By Benjamin H. Friedman and Justin Logan
Finland announced last week that it will apply for membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and neighboring Sweden may soon follow suit. To most Western commentators, this is great news. Finland and Sweden are prizes for NATO’s side and their membership serves as a new way to punish Russian aggression. The preference in most NATO capitals, especially Washington, seems to be more for a coronation than a debate that evaluates the costs and benefits of allying with these states.
The case for Finland is especially problematic. Washington should withhold its support, at least until existing European allies make a convincing case that they will bear any added burden. The United States can have good and mutually beneficial relations with Finland without threatening nuclear annihilation of Russians—the core promise on which NATO runs—on its behalf. Nor does it leave Finland very insecure: Finland’s long-time neutrality has been a great security success, and it is still safe.
Finland’s desire to join NATO is understandable. Its president, Sauli Niinistö, answered Russian claims that Finnish accession would threaten Russian security by shooting back, “you caused this. Look in the mirror.” It’s a story as old as time: When the world looks scarier, countries reach for more security by heightening their own defenses and/or joining alliances. But Finland’s interests are not the same as other NATO countries’, and its prospective benefits to the alliance, particularly to the United States, are small and outweighed by costs.
This piece was originally published in The National Interest on May 22, 2022. Read more HERE.