The dangers of letting blustery rhetoric dictate US policy in Ukraine

By Ben Friedman

If you were worried that the Biden administration’s strategy toward the war in Ukraine has us drifting closer to catastrophic escalation in service — not of core U.S. interests — but of unrealistic dreams of an outright battlefield victory for Ukraine, I have bad news: it may be worse than that. Biden and company may be steering toward trouble they see clearly, but for whatever reason will not avoid, as a recent article in the Washington Post detailed:

“Privately, U.S. officials say neither Russia nor Ukraine is capable of winning the war outright, but they have ruled out the idea of pushing or even nudging Ukraine to the negotiating table. They say they do not know what the end of the war looks like, or how it might end or when, insisting that is up to Kyiv.”

If accurate, this quote means that the administration’s take on the war is similar to that of most experts: that despite the impressive weakness Russia has shown lately, it could manage to dig in, and with the help of locals and draftees, prevent Ukraine from retaking the rest of the Donbas region, at least anytime soon. But Ukraine’s chances of success there are far greater than in Crimea, which is easier for Russia to defend and more likely to elicit defense by tactical nuclear weapons.

The quote, again if accurate, would also mean the Biden administration shares the view of its dovish critics, who contend that the effect of U.S. policy toward the war in Ukraine is to prolong it. With billions in aid, we could be encouraging Ukraine to try to win outright rather than use its presently strong battlefield position to negotiate the war’s end, with the sacrifices of some territory, certainly Crimea, and neutrality that will almost inevitably entail.

This piece was originally published in Responsible Statecraft on October 14, 2022. Read more HERE.