Last week, President Donald Trump said he was extending the ceasefire with Iran until “discussions are concluded.” Meanwhile, Iran continues to assert control over the Strait of Hormuz, amid an attempted U.S. blockade of Iranian shipping. With talks at an impasse, Iran on Sunday offered a new proposal to the U.S. to open the Strait and end the war, while postponing nuclear negotiations.
In this DEFP Q&A, Policy Director Ben Friedman discusses what the U.S. should do next and examines the lessons of this war. (This interview has been lightly edited for clarity. Watch the full interview here.)
What should the U.S. do amid the deadlock in negotiations?
Friedman: The U.S. has no real interests at play in this war in Iran, except for a problem we caused by launching the war: the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and its effect on oil and gas prices. That problem doesn’t need to be solved, but it would be better if it was. The Iranians have apparently offered to reopen the strait if the U.S. ends its blockade and agrees to defer talks on other matters, including nuclear issues. That is the kind of deal the U.S. should be proposing.
Before the war, the U.S. could have had a good deal on Iran’s nuclear program, but Trump chose to bomb anyway. Now it’s going to be much harder, as a result of the war and Iran’s success in withstanding it, to get a deal on nuclear issues. But the U.S. doesn’t really need that kind of deal anyway. Iran’s strategy for a long time has been to move toward nuclear weapons without actually developing them in exchange for sanctions relief. Their nuclear program was decimated in the June 2025 U.S. strikes, and they’re not particularly close to having a nuke, whether or not they want one. It’s not something we need to solve right away, but maybe down the road we can get a deal. Even if we don’t, the U.S. can live with the results.
There are also calls to do something about Iran’s ballistic missiles. These are unreasonable demands, especially if Iran is not going to have nuclear weapons. Any state needs the ability to deter attack and to defend itself, and any Iranian government—even if they’re nice liberal people that we invent in a laboratory—is going to want that capability.
Iran has seen, as a result of this war and past strikes, that they need deterrent capability, so they’re not going to give up their missiles, and they can always rebuild them if we destroy them. The same arguments can be made for Iran’s so-called “proxies,” which they view as a deterrent they’re not going to give away as a result of being bombed. Perhaps in future talks, we could address that. But it’s not a major problem for the U.S., whatever Israel or the Gulf states think. It can be their problem.
If Iran’s recent proposal to open the strait doesn’t end the war—either because we don’t take the deal or they do not actually open it—then the U.S. should just walk away. Iran might impose a tariff on shipping through the strait, which wouldn’t be good because freedom of navigation is an important principle that benefits the United States. It would also be bad for the global economy and oil prices. But oil traffic would flow again. A tariff wouldn’t do much for the Iranian economy and it wouldn’t affect the balance of power in the region. It’s not ideal, but we can live with it.
The best deal would be to agree with the Iranians to reopen the strait and defer nuclear talks. The next best option is to just walk away. Continuing the war is, by far, the worst option.
How should the U.S. deal with potential spoilers, particularly Israel?
Friedman: If the Trump administration is going to get a deal that keeps the peace with Iran and reopens the strait, it has to be willing to be tougher on Israel than it’s been to this point. The furthest the Trump administration has gone was to impose a ceasefire in Lebanon—although Israel has been violating it—which allowed for the ceasefire with Iran. Trump talked tough and told the Israelis to cut it out in Lebanon, but he’s never really been willing to impose penalties on Israel.
Even past administrations haven’t been willing to punish Israel, which would mean taking away some of their aid and the military support we give, or at least threatening meaningfully to do so. If Trump won’t do that, what he says to them doesn’t really matter. The number one thing the U.S. needs to do to make a deal stick is to be tough with the Israelis. Otherwise, they can just restart the war, and then the Iranians won’t go along with a deal or won’t stick to it if they sign it in the first place.
Other potential spoilers include the Gulf states, particularly the UAE, which has become much more aggressive lately and broken off from Saudi Arabia in important ways. I don’t think those states will be a real problem in terms of restarting the war. They might push the United States to bomb Iran and have Washington solve their security problems for them, like getting rid of Iranian missiles so there’s no threat to Abu Dhabi or Dubai. But when push comes to shove, I think they’ll go along with the United States because they’ve never really shown the temerity to fight Iran on their own.
What lessons should policymakers take from the war?
Friedman: There are three big lessons, which we’ve learned before and need to relearn from this war.
The first lesson is about the limits of strategic air power. U.S. air power has not only failed to deliver the big political effects that President Trump and others hoped for, like inducing a popular uprising and regime change. It also hasn’t succeeded tactically, in the sense of destroying all the targets that we thought it might or that the Pentagon said they were aiming at.
The Iranians still have a significant missile capability, and the U.S. hasn’t knocked out their entire navy. Iran has plenty of capability left over, which is unsurprising based on past wars. There’s often a tendency to believe that technology has created magical solutions to long-standing problems. But this war reaffirms that’s not true and that you shouldn’t expect big results, even tactically—let alone goals like regime change—just by bombing people.
The second big lesson is closely related to the first: nationalism is a powerful force in international politics and it shouldn’t be underestimated. When you bomb people, they tend to reaffirm their identity and cheer for their government, even if they didn’t love that government before it was attacked. There’s a rally-around-the-flag effect because people feel a greater sense of common identity when they’re under attack.
The third big lesson is that our bases in the Middle East, and around the world, are increasingly vulnerable. There’s been a “precision revolution,” with missiles and air power becoming more accurate. That used to be something the United States mostly enjoyed alone, but other big powers later acquired that capability as well. Now it’s spread to countries like Iran, where they have missiles and drones that can target U.S. bases. It’s not just the accuracy; it’s the sheer number of missiles and particularly drones they can fire that make our bases a burden.
Because of these same technologies, U.S. air power and precision means we don’t actually need these bases as much, as longer-range strikes are just as effective. If you want to have wars like this—which we shouldn’t—it can be done with carriers and bombers, meaning local or regional bases are unnecessary.
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