President Trump’s much-anticipated trip to China yielded few concrete outcomes while demonstrating both powers’ desire to stabilize the relationship.
What does the visit mean for U.S.-China relations?
In this DEFP Q&A, Asia Program Director Lyle Goldstein unpacks the takeaways from Trump’s summit with Chinese leader Xi Jinping. (This interview has been lightly edited for clarity. Watch the full interview here.)
Did China offer to help solve the Iran conflict?
Goldstein: Iran was definitely the elephant in the room. We don’t have much concrete information about what transpired. Trump mentioned that Xi said China would not send weapons to Iran and Xi agreed with the U.S. position that there should be no Iranian-run toll system for the Strait of Hormuz.
The Chinese commitments seemed opaque at best—but that doesn’t mean there’s nothing there. There could have been some sort of gentlemen’s agreement. China wants the strait open, and it’s quite credible that China did say it opposes tolls. The real question is how far China is willing to go to influence Iran in a positive direction. I have doubts, considering, for example, how China has dealt with North Korea. China seems very reluctant to exercise pressure and influence in these kinds of situations. Chinese diplomacy typically uses carrots to move forward slowly, but doesn’t push too quickly. So I don’t think we should expect much.
But China can be helpful on the margins, and it does have significant influence over Tehran, as it does with other regional actors like Pakistan, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. Let’s not forget that in 2023, Beijing brokered an impressive agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran. They do have a track record of helping to solve problems through practical, step-by-step mediation. I’m not altogether pessimistic, but I’m also not expecting China to solve the conflict in Iran.
How did Xi and Trump approach the Taiwan question?
Goldstein: Much of the commentary in the U.S. press and among American experts has tended to suggest that Xi’s comments on Taiwan—when he said that if the situation was mishandled, it would lead to conflict—were over the top and set a bad tone for the meeting. I don’t see it that way at all. The Taiwan issue absolutely had to be addressed. For Xi Jinping and his colleagues at the top of the Chinese government, Taiwan is the core of their core interests.
I would have preferred to see a set of grand bargains that would take us to a much more peaceful place, but the reality is that’s quite unlikely. What is possible is this type of high-level dialogue between the two leaders discussing each other’s priorities. Washington’s priority right now is Iran, but Beijing’s priority for decades has been reunification with Taiwan. In fact, the very foundation of modern U.S.-China relations has been mutual understanding on Taiwan.
Xi’s language was certainly tough. He alluded to the possibility of conflict, and he urged the U.S. to be extremely cautious. But that’s just common sense—we’re talking about two nuclear-armed superpowers. Like with the Iran issue, I would have liked to see something more concrete, such as an agreement on reciprocal de-escalation regarding Chinese exercises around Taiwan and U.S. arms sales and deployments to Taiwan, which have only been growing. Still, there are hopeful trends—including the fact that these leaders are talking—and I’m more optimistic than I was six months ago.
How would you assess the state of U.S.-China relations today?
Goldstein: I’m cautiously optimistic—things could be far worse. In Trump’s first administration, China hawks like Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and National Security Adviser John Bolton sent U.S.-China relations into a spiral of instability and put us on a course for war. We’re still recovering from the damage that was done during that period. Even though Trump’s second administration does have some China hawks, we’ve seen some course corrections.
It’s very interesting to consider how those changes came about. In response to U.S. tariffs, China announced in October 2025 that it would expand restrictions on the export of rare earths to the U.S. That move ultimately led to the one-year trade truce between the countries. It’s hard to think of another country standing up to U.S. pressure like that. I’ve spoken with many in China who see it as a world-historical moment.
The U.S. should also take stock of that moment and what it means. Perhaps it indicates that both sides should come together as equals and see how they can manage the relationship. Neither Washington nor Beijing really holds any decisive cards. Both sides have points of pressure on the other. With that realization, the U.S. and China should move forward in an equal and mature way.
It seems to me that Trump has taken this on board. He has often made favorable comments about China and U.S.-China relations and does not seem to have bought into a Cold War mentality. The Trump administration’s biggest weakness on China is that it doesn’t seem able to define and deploy a consistent approach or to give the relationship the priority it deserves. Look at this summit as an example. The U.S. team seemed unprepared to make major compromises or to address important issues because of the U.S. focus on the war in Iran.
Overall, U.S.-China relations are in a better place, and the Trump administration has done a somewhat better job than I would have thought. Nonetheless, it’s still a very tense relationship. Both militaries are still earnestly preparing for the possibility of war. Both sides need to work harder to stabilize the relationship and reach concrete compromises on difficult issues like Taiwan, the South China Sea, the Korean Peninsula, and strategic arms talks—and that’s just the security side. There are many economic issues as well, and they are equally complicated. Both sides need to roll up their sleeves and keep making progress.
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