The recent debate between Vice President Kamala Harris and the former President Donald Trump focused relatively little on foreign affairs. This was probably a good thing, as when the conversation finally did turn to foreign policy, both candidates reiterated an inherited and widespread belief that protecting vital U.S. interests depends on the perception that America is willing to wage war no matter how minor the interests, powerful the adversary, or distant the battlefield.
This shibboleth of the foreign policy elite is a version of the “domino theory,” which stipulated 50 years ago that if Vietnam fell to communism, other, more strategically significant states would soon follow. The experience of the Vietnam War and its aftermath should have disabused Americans of this superstition. Policymakers, afraid to lose face by admitting victory was impossible, pointlessly wreaked destruction on Southeast Asia.
Vietnam ultimately fell to communism and the United States was humbled, yet the other “dominoes”—Japan, South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, etc.—didn’t fall. Instead, Vietnam soon found itself at war with communist Cambodia and China. Over subsequent decades, Vietnam developed normal diplomatic relations and strong economic ties with the United States, and is now considered by Washington to be an important partner to counterbalance China.
The lure of domino theory, however, remains deeply ingrained among the foreign policy elite and the commentariat. Two examples from last week’s debate demonstrate its persistence.
Read at The American Conservative
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Events on Grand strategy
