China has the world’s largest navy, but there are important questions about its ability to contest the United States on a global scale. To do so, China would need more overseas bases than the two it currently has in Djibouti and Cambodia. Similarly, its aircraft carriers cannot sustain high-tempo aviation operations beyond the First Island Chain for an extended period. Developing super-quiet attack submarines would markedly improve China’s ability to conduct blue-water operations. However, to date, China has not fielded submarines that match the technological capabilities of U.S. boats. A careful examination of China’s naval strength shows that while it is well-positioned to wage a war close to its shores, the PLAN is not a global peer of the U.S. Navy.
Despite Russia’s recent capture of Avdiivka, the war in Ukraine is entering its third year at a relative stalemate. Major changes to the 600-mile long frontline are few and far between, with Ukraine and Russia finding offensive warfare costly and resource-intensive. At the same time, neither side is willing to compromise on its maximalist aims, making talks on a ceasefire or end-of-war settlement remote. Yet with additional U.S. military aid to Ukraine stalled in Congress, questions arise as to how long the U.S. can maintain the status quo—and whether it even should. This brief argues that U.S. policy toward Ukraine and Europe overall is in need of significant reform. A combination of defensive security aid to the Ukrainian military, real burden-sharing in Europe and avoiding firm U.S. defense commitments to Ukraine has a better chance of accomplishing the limited U.S. interests at stake with less risk and at reasonable cost.
The Israel-Saudi normalization deal is still alive and still could be a bad deal for the United States. The war in Gaza has pushed the sweeping U.S.-backed diplomatic normalization deal between Saudi Arabia and Israel to the back burner, but both governments are likely to try to revive it at some point. This brief examines the drivers of the normalization deal, analyzes the case for and against it from the perspective of U.S. interests, and concludes that it is not worth much to Americans—nothing like the reported concessions the United States was prepared to make. Security guarantees for Saudi Arabia in particular should be avoided.
The Israel-Hamas conflict shows little signs of slowing down, and the risk of a wider war remains credible. This brief examines and addresses the complex dynamics at play that could cause the crisis to expand, and it clearly defines parameters for how the U.S. should navigate the conflict. Washington should avoid direct U.S. military involvement, work with all parties to prevent escalation, and redeploy troops out of Syria—and eventually Iraq—which denies Iran leverage for broadening the war.
The balance of power in East Asia has shifted in China's favor, but it does not follow that China constitutes a major threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of all neighboring states. As DEFP Non-Resident Fellow Peter Harris argues in a new explainer, upholding peace and stability in East Asia does not require U.S. military primacy. U.S. efforts to dominate the region could backfire by intensifying the U.S.-China rivalry and plunging East Asia into a new cold war. A more sensible approach would be to move toward an offshore balancing posture that incentivizes capable regional states to provide for their own defense and deter Chinese aggression.
The Israel-Hamas conflict shows little signs of slowing down, and the risk of a wider war remains credible. This brief examines and addresses the complex dynamics at play that could cause the crisis to expand, and it clearly defines parameters for how the U.S. should navigate the conflict. Washington should avoid direct U.S. military involvement, work with all parties to prevent escalation, and redeploy troops out of Syria—and eventually Iraq—which denies Iran leverage for broadening the war.
U.S.-Iran nuclear diplomacy is on the brink of collapse. A year after President Trump withdrew from the JCPOA, Iran restarted and advanced its nuclear program. Despite re-engaging with Tehran diplomatically, the Biden administration has so far failed to revive the JCPOA in large part because the administration continues its predecessor’s approach of maximum pressure. If the administration doesn’t shift course, it will likely destroy the JCPOA, and Iran will move toward a bomb. This predictable failure, however, would not justify preventive military strikes that could result in U.S.-Iran war.
Supporters of the U.S. “maximum pressure” strategy on Iran said sanctions would compel Tehran to accede to U.S. demands, but the strategy failed. Iran resumed enriching uranium at higher levels and increased its aggression in the Middle East. The U.S. can offer some relief from specific sanctions now, unwinding the failed strategy and helping to return both sides to compliance with the JCPOA. No matter what happens in current nuclear talks, however, U.S.-Iran diplomacy should continue, and the U.S. should avoid unnecessary war with Iran.
There are practical constraints on the military and strategic value of Iran building a nuclear arsenal. At least initially, the arsenal would be significantly limited in the number of warheads and weapon yield. The process itself would likely necessitate other provocative and detectable steps, such as Iran restarting its heavy water reactor at Arak or conducting nuclear testing. And even with a weapon, Iran’s ability to reliably deliver it by missile—against Israel, for example—is not certain.
U.S. forces deployed to Iraq in 2014 to help annihilate ISIS’s territorial caliphate there, which was achieved more than three years ago. No core U.S. interest today requires a military presence in Iraq. The U.S. can minimize the risks of war, dissolve unnecessary commitments, and focus on higher priorities by withdrawing the remaining 2,500 troops and allowing Iraqi security forces to take responsibility for Iraq’s security.
