China has the world’s largest navy, but there are important questions about its ability to contest the United States on a global scale. To do so, China would need more overseas bases than the two it currently has in Djibouti and Cambodia. Similarly, its aircraft carriers cannot sustain high-tempo aviation operations beyond the First Island Chain for an extended period. Developing super-quiet attack submarines would markedly improve China’s ability to conduct blue-water operations. However, to date, China has not fielded submarines that match the technological capabilities of U.S. boats. A careful examination of China’s naval strength shows that while it is well-positioned to wage a war close to its shores, the PLAN is not a global peer of the U.S. Navy.
Despite Russia’s recent capture of Avdiivka, the war in Ukraine is entering its third year at a relative stalemate. Major changes to the 600-mile long frontline are few and far between, with Ukraine and Russia finding offensive warfare costly and resource-intensive. At the same time, neither side is willing to compromise on its maximalist aims, making talks on a ceasefire or end-of-war settlement remote. Yet with additional U.S. military aid to Ukraine stalled in Congress, questions arise as to how long the U.S. can maintain the status quo—and whether it even should. This brief argues that U.S. policy toward Ukraine and Europe overall is in need of significant reform. A combination of defensive security aid to the Ukrainian military, real burden-sharing in Europe and avoiding firm U.S. defense commitments to Ukraine has a better chance of accomplishing the limited U.S. interests at stake with less risk and at reasonable cost.
The Israel-Saudi normalization deal is still alive and still could be a bad deal for the United States. The war in Gaza has pushed the sweeping U.S.-backed diplomatic normalization deal between Saudi Arabia and Israel to the back burner, but both governments are likely to try to revive it at some point. This brief examines the drivers of the normalization deal, analyzes the case for and against it from the perspective of U.S. interests, and concludes that it is not worth much to Americans—nothing like the reported concessions the United States was prepared to make. Security guarantees for Saudi Arabia in particular should be avoided.
The Israel-Hamas conflict shows little signs of slowing down, and the risk of a wider war remains credible. This brief examines and addresses the complex dynamics at play that could cause the crisis to expand, and it clearly defines parameters for how the U.S. should navigate the conflict. Washington should avoid direct U.S. military involvement, work with all parties to prevent escalation, and redeploy troops out of Syria—and eventually Iraq—which denies Iran leverage for broadening the war.
The balance of power in East Asia has shifted in China's favor, but it does not follow that China constitutes a major threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of all neighboring states. As DEFP Non-Resident Fellow Peter Harris argues in a new explainer, upholding peace and stability in East Asia does not require U.S. military primacy. U.S. efforts to dominate the region could backfire by intensifying the U.S.-China rivalry and plunging East Asia into a new cold war. A more sensible approach would be to move toward an offshore balancing posture that incentivizes capable regional states to provide for their own defense and deter Chinese aggression.
The U.S. was right to leave Afghanistan. By withdrawing militarily from the country, the U.S. extracted itself from a costly war that did not protect Americans from terrorism or help Afghanistan transition to a healthy democracy. Now, with the resources freed up by withdrawal, the U.S. is better able to honor commitments elsewhere and invest at home.
The United States should apply the lessons learned in Afghanistan to Syria and pull out its ground forces. President Biden noted two key reasons for exiting Afghanistan: military missions should have achievable objectives and strikes and raids from afar, instead of permanent occupation, are sufficient to thwart foreign terrorism against United States. Both conditions also apply to Syria, where the original mission to dismantle ISIS’s territorial caliphate, once achieved, morphed into an open-ended campaign with murky objectives divorced from U.S. security and from counterterrorism.
The U.S. security interest in Afghanistan is unchanged after it ended its nearly 20-year occupation: defend against terrorists with the capability and intent to strike the U.S. To aid its counterterrorism goals, the U.S. could take steps to ease some sanctions and restrictions on the Taliban. This would also help relieve an economic crisis which threatens to starve many Afghans, who should not be punished for their government’s past sins
The Biden administration has three options in Afghanistan: (1) keep the U.S. commitment to exit by May 1; (2) prolong the war by breaking the U.S.-Taliban agreement; or (3) prolong the war by attempting to negotiate with the Taliban for an extension. Withdrawing by May 1 is optimal. The U.S. can better secure its counterterrorism goals while not imperiling U.S. troops in Afghanistan any longer, or spending billions of dollars more on a conflict two decades of evidence shows is futile and wasteful to perpetuate.
Plans to reduce U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan and Iraq to 2,500 are responsible—it would be irresponsible not to continue to zero. The ongoing U.S. military occupations are costly mistakes that come at the expense of higher defense priorities. In Afghanistan, the February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement set a timeline to remove all U.S. forces by May 2021. Nothing should derail progress toward bringing all U.S. troops home by that deadline.
The next four years are an opportunity for the U.S. to pursue a new, more realistic foreign policy. In addition to the urgent task of ending endless wars, the U.S. should focus on narrow missions in the Middle East to thwart anti-U.S. terror threats. In Europe, the U.S. should shift burdens to NATO members. And in East Asia, it should encourage allies to invest in defensive capabilities to strengthen deterrence. In all, abandoning the failed status quo in favor of a foreign policy based on restraint will mean a stronger America with more security at less cost and risk.
No matter what Afghanistan’s future holds, the U.S. will remain fundamentally safe. Local forces can contain any terrorism originating there, and the U.S. global capability to remotely monitor and strike terrorists will remain potent. A U.S. exit reduces our burdens and pressures nearby powers—some of them U.S. rivals—to invest more in Afghanistan’s stability. No likely outcome should slow a complete military withdrawal by the end of April 2021.
The U.S. rightly went to war in Afghanistan after 9/11 to decimate Al-Qaeda and punish the Taliban. Following a swift victory, however, the mission transformed into a nation building venture, doomed to strategic failure, that has continued for more than 18 years. U.S. leaders incorrectly feared the failure of the Kabul government could create a safe haven for terrorists. But the U.S. is safe from terrorism because of its capability to gather intelligence on, and strike, anti-U.S. terrorists anywhere. This capability has only grown more sophisticated since 9/11. As tragic as it is, violence in Afghanistan should not be confused with U.S. security—and it should not slow the overdue withdrawal of all U.S. forces.
Following 9/11, the United States was right to target Al-Qaeda and the Taliban government which harbored them—that was a justified, achievable mission. After a swift victory and the establishment of a new, popular Afghan government, policymakers should have removed U.S. troops. Instead, Washington pursued a nation-building effort to establish a central authority to govern all of Afghanistan—a goal unrelated to the core security interests that justified the initial campaign and impossible to achieve at reasonable cost. After nearly 18 years of war and our key goals accomplished long ago, it is past time to withdraw all U.S. forces to focus on vital national security interests.
The U.S. was right to punish and deter Al-Qaeda and the Taliban for harboring them following 9/11. But after swift victory, Washington transformed the mission to an unnecessary, costly nation-building effort. The outlines of a U.S.-Taliban agreement rest on four pillars: (1) the Taliban renounce Al-Qaeda and all terrorists, (2) a cease-fire covering all parties, (3) the Taliban agree to negotiate with the Afghan government, and (4) the U.S. military will draw down its forces. But only a full withdrawal is necessary for U.S. security, and that requires no agreement with the Taliban.
