During his speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos, President Donald Trump backed off his threats to use force to acquire Greenland and to impose tariffs on eight European countries who opposed a U.S. takeover of the island. Instead, it was announced that Trump had come to a “framework” agreement with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, which reportedly permits the United States to construct additional bases there. For the time being, this has allayed some immediate fears about an imminent military crisis between the U.S. and its NATO allies.
Yet even if the specifics of an agreement get settled—no sure thing given Trump’s propensity to change his mind and Denmark’s red-line on conceding to anything that undercuts their own sovereignty—the damage between Washington and its NATO allies may have already been done. By forcing allies to undergo routine demonstrations of servitude and rituals of humiliation, Trump risks overplaying his hand to the long-term detriment of U.S. power. The danger is not that the military alliance—which is already past its expiration date—might eventually come to an end, but that Washington will unnecessarily turn Europe and Canada into antagonists who feel compelled to balance against the United States.
Despite the outlines of an agreement and the beginning of negotiations on the details, Trump remains fixated on the notion of bringing Greenland under de facto U.S. control. This is equal parts baffling and unsurprising. Yes, the largely icebound island is strategically placed in the northeast Atlantic between Europe, North America, and the Arctic. Yes, Greenland also has deposits of critical minerals and fossil fuels that the United States, and Trump himself, covets. But the fundamentals were already on Washington’s side: the United States already effectively controls Greenland, which is covered by NATO’s Article 5 clause; Denmark was willing to significantly enhance U.S. access and influence on the island even before Trump opted for a strategy of coercion; and despite Trump’s claims to the contrary, Greenland faces no risk from Russia or China. Indeed, there is more Russian air and naval activity in the Bering Strait off the coast of Alaska than there is in the Arctic Circle.
Moreover, even if Trump acquired Greenland by purchase rather than force, only 17 per cent of Americans and 6 per cent of Greenlanders want the U.S. to possess the island. That brings a whole new set of delicate questions. Would the 56,000 or so residents of Greenland have full citizenship rights, or would they be held in permanent representational limbo like Puerto Rico and Guam? What would Trump do if Greenlanders tried to resist what they almost certainly would view as a colonial occupation? And shouldn’t incorporation into the United States require the consent of the governed, both current and prospective?
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