U.S. forces originally deployed to Syria to help annihilate ISIS’s territorial caliphate, which was achieved more than two years ago. No core U.S. interest today requires a military presence in Syria. Maintaining the current deployment needlessly prolongs the civil war, exacerbates suffering there as a result of the war's continuation, and risks drawing the U.S. into wider conflict.
The U.S. military presence in Iraq and Syria—unnecessary after the collapse of ISIS’s territorial caliphate—is today part of an unsuccessful compellence strategy against Iran. It is a potential “tripwire” that could cause an escalation toward a larger and needless conflict. A full U.S. military withdrawal would reduce the risks of war and aid President Biden’s efforts to pursue diplomacy with Iran and salvage the 2015 nuclear deal.
The U.S. and Saudi Arabia are not treaty allies and never have been. Moreover, today the U.S. can meet its narrow interests in the Middle East without providing unconditional support to Saudi Arabia. Catering excessively to the kingdom’s demands, supporting its foreign policy, and stationing U.S. troops on Saudi soil undermine U.S. interests. Instead, the U.S. should recalibrate Saudi relations to maintain a less accommodating, more balanced and business-like relationship.
The Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” strategy against Iran was supposed to lead to a better nuclear deal and moderate Iran’s foreign policy. It has achieved the opposite, with diplomacy halted and tensions spiking across an array of areas. Instead of continuing with maximum pressure, the Biden administration should set a new strategy, one based on deterrence and diplomacy. Restoring the nuclear deal offers a natural place to begin, but it should build from there to reflect that U.S. interests are limited and easily achieved.
Over four years, the U.S. could reduce its presence in the Middle East by as many as 50,000 military personnel, mainly by drawing down its forces in four key states—Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE—and ending regular deployments to the region by carrier battle groups. Moving to the region’s periphery—drawing on existing bases and access agreements with Jordan and Oman—could position the U.S. to return to a role as offshore balancer with an option to completely withdraw from the region.
Two U.S. administrations in a row have supported the Saudi-led coalition’s intervention in Yemen’s civil war, a violent caldron for local and regional grievances. U.S. participation in this war prolongs it; exacerbates human suffering; and gives the main U.S. concern in Yemen, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, greater space to operate. Involvement in this proxy war undermines U.S. interests and values—ending our support would encourage Saudi Arabia to settle and help end the conflict.
The next four years are an opportunity for the U.S. to pursue a new, more realistic foreign policy. In addition to the urgent task of ending endless wars, the U.S. should focus on narrow missions in the Middle East to thwart anti-U.S. terror threats. In Europe, the U.S. should shift burdens to NATO members. And in East Asia, it should encourage allies to invest in defensive capabilities to strengthen deterrence. In all, abandoning the failed status quo in favor of a foreign policy based on restraint will mean a stronger America with more security at less cost and risk.
Nothing about the Middle East warrants an enduring U.S. military presence there. Of the few important interests there—preventing major terrorist attacks, stopping the emergence of a market-making oil hegemon, curbing nuclear proliferation, and ensuring no regional actor destroys Israel—not one requires a permanent garrison of American troops. The roughly 60,000 U.S. military personnel in the region should come home.
The U.S. should not keep troops in Syria and Iraq to fight ISIS’s remnants. ISIS’s loss of territory left its fighters operating in small groups, struggling to survive, and devastated its capacity to plot attacks. Local forces—Syria, Iraq, Kurds, Iran, and Shia militias—eagerly attack ISIS’s remnants. Misgovernment and sectarian divides might allow ISIS or some other radical Sunni jihadist entity to regain capability. But deployed U.S. forces do little to prevent that and risk sparking war with Iran or another state. If an ISIS dangerous to the U.S. does re-emerge, U.S. airstrikes and local allies can again target it.
Maximum pressure is an escalation strategy that courts war with Iran. It has already led to direct U.S.-Iran conflict and leaves U.S. soldiers in Iraq and Syria especially vulnerable to Iranian reprisals. Instead of the U.S. dictating the terms of engagement, keeping U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria allows Iran and other adversaries to target Americans at will. The likelihood for American fatalities to trigger a prolonged and costly war with Iran, combined with growing local hostility to the U.S. presence, makes it imperative to withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq and Syria.
The origins of the heightened crisis with Iran can be traced back to “maximum pressure,” the Saudi war in Yemen, and the broader Sunni-Shiite fight between Riyadh and Tehran. The recent attacks on Saudi Arabia’s oil infrastructure should come as no surprise. But it is a major warning to de-escalate. As realists predicted, economic sanctions are strangling Iran’s economy, but it is resulting in increasingly risky, belligerent behavior—the exact opposite of its intent. Any military response could spiral into a regional war. Unwinding economic sanctions and pursuing strong diplomacy would best safeguard U.S. interests.
Like most Middle East nations, Iran is guilty of malign behavior—but it is weak, regionally isolated, and unable to meaningfully project power. Its undesirable local activities pose no direct threat to the United States, and it lacks the capability to cause significant disruptions to the flow of oil. The threat Iran does pose is easily checked by its more powerful neighbors. “Maximum pressure” is a risky strategy that could provoke a war instead of negotiations. Normalizing relations with Iran would enhance U.S. security, extricate the U.S. from the region’s disputes, and avoid a potentially catastrophic war.
