balancing and burden sharing in Asia, major troop reductions in Europe and the Middle East, and limiting presence deployments to preserve military readiness, the United States can realign its military posture to sustainably confront the challenges ahead.

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Leaving Iraq serves U.S. interests

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Leaving Iraq serves U.S. interests

U.S. forces deployed to Iraq in 2014 to help annihilate ISIS’s territorial caliphate there, which was achieved more than three years ago. No core U.S. interest today requires a military presence in Iraq. The U.S. can minimize the risks of war, dissolve unnecessary commitments, and focus on higher priorities by withdrawing the remaining 2,500 troops and allowing Iraqi security forces to take responsibility for Iraq’s security.

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It is time for U.S. troops to leave Syria

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It is time for U.S. troops to leave Syria

U.S. forces originally deployed to Syria to help annihilate ISIS’s territorial caliphate, which was achieved more than two years ago. No core U.S. interest today requires a military presence in Syria. Maintaining the current deployment needlessly prolongs the civil war, exacerbates suffering there as a result of the war's continuation, and risks drawing the U.S. into wider conflict.

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Leaving Iraq and Syria avoids war and aids Iran diplomacy

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Leaving Iraq and Syria avoids war and aids Iran diplomacy

The U.S. military presence in Iraq and Syria—unnecessary after the collapse of ISIS’s territorial caliphate—is today part of an unsuccessful compellence strategy against Iran. It is a potential “tripwire” that could cause an escalation toward a larger and needless conflict. A full U.S. military withdrawal would reduce the risks of war and aid President Biden’s efforts to pursue diplomacy with Iran and salvage the 2015 nuclear deal.

Checks and balances on war powers

Checks and balances on war powers

The U.S. Constitution reserves the power to declare war to the legislative branch, but in recent years Congress has ceded that responsibility to the executive branch. The War Powers Resolution of 1973 has been misunderstood and misconstrued. Open-ended and vague authorizations for the use of military force have resulted in sprawling and endless wars divorced from original objectives. Only Congress can reclaim its constitutional authority in conducting U.S. foreign policy.

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Not an ally: Recalibrating U.S.-Saudi Relations

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Not an ally: Recalibrating U.S.-Saudi Relations

The U.S. and Saudi Arabia are not treaty allies and never have been. Moreover, today the U.S. can meet its narrow interests in the Middle East without providing unconditional support to Saudi Arabia. Catering excessively to the kingdom’s demands, supporting its foreign policy, and stationing U.S. troops on Saudi soil undermine U.S. interests. Instead, the U.S. should recalibrate Saudi relations to maintain a less accommodating, more balanced and business-like relationship.

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Now is the optimal time to exit Afghanistan

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Now is the optimal time to exit Afghanistan

The Biden administration has three options in Afghanistan: (1) keep the U.S. commitment to exit by May 1; (2) prolong the war by breaking the U.S.-Taliban agreement; or (3) prolong the war by attempting to negotiate with the Taliban for an extension. Withdrawing by May 1 is optimal. The U.S. can better secure its counterterrorism goals while not imperiling U.S. troops in Afghanistan any longer, or spending billions of dollars more on a conflict two decades of evidence shows is futile and wasteful to perpetuate.

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A plan for U.S. withdrawal from the Middle East

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A plan for U.S. withdrawal from the Middle East

Over four years, the U.S. could reduce its presence in the Middle East by as many as 50,000 military personnel, mainly by drawing down its forces in four key states—Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE—and ending regular deployments to the region by carrier battle groups. Moving to the region’s periphery—drawing on existing bases and access agreements with Jordan and Oman—could position the U.S. to return to a role as offshore balancer with an option to completely withdraw from the region.

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End U.S. support for war in Yemen

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End U.S. support for war in Yemen

Two U.S. administrations in a row have supported the Saudi-led coalition’s intervention in Yemen’s civil war, a violent caldron for local and regional grievances. U.S. participation in this war prolongs it; exacerbates human suffering; and gives the main U.S. concern in Yemen, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, greater space to operate. Involvement in this proxy war undermines U.S. interests and values—ending our support would encourage Saudi Arabia to settle and help end the conflict.

