Taiwan is the most dangerous flashpoint between the United States and China, one that could even portend nuclear war between the two superpowers. But some observers consider the island a formidable stronghold, with challenging terrain that could deter China from invading.
But what are the prospects for a successful Chinese invasion of Taiwan and how prepared is Taiwan to defend itself?
In this Q&A, Defense Priorities Asia Program Director Lyle Goldstein, the author of a five-part explainer series on Taiwan, discusses the feasibility of a Taiwan invasion and what the United States could and should do in such a scenario.
Based on China’s capabilities, how realistic is it to expect that Beijing could successfully invade Taiwan in the next few years?
Goldstein: To be realistic, we should consider this as a decently high probability. The Chinese armed forces have focused on this scenario for decades and have been ready for some time. The keys to the scenario are proximity and will.
Given that Taiwan is just 100 miles off the coast of China, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) can use all aspects of China’s substantial power, including its three armed services, but also powerful non-regular forces, such as the large China Coast Guard and People’s Armed Police. The PLA can deliver immense firepower against the island, using ballistic and cruise missiles, drones, and even rocket artillery. Its large air force is also ready to deliver precision strikes with glide bombs and other munitions.
As Taiwan is being pounded from the air, China is likely to deploy a massive force of helicopters and transport aircraft to deliver tens of thousands of special forces and paratroopers into the rear of the island’s defenses.
These steps could go forward with minimal warning. Given China’s advanced infrastructure and immense ports—the largest and most efficient in the world—it is likely that the invasion force could be ready in a matter of a few days.
Taiwan’s defenders could not be certain where China intends to land and would have difficulty distinguishing the main force from mere feints. Far from the fortress some imagine, Taiwan is lightly defended due to historically low defense spending and a high quality of life.
Even if successful, an invasion would be enormously costly for China. How might Beijing weigh these costs against its goal of “national rejuvenation”?
Goldstein: It is certainly true that China would likely pay substantial costs if it opts for an invasion or chooses to coerce Taiwan using military force. These costs could amount to hundreds of thousands of casualties, a disruptive war that could drag on for months or even years, and a prolonged period of diplomatic and economic isolation akin to Russia’s treatment after it invaded Ukraine. Such costs are indeed daunting, and many observers have suggested that the Chinese ruling party could even risk its legitimacy by gambling under such circumstances.
But historically, China has been willing to take substantial risks and pay enormous costs to maintain its territorial integrity and combat nearby threats. While Beijing has thankfully not resorted to the large-scale use of force against its neighbors in recent years, its position on Taiwan has changed little since 1949.
Many Americans do not realize that Taiwan has been the central roadblock to improving U.S.-China relations. Even after the initial rapprochement between Beijing and Washington in 1971–72, it took until 1979 to reach an agreement on formal diplomatic relations, precisely because China wanted to ensure that the United States was withdrawing its previously extensive military forces (including nuclear weaponry) from Taiwan.
The PLA kept shelling Taiwan-held offshore islands until 1979. The Korean War has likewise shown that China will fight to keep hostile forces away from its borders and that it’s willing to challenge the U.S. directly, if necessary.
A final point to understand is that Taiwan is directly connected to Chinese nationalism thanks to Japan’s occupation of the island from 1895 to 1945. It is well known among Chinese scholars that Japan’s aggression against China served as the main crucible for fostering Chinese national consciousness in modern history. So Taiwan’s recovery is in turn viewed as the ultimate symbol of redressing historical wrongs against China. That very strong current of Chinese nationalism could, unfortunately, lead Beijing to take substantial risks in a Taiwan scenario.
Many observers argue that a Taiwan invasion is likely a losing prospect for China and even that a U.S. intervention against China could be a success. What are those arguments missing?
Goldstein: Such arguments are missing both basic fundamentals and nuances. Starting with the basics, it should be understood that in a U.S.-China war over Taiwan, we are comparing a Chinese logistics supply line of 100–200 miles versus 5,000–8,000 miles for the United States. That glaring asymmetry is mostly all one needs to know. Yet there are additional nuances worth exploring.
- Taiwan is very vulnerable to a blockade. Where Ukraine, for example, has long borders with NATO states that allow for resupply, the same is not true of Taiwan.
- The Taiwan Strait is very shallow, generally less than 100 meters. That suggests it is not amenable to submarine operations and can also be mined to keep U.S. and allied submarines away from a Chinese amphibious armada.
- Taiwan is often said to be so mountainous as to make it a “natural fortress,” but its mountains are on the eastern side of the island. This would complicate an invasion on Taiwan’s eastern beaches, but China is unlikely to attempt an attack from the east because alternative attack vectors make more sense.
Moreover, the PLA has been extremely effective in mountain warfare (e.g., the Korean War and Sino-Indian War) and would most certainly use Taiwan’s extensive mountains to its advantage. Chinese strategists noted, for example, that in the Falklands War, the UK sought beaches surrounded by mountains, since they are useful for protecting an initial lodgment area from counterattack.
It’s been said that Taiwan’s geography is not conducive to armored maneuver warfare. That’s quite true, but the Chinese understand this well and have developed their doctrine accordingly, with a focus on basic infantry tactics, urban warfare, airpower, and drones.
Why is Taiwan so unprepared for a cross-strait war?
Goldstein: Taiwan has made some good investments in the last few years, including in Stingers and Javelins, the same asymmetric weapons that have proven successful in the Russia-Ukraine War. Still, the larger picture is not particularly encouraging. Entrenched interests, both in Taipei and in Washington, have made bountiful riches from the trade in showy weapons like F-16 fighters and old U.S. frigates. These weapons will be all but useless against the PLA firepower onslaught.
Runways will be destroyed, preventing Taiwan fighters from ever taking off, while the bulk of Taiwan’s navy is expected to be destroyed at the pier or otherwise bottled up in port. Some of Taiwan’s most extravagant projects, whether building submarines or large amphibious ships or anti-submarine aircraft, defy any coherent strategic explanation.
Beyond profit, there is a long-standing and deeply entrenched bias in Taiwan toward the so-called elite service branches of the Air Force and the Navy, while ground forces have been neglected for decades. It is unclear whether the buildup of mobile, ground-based anti-ship missiles will be effective. Similarly, the new focus on recapitalizing Taiwan’s armored forces may not reflect changes in warfare that are demonstrating the vulnerability of such systems.
More fundamentally, Taiwan has resisted total militarization, despite some talk about “whole of society resilience.” Taipei’s leaders seem to hope that, on the one hand, China would not dare attack, and on the other, the United States would “send in the cavalry” as necessary. Neither assumption is justified.
It’s quite understandable that people in Taiwan do not want to massively fortify their island. A relatively simple and cheap fix is to reorganize military reserve training to make these formations more robust. But there seems to be little appetite in Taiwan for adopting the level of militarization that genuine defense would require against a rising superpower just 100 miles away
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