All of Europe and not a few Americans are breathing a sigh of relief after President Donald Trump’s January speech in Davos, Switzerland, in which he ruled out the use of force to secure Greenland. To say that this crisis was on the cusp of prompting the deepest Trans-Atlantic breach in decades is an understatement. That is doubly the case, since 24 hours prior it was reported that Danish troops were reinforcing their geographically huge, but sparsely populated island colony in North America, setting up what heretofore had been an impossible-to-imagine armed conflict between NATO allies. The future of European security is ripe for extended debate and no doubt this will be occurring in 2026 and beyond. Some have already pointed out that a silver lining of present U.S.-Europe fractures could be that it forces Europeans to take their own security with greater seriousness. However, the issue of Arctic security, along with Greenland’s specific role in that region, also deserves closer scrutiny. Indeed, U.S. maritime strategists must focus on this question, since it will undoubtedly impact the future shape, structure, doctrine, and deployments of the U.S. Navy in coming decades. However, evidence from a new book-length investigation on China-Russia cooperation in the maritime domain makes clear that the naval threat to the Arctic and Greenland from this quasi-alliance is actually minimal. To claim otherwise reflects unfortunate tendencies in Washington and elsewhere toward threat inflation.
Many arguments have been put forward regarding the imperative for the United States to control Greenland for its national security. Such arguments are not all outlandish and have a firm basis in both history and geography. It should be sufficient to simply recall the island’s crucial role in U.S. military operations during World War II, both to win the Battle of the Atlantic and to transfer massive fighting power safely to Europe.
Putting the issue of resource exploitation aside, another key aspect of the White House argument concerns the future construction of the “Golden Dome” to better protect the United States from air and missile attack. Some efforts in this regard are perhaps warranted, but the fact that both China and Russia now seem to possess ample nuclear weaponry that use myriad penetration aids (e.g. multiple independent reentry vehicles [MIRVs], decoys, and non-elliptical flight paths) as well as the ability to substantially alternate attack routes may cast doubt on this plan. Of course, it is worth underlining that the United States already has a missile-tracking station on Greenland and could add more under the existing 1951 Treaty governing U.S. military deployments to the island.
Author