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End the war in Afghanistan and unwind post-9/11 mistakes

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End the war in Afghanistan and unwind post-9/11 mistakes

Plans to reduce U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan and Iraq to 2,500 are responsible—it would be irresponsible not to continue to zero. The ongoing U.S. military occupations are costly mistakes that come at the expense of higher defense priorities. In Afghanistan, the February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement set a timeline to remove all U.S. forces by May 2021. Nothing should derail progress toward bringing all U.S. troops home by that deadline.

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U.S. foreign policy priorities for the next four years

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U.S. foreign policy priorities for the next four years

The next four years are an opportunity for the U.S. to pursue a new, more realistic foreign policy. In addition to the urgent task of ending endless wars, the U.S. should focus on narrow missions in the Middle East to thwart anti-U.S. terror threats. In Europe, the U.S. should shift burdens to NATO members. And in East Asia, it should encourage allies to invest in defensive capabilities to strengthen deterrence. In all, abandoning the failed status quo in favor of a foreign policy based on restraint will mean a stronger America with more security at less cost and risk.

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The case for withdrawing from the Middle East

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The case for withdrawing from the Middle East

Nothing about the Middle East warrants an enduring U.S. military presence there. Of the few important interests there—preventing major terrorist attacks, stopping the emergence of a market-making oil hegemon, curbing nuclear proliferation, and ensuring no regional actor destroys Israel—not one requires a permanent garrison of American troops. The roughly 60,000 U.S. military personnel in the region should come home.

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Scenarios for post-U.S. Afghanistan

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Scenarios for post-U.S. Afghanistan

No matter what Afghanistan’s future holds, the U.S. will remain fundamentally safe. Local forces can contain any terrorism originating there, and the U.S. global capability to remotely monitor and strike terrorists will remain potent. A U.S. exit reduces our burdens and pressures nearby powers—some of them U.S. rivals—to invest more in Afghanistan’s stability. No likely outcome should slow a complete military withdrawal by the end of April 2021.

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Debunking the safe haven myth

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Debunking the safe haven myth

The U.S. rightly went to war in Afghanistan after 9/11 to decimate Al-Qaeda and punish the Taliban. Following a swift victory, however, the mission transformed into a nation building venture, doomed to strategic failure, that has continued for more than 18 years. U.S. leaders incorrectly feared the failure of the Kabul government could create a safe haven for terrorists. But the U.S. is safe from terrorism because of its capability to gather intelligence on, and strike, anti-U.S. terrorists anywhere. This capability has only grown more sophisticated since 9/11. As tragic as it is, violence in Afghanistan should not be confused with U.S. security—and it should not slow the overdue withdrawal of all U.S. forces.

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Dealing with the remnants of ISIS

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Dealing with the remnants of ISIS

The U.S. should not keep troops in Syria and Iraq to fight ISIS’s remnants. ISIS’s loss of territory left its fighters operating in small groups, struggling to survive, and devastated its capacity to plot attacks. Local forces—Syria, Iraq, Kurds, Iran, and Shia militias—eagerly attack ISIS’s remnants. Misgovernment and sectarian divides might allow ISIS or some other radical Sunni jihadist entity to regain capability. But deployed U.S. forces do little to prevent that and risk sparking war with Iran or another state. If an ISIS dangerous to the U.S. does re-emerge, U.S. airstrikes and local allies can again target it.

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Keeping U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria courts war

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Keeping U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria courts war

Maximum pressure is an escalation strategy that courts war with Iran. It has already led to direct U.S.-Iran conflict and leaves U.S. soldiers in Iraq and Syria especially vulnerable to Iranian reprisals. Instead of the U.S. dictating the terms of engagement, keeping U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria allows Iran and other adversaries to target Americans at will. The likelihood for American fatalities to trigger a prolonged and costly war with Iran, combined with growing local hostility to the U.S. presence, makes it imperative to withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq and Syria.

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Counter anti-U.S. terror threats with targeted raids, not permanent occupations

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Counter anti-U.S. terror threats with targeted raids, not permanent occupations

The death of ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi during a U.S. special forces raid follows the decisive military victory over ISIS’s caliphate. The raid’s success highlights U.S. intelligence capabilities—the globe’s most robust and well-funded—to locate anti-U.S. terrorists and the military’s ability to strike targets anywhere in the world, even without a local presence. With ISIS’s caliphate destroyed, the U.S. military mission is over. The U.S. should avoid being ensnared in another permanent policing mission, and instead methodically withdraw all remaining forces from Syria.